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Florida reformed its civil service system with the passage of the Service First Initiative of 
2001, resulting in a unique organizational setting by altering the employer-employee 
relationship, yet little academic research explored the power tactics used by politicians 
and political appointees in order to gain subordinate compliance in unique organizational 
environments. Using French and Raven’s bases of social power theory and Raven’s 
interpersonal power interaction model as the foundation, the primary purpose of this 
stratified cross-sectional study of politicians and political appointees in Florida was to 
explore whether certain demographic factors are predictors of the extent to which French 
and Raven’s “hard” and “soft” power tactics are used.  Survey data were collected using 
the interpersonal power inventory, political predisposition measure, and a self-developed 
demographic information form from 354 political appointees and state employees and 
were analyzed using simple multiple linear regression. Findings indicated the usage of 
the power tactics is consistent Ravens original research with influence agents preferring 
the soft power tactics over hard.  Findings also showed  that age and race (notably 
African American) are statically significant predictors of usage of soft power tactics of 
expert, referent, informational, the legitimacy of dependency, personal reward and harsh 
power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity and equity (p <.05). Positive 
social change implications resulting from this study include recommendations regarding 
development of leadership programs to reduce the reliance on the use of harsh power 
tactics in order to increase organizational and personal outcomes within Service First 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Background of the Study 
 The use of power is central to the ability of leaders to gain subordinate 
compliance to increase organizational outcomes (Pierro, Raven, Amato, & Bélanger, 
2013). How power is exercised in organizational settings impacts almost every facet of an 
organization (Pfeffer, 1981). The concept of power has been the topic of study in a wide 
variety of organizational settings and academic disciplines. However, existing research 
suffers from methodological issues (Podsakoff & Schriescheim, 1985). Radically 
reforming traditional civil service structures changes the employer-employee relationship 
(Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The changes ultimately impact how 
leaders exercise power within organizations, and existing the research fails to address 
how leaders exercise power after radical reforms. The state of Florida instituted radical 
civil service reforms with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The ability of 
leaders to effectively employ power in the employer-employee relationship has a direct 
bearing on employees’ ability to influence and accomplish tasks (French & Raven, 1959). 
How Florida’s politicians and political appointees exercise their bases of power directly 
affects the delivery of government services.  
 The Florida legislature passed the Service First Initiative (2001) with the goal of 
radically reforming its civil service system. The legislature wanted to ensure that state 
employees were more responsive to executives (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). One of the 
reforms resulted in the transfer of “16,901 supervisors, managers, directors, 
administrators, and confidential employees” from the Career Services (CS) to Selected 
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Exempt Service (SES) employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001, para. 
1). The change effectively made the transferred employees political appointees.  
The lack of scholarship on how the changes affected the use of power in organizational 
settings after radical reforms prevents politicians and executives from accurately 
determining the positive and negatives outcomes of the use of power since the reforms.  
The purpose of the quantitative dissertation study was to investigate to what 
extent Florida’s politicians and political appointees have exercised the individual bases of 
power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Hays and Sowa (2006) and 
Kellough and Nigro (2006) found that reforms to civil service alter the employee-
employer relationship. While research into the use of social power has produced 
consistent results, methodological issues reduced their relevancy to unique organizational 
factors (Podsakoff & Schriescheim, 1985). Current scholarship has failed to address how 
the use of power by politicians and political appointees is affected after radical civil 
service reforms. In this study, I attempted to fill the gap in the literature on how the 
reforms affected the use of power by Florida’s politicians and political appointees after 
the reforms. Addressing how the bases of power are employed by politicians and political 
appointees after radical civil service reforms provided a framework to understand what 
effects the changes to the employer-employee relationship have on government human 
resources management practices. Using French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power 
theory and Raven’s (1992) power/interaction model of interpersonal influence (IPIM), I 
determined whether the usage of the different bases of power by politicians and political 
appointees are inconsistent with other organizational settings. 
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The methodology of the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design, 
which I used to determine how Florida’s political appointees and supervisors utilized 
French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power after the Service First Initiative (2001). 
I employed a one-time, cross-sectional survey, which is appropriate for data that are not 
observable (see Liu, 2008). The survey, informed consent, and the cover letter were 
mailed to participants requesting their participation. The research population included all 
members of Florida’s State Personnel System and politicians elected to statewide offices 
with executive branch duties. The research population consisted of 88,046 employees. 
With the sampling population being finite, the population was ideal for inclusion of all 
sampling units (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I employed a probability 
sample design using the stratified random sampling method. The benefit of the design is 
that it allowed for the separation of the population into different state agencies and 
departments through proportionate stratification sampling (Hade & Lemeshow, 2008). 
The sampling design ensured that the sample size for the different state agencies and 
departments was appropriate. 
The theoretical framework for the study that I applied to the altered Florida state 
government employer-employee relationship was French and Raven’s (1959) bases of 
social power theory. The bases of social power theory is the most commonly used 
typology in the study of power (Mintzberg, 1983). Weber (1947) defined power as the 
ability to overcome the resistance of others to achieved objectives. French and Raven 
identified the power bases as reward, coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power. 
Raven (1965) added informational power as an additional base of power. Politicians and 
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political appointees employ the bases of power to achieve policy goals and initiatives. 
The exercise of social power by politicians and political appointees is dependent on a 
variety of organizational and social factors. The basis of social power theory is the most 
frequently used theoretical basis involving the use of power in organizational settings 
(Mintzburg, 1983). The bases of social power theory was the appropriate framework to 
use to determine whether the altered employer-employee relationship affected the 
predominate bases of social power used by politicians and political appointees due to the 
use of the power tactics being unobservable..  
I made five assumptions in the study. The assumption was that politicians, 
political appointees, and state employees answered the survey honestly and free of bias. I 
assumed that some respondents have dual roles of supervisor and subordinate and that 
supervisors answered the survey for both roles truthfully and free of bias.  I assumed all 
respondents are full-time employees of the State of Florida. I assumed that the state of 
Florida employees comply with the directions from supervisors, political appointees, and 
politicians with executive branch duties. I also assumed politicians and political 
appointees use all the base of social power to accomplish policy goals and build political 
support and power bases (French and Raven, 1959). .  
The State of Florida Civil Service System underwent radical reform as a result of 
the Service First Initiative (2001), resulting in a unique organizational setting. To study 
the changes that take place over an extended period, the use of longitudinal research 
design is ideal; however, the use of a longitudinal research design was unavailable for 
this study due to time constraints. The cross-sectional survey design collects data at a 
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point in time and allows for subgroup comparisons (Liu, 2008). This study was limited in 
applicability to state and local governments that have radically reformed their civil 
service systems and have similar organizational settings. This study was dependent on 
how respondents chose to answer the survey questions and only addressed the use of the 
bases of power by politicians, political appointees, and state employees in their current 
positions. The use of the cross-sectional data limited the ability to test causal 
relationships.  
The scope of the study addressed how Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees have utilized the French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory to 
implement policy goals after the Service First Initiative (2001). The IPIM provides a tool 
to examine to what extent Florida’s politicians and political appointees employ individual 
bases of social power (see Raven, 1993). Raven (2008) stated the use of the bases of 
social power and the need for surveillance is dependent on the implementation of social 
change. Reward and coercive power require social dependency and surveillance to be 
effective (Raven, 1991, 2008). Informational power, on the other hand, leads to socially 
independent change when the subordinate, after being provided information as to the 
need for change, accepts and changes behaviors (Raven, 1991, 2008). Informational, 
expert, and referent power are dependent on the actions of the influencing agent but do 
not require surveillance (Raven, 1991, 2008). In this study, I only addressed current, full-
time Florida state government employees and excluded former, temporary, and contract 
employees. Excluding former state employees was necessary because the probability of 
obtaining valid contact information was problematic in that there was no reliable database 
6 
 
containing their contact information. Temporary and contract employees are difficult 
populations to survey due to their transient nature. Members of the Florida Senate and the 
House of Representatives were also excluded because they do not have executive branch 
duties.  
Scholars have explored the use of social power in a wide range of organizational 
settings but have not addressed the changed employer-employee relationship resulting 
from radical civil service reforms. Florida's enactment of the Service First Initiative 
(2001) provided a unique organizational setting to study the effects the changes to the 
employer-employee relationship had on the use of social power bases by politicians and 
their political appointees. The results of this study have broader implications for states 
and local governments that have enacted radical civil service reforms, where evidence 
suggests the reform objectives have not materialized (see Jordan & Battaglio, 2014). The 
identification of the usage of the power bases will help in identifying whether the goals of 
making employees more responsiveness to executive leadership are being achieved 
(Nigro & Kellough, 2008). Failure to understand the effects of the civil service reforms 
on the employer-employee relationship limits policymakers from determining whether 
the stated reform goals are effective in achieving those goals or if those reforms further 
add to the dysfunction of government. Identifying the power bases used by politicians 
and political appointees will help leaders discern differences in the uses of power bases 
compared to other organizational settings. Leaders then can identify and/or develop 
leadership training programs designed to improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, 
employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.  
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In this study, I built on prior research into the usage of the bases of social power 
in organizations. The Florida Civil Service system was a unique organizational setting 
after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). One of the goals of the initiative 
was to increase state employee accountability to executive leadership (Nigro & Kellough, 
2008). Existing research into the effects of the Service First Initiative suffered from 
maturation because not enough time had passed between the passage of the initiative and 
the time of the studies. In this study, I also answered the question to what degree 
Florida’s politicians and political appointees used harsh or soft power tactics. 
Additionally, I answered whether they used the harsh power tactics of personal and 
impersonal coercion and reward, legitimacy of position, equity, and reciprocity, or soft 
power tactics of expert, referent, informational power, and legitimacy of dependence, in a 
manner that is consistent with other organizational settings. The exercise of the power 
tactics by supervisors in an organization has a direct bearing on organizational 
effectiveness. 
Problem Statement 
Florida’s Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida’s Civil Service 
System by reducing traditional merit protections and moving 16,901 supervisors from 
classified to selected exempt service (SES) employment classification (Summary of 
Service First, 2001). The reforms significantly changed the employer-employee 
relationship, and existing research did not address what effect the reforms had on the 
application of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees. The 
failure to address the use of the bases of social power after radical civil service reform is 
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problematic in that the changed employer-employee relationship may reduce the 
effectiveness of any reforms. 
The public has increasingly demanded greater efficiency and accountability from 
public sector employees and administrators. The Service First Initiative (2001) reforms 
altered the employer-employee relationship in Florida’s Civil Service System (Bowman 
& West; 2007; Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The reforms constitute an 
organizational cultural change, and leaders need to understand that change in culture 
impacts the success or failure of the change efforts (Mott, 2008). The existing research 
into the reform objectives of increased public employee accountability and effective 
governance has shown that it has not produced the desired outcomes (Nigro & Kellough, 
2008). Currently, there are calls for additional reforms to achieve the desired outcomes. 
Research into the past reforms has failed to investigate how the reforms affected how 
politicians and political appointees employ the bases of power and influence. Research 
into how leaders exercise the bases of power in a wide variety of organizational settings 
have been the subject countless studies and have produced generally consistent results; 
however, methodological shortcomings of field studies prevented those studies to be 
generalized to unique organizational settings (Podsakoff & Schriescheim, 1985).  
The radical reform of the State of Florida’s Civil Service System instituted by the 
Service Frist Initiative (2001) and the resulting change in the employer-employee 
relationship make it a unique organizational setting. The exercise of social power and 
influence by influencing agents affects the organizational commitment of members of an 
organization (Pierro et al., 2013). Organizations consist of social networks that are 
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subject to the manner power is projected by influence agents (Friedkin, 2011). Leaders 
can engage a wide variety of power bases to influence organizational members (French & 
Raven, 1959). Without understanding what effect the past reforms had on the bases of 
power employed, further reform effectiveness is questionable. 
The passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) resulted in organizational 
changes to the State of Florida’s human resource practices that have taken a long time to 
reach maturity. Prior research has failed to investigate what effect the changes to the 
human resources practices had on the exercise of social power and influence by 
politicians and political appointees in government organizations. Building on French and 
Raven’s (1959) bases of social influence and power and Raven’s (1965) addition of 
information power to the bases, Raven (1992) developed the IPIM to differentiate the 
original six power bases into harsh and soft bases of power. The main difference between 
harsh and soft power tactics is the amount of freedom the target has in choosing to what 
degree to comply (Pierro, Cicero, & Raven, 2008). Information power leads to socially 
independent change through the dissemination of relevant information and acceptance by 
the subordinate who internalized the change (Raven, 2008). Reward and coercive power 
usage by a leader involve socially dependent change and require surveillance resulting 
from the ability to distribute rewards or administer negative consequences based on the 
degree of compliance by the subordinate (Raven, 2008). Finally, legitimate, expert, and 
referent power bases lead to socially dependent change that does not require surveillance 
(Raven, 2008). Pierro et al. (2013) found that transformational leaders were more likely 
to employ soft bases of power, while transactional leaders were more likely to lead to 
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subordinate compliance and organizational commitment. The organizational commitment 
of employees impacts almost every facet of organizations, including responsiveness to 
executive leadership, employee retention, and employee and organizational performance. 
In this study, I built on why the goals of the reforms have not achieved their desired 
effect through the uses of social influences and power bases. 
The demographic characteristics of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and 
state employees are relevant variables in understanding the extent of usage of each base 
of social influence and power by politicians and political appointees. The independent 
variables for this study were the demographic data: age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, 
the length of service, and political ideology/affiliation. The dependent variables were the 
11 delineated power tactics of French and Raven’s (1959) and Raven’s (1965) seminal 
work that were collected in Raven’s (1992) IPIM. The IPIM items include reward 
impersonal, coercive impersonal, expert, referent, informational, the legitimacy of 
position, legitimacy of reciprocity, legitimacy of dependence, legitimacy of equity, 
personal reward, and personal coercion power (Raven, 1992). My hypothesis was that the 
demographic characteristics directly influence how politicians and political appointees’ 
view state employees and their choice to employ a particular base of social power and 
influence. 
In this study, I attempted to fill the gap in existing research of radical civil service 
reform has on how and to what extent leaders employ the individual bases of power. As 
noted by Hays and Sowa (2006), and Kellough and Nigro (2006), the reforms changed 
the employer-employee relationship by giving more control to the employer. Researchers 
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have studied various aspects of civil service reforms over several decades; however, they 
have failed to research how social power is employed by politicians and political 
appointees after radical civil service reform. Rubin and Kellough (2012) studied how the 
reforms affected employee perceptions of procedural justice and found that the reforms 
initially led to increased complaints but after time the number of complaints decreased. 
The use of the bases of power is a determinate of an organization’s climate (Landells & 
Albrecht, 2013). The lack of research into the effect the reforms had on the uses of bases 
of power is somewhat surprising because the use of the bases of power affects almost 
every facet of an organization. A leader’s failure to understand how the usage of the 
bases of power in organizations that have undergone radical reforms limits organizational 
effectiveness. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to determine how state politicians and political 
appointees in Florida utilized the bases of power after the passage of the Service First 
Initiative (2001) through the lens of French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power 
theory. The Service First Initiative reduced merit protections, thereby negatively affecting 
employee rights and job security and changing the employer-employee relationship (Hays 
& Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Podsakoff & Schriescheim (1985) identified 
methodological issues that were preventing previous studies from being applied to unique 
organizational settings. The Florida Civil Service System presents a unique 
organizational setting as a result of the reforms to determine the extent the harsh and soft 
power tactics are employed by Florida politicians and political employees in carrying out 
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their executive duties instituted by the Service First Initiative. In this study, I also 
attempted. Once the extent of the usage of each base of power was determined, I could 
compare them with results from other organizational settings to determine whether the 
use of the different bases of social power was consistent or not. 
My hope was that this research would provide insight into how extensive the use 
of each base of social power by Florida’s politicians and political appointees was after the 
passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). By quantifying the extent each base of 
social power was used, I made it feasible to determine whether Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees use the bases of power in a manner inconsistent with other 
organizational settings. Additionally, it provided empirical evidence to support the 
creation of leadership training programs geared toward developing leadership skills for 
politicians who have executive branch duties, political appointees, and supervisors. In 
turn, the improvement of these groups’ leadership skills will improve the organizational 
climate, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
Research Question 
I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:  
Research question: What extent do Florida politicians and political 
appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of  
their leadership duties?  
Research subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are  
predictors of the use of the individual bases of social power?  
Research subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the  
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individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees? 
Research subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and 
political appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power? 
H0: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees are more likely to uses harsh bases of social power to achieve policy 
goals.  
H1: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees are more likely to uses soft bases of social power to achieve policy 
goals.  
Theoretical Base 
The foundational cornerstone guiding this study was the bases of social power 
theory (French & Raven, 1959). The bases of social power include reward, coercive, 
expert, legitimate, and referent power (French & Raven, 1959). The definition of social 
power is the ability of a person, criterion, subgroup, or group to influence another person 
(French & Raven,1959). Reward power is the ability of the social agent to give or 
withhold rewards (French & Raven, 1959). Coercive power differs from reward power in 
that the expectations of the target of the influence attempt concerning the application of 
punishment for failure to comply with the influence attempt are applied (French & 
Raven). Expert power results from the level of knowledge and trust attributed to the 
target to the social influence agent (French & Raven, 1959). Legitimate power is the most 
complex power base and results in change as a result of the presence of the social agent 
that becomes internalized by the influence attempt target (French & Raven, 1959). French 
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and Raven stated that referent power is the amount of identification the target of the 
influence attempt has for the social agent. Raven (1965) added informational power as a 
base of social power in follow-up work to the original bases of social power theory. 
Information power occurs when the provided necessary information, the target 
assimilates and internalizes that information and changes independently of the social 
agent (Raven, 1965). The IPIM provides further clarification of the bases of power from 
the perspective of both the target of the influence attempt and social agent. Raven (2008) 
stated that agents will use the power strategy that is appropriate for the subordinate’s 
perceptions and will be the most effective in achieving their goals.  
The passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed the human 
resource practices by eliminating or reducing traditional merit protections in Florida Civil 
Service System. The changes involved changing the hiring and promotional rules by 
removing merit selection to requiring the employing agency ensure the selected candidate 
meets the minimum qualifications and removing the requirement to maintain 
documentation (F.S. 110.213). Politicians and political appointees use the bases of social 
power to accomplish policy goals and build political support. French and Raven’s (1959) 
bases of social power theory addresses the level of influence and power that a social 
agent has on an individual. The uses of each base of social power are dependent on how 
the politician perceive the target of the influence.  
The IPIM further defines the bases of power into harsh and soft power bases 
(Pierro et al., 2008; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Raven, 2012). The difference between harsh 
and soft power is the degree to which the target of the influence attempt perceives the 
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option to comply (Pierro et al., 2013). The harsh power bases include coercion, reward, 
the legitimacy of position, equity, and reciprocity (Pierro et al., 2008). The soft bases of 
power include expert, referent, informational, and legitimacy of dependence (Pierro et al., 
2008). Pierro et al., stated the employment of soft power tactics lead to improved 
outcomes for organizations and individuals. My major hypothesis in this study was that 
Florida’s politicians and political appointees employ harsh organizational setting 
resulting from the changes to the human resource practices. A more detailed explanation 
will be forthcoming in Chapter 2. 
One of the goals of the Service First Initiative (2001) was to make government 
employees more accountable to the leadership of elected officials and administrators 
(Nigro & Kellough, 2008). According to Elgie (2007), the goal of leadership in a group 
process to change the current status of public governance. Through the exercise of power, 
political leaders and their appointees try to influence those they lead (Landau, 2007). 
French and Raven (1959) described social influence and power as the ability of a person 
or group to create a change in the views of others. Florida’s politicians used their legal 
authority to pass the Service First Initiative to facilitate changes in the civil service 
system. Those changes provide expanded opportunities to exercise French and Raven’s 
bases of social power to achieve policy goals. The bases of social power theory relates to 
the approach and research question of this study in that it provides a framework to 
understand what are the bases of power predominately used in the changed employer-




Nature of Study 
In this quantitative study, I used a stratified, cross-sectional survey design. The 
cross-sectional survey design was ideal for surveying Florida state employees because it 
allowed for the economical collection of a large amount of data. Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (2008) stated that variables that are not able to be observed are not appropriate 
for experimental designs or before and after comparisons. The variables of political 
ideology/affiliation and the different bases of power were not able to be observed; 
therefore, my use of the cross-sectional survey design was appropriate for the collection 
of data that were not able to be observed. The design allowed for flexible data collection 
methods of a finite study population consisting of elected officials, political appointees, 
and state employees. The cross-sectional survey design is compatible with conducting 
survey questionnaires (Creswell, 2009). With expected differences in the results between 
the various state agencies and departments, a stratified random sampling method was 
appropriate to determine differences in the use of the power bases in Florida’s State 
Personnel System (SPS) (see Hade & Lemeshow, 2008). The simple random sampling 
was not an appropriate method because it does not allow for assigning employees to the 
different groups.  
The independent variables consisted of the participants’ education, political 
predisposition, gender, race/ethnicity, pay bands, the length of service, agency, political 
appointees, and state employees. The dependent variables were derived from French and 
Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory and Raven et al.’s (1992) IPIM and included 
reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of 
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position, legitimacy of reciprocity, legitimacy of dependence, legitimacy of equity, 
personal reward, and personal coercion power. In this cross-sectional study, I used a 
Likert Scale to measure the association between the independent and dependent variables. 
The sample population consisted of Florida’s elected executive branch politicians, 
political appointees, and SPS employees. I mailed participants a package consisting of a 
cover letter, informed consent, and the survey, requesting their participation via the U.S. 
mail in a business-reply envelope (see Appendix H). The use of the survey method is a 
common method of collecting data in social science research (Frankfort-Nachmaias & 
Nachmaias, 2008). The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Software program 
was the tool I used for data management and analysis. An independent samples t test is 
appropriate to test the mean between the independent variables and was used in this study 
and used in this study (see Green & Salkind, 2014). With the sample population being 
finite, the standard error correction needs to be calculated and accounted for (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The issue of validity in the sampling is due to none-
response error rate and is addressed by ensuring there is a large enough sample 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). 
Operational Definitions 
Reward impersonal power: Based on the premise of financial or nonfinancial 
rewards (Raven, 1992). 
Coercive impersonal power: Based on the threat of punishment (Raven, 1992). 
Expert power: Based on providing knowledge or expertise (Raven, 1992). 
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Referent power: Enhancing target’s identification with influencing agent (Raven, 
1992). 
Informational power: Based on providing information that overcomes resistance 
to the influence attempt (Raven, 1992). 
Legitimacy position power: Based on the attachment the target of the influence 
attempt has to the influence agent (Raven, 1992). 
Legitimacy reciprocity power: Based on the influence agent having done 
something for the target of the influence attempt and expect something in return (Raven, 
1992). 
Legitimacy dependence power: Based on the obligation or need to help others 
who need assistance (Raven, 1992). 
Legitimacy equity power: Based on the target of the influence attempts need to be 
compensated for work or negative personal outcome(s) resulting from act(s) of the 
influence agent (Raven, 1992). 
Personal reward power: Based on the ability to provided rewards (Raven, 1992). 
Personal coercion power: Based on the threat of disapproval or dislike (Raven, 
1992). 
Politicians: Florida politicians elected to the statewide office that have executive 
branch duties. The following statewide political offices with executive branch duties are 
the Office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer, 
and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (F.S. Ch. 14-19).  
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Political appointees: Employees in the SES and Senior Management Service 
employment classifications in Florida’s SPS (Florida Department of Management 
Services).  
State government employees: Employees in the Career Service employment 
classification in Florida’s SPS (Florida Department of Management Services). 
Assumptions 
In this study, I made the following assumptions: 
• That responding participants truthfully answered the survey questionnaires.  
• When evaluating the power bases, I assumed that responding participants 
answered free of bias.  
• Supervisors who had supervisory and subordinate roles completed the survey 
questionnaires appropriately for both roles.  
• Politicians and political appointees use all bases of social power to accomplish 
policy goals and to build to gain political support and build power bases. 
(French and Raven, 1959).  
• All respondents are full time employees in the state of Florida SPS. 
The assumptions in this study were necessary because they directly related to the 
context of this study and the role of the participants. The large population required the 
assumption that the respondents answered the survey truthfully and free of bias.  
Scope  
The scope of the study involved how Florida’s politicians and political appointees 
utilized the French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory to implement policy 
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goals after the Service First Initiative (2001). The IPIM provided me with a tool to 
examine to what extent Florida’s politicians and political appointees employ individual 
bases of social power (see Raven, 2008).  
I used the cross-sectional survey data collection methodology to determine the 
political affiliations/ideologies and the bases of social power used by politicians and 
political appointees to build political support to achieve policy goals. Scholars have 
described the concept of power as the ability of an individual to influence another by 
overcoming the resistance of another person (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981; Weber, 
1947). Others defined power as the ability to take actions to accomplish a goal (Bennis & 
Nanus, 1965; Kanter, 1977). The scholar's (Bennis & Nanus: Emerson; Kanter; Pfeffer; 
& Weber) definitions were lacking identification of the different bases of power, and 
therefore not appropriate for the study. French and Raven (1959), in their seminal work 
titled, “The Bases of Social Power Theory,” identified the power bases used to influence 
the actions or behavior of another person. 
Delimitations 
In this study, I only addressed current, full-time employees in the state of 
Florida’s SPS and elected politicians who hold statewide offices with executive branch 
duties. The SPS employees consisted of those employees assigned to the CS, SES, and 
the Senior Management Service (SMS) classifications. The elected politicians included in 
this study were the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, CFO, and 
commissioner of agriculture and consumer services of Florida. Excluded from the study 
were former, temporary, and contract SPS employees. I also excluded former SPS 
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employees because the probability of obtaining valid contact information was 
problematic in that there was no reliable database containing their contact information. 
Temporary and contract employees are difficult populations to survey as a result of their 
transient nature. Members of the Florida Senate and the House of Representatives were 
also excluded because they do not have any executive branch duties. All employees of 
Florida State University, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, and Other 
Pay Plans were also excluded from the study.  
Limitations 
A major limitation of the research was the inability to measure the usage of the 
bases of social power directly. The sampling strategy involved respondents taking a 
stratified, cross-sectional survey. I did not believe the respondents would truthfully 
answer if asked if they benefitted from the uses of harsh power tactics.  
There were two areas of concern for potential bias that could have influenced the 
outcomes of the study. The first area of concern was nonresponse bias. Nonresponse bias 
occurs as a result of a high failure rate of respondents to respond to the survey. To control 
for nonresponse bias, I sent participants an introductory letter and a business reply 
envelope with the survey to increase the response rate. The second area of concern was 
result bias, which is a result of the wording of the questions because they may be 
confusing, double-barreled, leading, or threatening type question (see Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I addressed result bias by ensuring the survey questions 
were not confusing, double-barreled, leading, or threatening type question. To reduce the 
impact of the study limitations, I used measurement instruments that were strong in 
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regard to content, empirical, and construct validity. The study had a finite research 
population and used probability sampling that helped the validity of the measurement 
instruments (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
I did not investigate the motivational factors that influence Florida’s politicians 
and political appointee’s use of each the bases of social power in this study because they 
were not relevant to the study. I did not think the motivations behind the reforms was a 
issues that would fit the nature of the study. However, I could have legitimately 
investigated the motivations for the uses of the individual bases of social power.  
The cross-sectional survey design was ideal for this study in the extent of the 
usage of the individual bases of social power by Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees to achieve policy goals. However, the cross-sectional survey design had 
limitations. The design does not allow for the manipulation of the independent variables 
that allow for pretest-posttest comparisons (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
Additionally, the causation is logically inferred (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
Significance of the Study 
In this study, I investigated the gap in the literature that has existed as a result of 
the changed employer-employee relationship caused by the radical civil service reforms 
in Florida with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The results of this study 
provided a framework for organizations to address shortcomings of the radical reforms 
and the failure to achieve the objectives of the reforms. The findings of this study 
advanced the knowledge of the use of the bases of social power in unique organizational 
settings. The results of this study identified the extent politicians and political appointees 
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use the individual bases of social power tactics as related to the changed employer-
employee relationship. The identification of the prominent usage of each power bases 
will help identify areas where organizations can identify leadership training protocols 
designed to teach politicians and political appointees the appropriate use of the bases of 
social power and improve their leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee 
responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
Across the nation, there are additional calls for radically reforming civil service 
systems at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Research on past reforms 
has shown that the goals of reforms have largely not achieved the desired outcomes 
(Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The results of this study benefits the field by identifying the 
base of power usage by Florida's politicians and political appointees after radical reforms 
to the human resource practices. Leaders engage in a wide variety of power bases to 
influence organizational members (French & Raven, 1959). The results of this study can 
be compared to other organizational settings to differentiate differences in the usage of 
the bases of power by leaders. Comparing the findings of this study to other types of 
successful organizational settings that have radically reformed their human resource 
practices allows leaders to identify areas of the reforms that are not conducive to 
achieving policy goals and organizational effectiveness. The identification of an 
overreliance on harsh or soft power tactics provides a framework for leaders to develop 
leadership training programs that ultimately improve leadership skills, organizational 
climate, employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency.  
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The objectives of the radical civil service reform movement that swept across the 
nation over that last quarter century have largely failed to materialize (Jordan & 
Battaglio, 2014). Despite this failure, reform advocates, such as political interest groups, 
politicians, and everyday citizens, are championing additional radical reforms at the 
federal, state, and local government levels (Bowman, 2002). Without understanding the 
reason for the failure of the radical reforms to achieve the objectives, policymakers may 
repeat the same mistakes if they proceed with further reforms. The affect that radical civil 
service reforms have on the employer-employee relationship and the application of the 
individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees provides insight 
into the causes of the failure to make employees more responsive to organizational 
leaders. Understanding the extent of each power base used by politicians and political 
appointees allow leaders to discern differences in the use of power bases compared to  
other organizational settings that affect employee loyalty, employee responsiveness, and 
government efficiency. The findings of the study allow for government organizations 
contemplating radical reforms to their human resources practices to identify leadership 
training programs designed to improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, employee 
responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
The findings of the study present broader implications for positive social change 
besides the determination of the extent each social power usage. Not only do the results 
of this study provide empirical data on the usage of each power base but they also allow 
policy maker to discern the differences in the usage of power bases when compared to 
other organizational settings. Using them, policymakers can identify leadership traits that 
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negatively impact on organizational outcomes. The application of the bases of social 
power by Florida’s politicians and political appointees influences every imaginable 
organizational outcome (see Pfeffer, 1981). The findings of this study provide a base of 
knowledge that assists policymakers in determining how the application of the bases of 
social power influences positive or negative organizational outcomes. By understanding 
how the application of the different bases of power have on organizational outcomes, 
policymakers contemplating additional reforms can develop strategies and training 
procedures that improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, responsiveness, and 
government efficiency. 
Summary and Transition 
The Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida’s Civil Service 
System and its human resources practices. The objectives of the radical reforms in 
Florida and across the nation have failed to produce the desired results (Jordan & 
Battaglio, 2014). While there is a plethora of research involving radical reform, scholars 
have paid scant attention to the issue of how politicians and political appointees employ 
the bases of social power in the changed employer-employee relationship after the 
reforms reach maturation. French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory 
provided me with the theoretical framework used in this study to evaluate the extent to 
which Florida’s politicians and political appointees employ each base of social power 
after the radical reforms of the Service First Initiative had a chance to mature. The 
understanding of how and to what extent politicians and political appointees employed 
the bases of social power is important in that the application of the bases of power affects 
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almost every aspect of organization and outcomes. French and Raven stated that how 
leaders employ power affects their ability to influence people and accomplish tasks.  
In Chapter 2, I will present a review of the literature involving the use of social 
influence and power using French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory and 
related methods. In Chapter 3, I will explain the research methodology and design as well 
as  the researcher’s role, sampling strategy, procedure, and data analysis in detail. 
Chapter 4 will include the results of the study. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will present a 
review of the findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for further research, 
and the implications for social change. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The Service First Initiative (2001) reformed Florida’s Civil Service System by 
removing many of the traditional merit protections and transferring “16,901 supervisors, 
managers, directors, administrators, and confidential employees” from the CS to SES 
employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001, p. 1). The initiative 
effectively made those transferred to the SES classification political appointees. 
Reforming traditional civil service systems changes the dynamics of the employer-
employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Existing research 
has failed to investigate the effect of the changes to the employer-employee relationship 
had on how leaders exercise power. Additionally, Podsakoff and Schriescheim (1985) 
identified methodological issues that prevented the applicability of the study to unique 
organizational settings such as Florida’s Civil System after the passage of the Service 
First Initiative. How leaders exercise power within their organizations directly affects 
their ability to influence subordinates and accomplish organizational objectives (French 
& Raven, 1959). French and Raven’s (1959) identified the bases of power as reward, 
coercive, expert, legitimate, and referent power. The purpose of the study was to 
determine how the altered dynamics of the employer-employee relations affected how 
Florida’s politicians and political appointees employ the bases of social power. 
The literature review for this study involved searches of databases for peer-
reviewed articles relating to the bases of social power theory, new public management 
(NPM), civil service reform, Service First Initiative (2001), patronage, and public 
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services motivation. The literature review will begin with a review of the theoretical 
framework of the study, French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory. Raven 
(1992, 1993) further delineated the bases of social power into hard and soft power tactics 
with the introduction of the IPIM. Next, I will present the relevance of the study and 
show civil service reforms in Florida are in keeping with the principles of the NPM 
doctrine. The NPM doctrine advocates for at-will employment, decentralization of human 
resource practices, and an elimination or reduction of employees’ due process rights 
(Bowman, 2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The literature review 
will also include evidence of patronage hiring and firings employment practices 
occurring as a result of the passage of the Service First Initiative (Bowman, 2002, 2006). 
The reforms gave Florida’s politicians and political appointees nearly unbridled power 
and the ability to make arbitrary and capricious personnel decisions in the execution of 
their executive branch duties. Lastly, in the literature review I will identify and provide a 
rationale for the  use of the quantitative methodology in the study. Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias (2008) stated that the quantitative method is the appropriate method for an 
economical data collection of data that are not observable. Quantitative designs allow for 
the quantification of certain aspects of a research population (Creswell, 2009). 
Quantitative, cross-sectional surveys using stratified sampling are appropriate to ensure 
the representation of all groups from different functional areas and divisions within the 
organization (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The study methodology involved 
a quantitative cross-sectional survey design, with a finite research population. 
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Related seminal work involving the social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), 
equity theory (Adams, 1963), expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), social impact theory 
(Latané, 1981), the need theory (McClelland, 1987), leader-member exchange (LMX) 
theory (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975), motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg, 1959), 
and operant behavior theory (Skinner, 1939) will be reviewed. NPM and the Service First 
Initiative (2001) reforms were designed to make public employees more responsive to 
political leaders (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006) and link pay with 
performance (Whalen & Guy, 2008). In the literature review, I also addressed my 
rationale for the selection of the dependent and independent variables.  
Preview of the Major Sections 
I began the introduction of the chapter with a description of the research problem 
that resulted from the changed employer-employee dynamics brought about by the 
passage and implementation of the state of Florida’s Service First Initiative (2001). The 
literature search strategy section will contain a detailed explanation of the databases used 
to find relevant peer-reviewed articles and an identification of the key terms that I used to 
locate articles for this study. The theoretical framework of the study was French and 
Raven (1959) bases of social power theory and Raven’s (1992) IPIM. I will discuss the 
theories and provide the rationale for my choice of them as the theoretical framework for 
the study. The literature review will also include articles related to how radical reforms 
affect the usage of power by politicians and political appointees and the usage of power 
in other organizational settings. In the literature review, I reviewed extant research in the 
field to establish its significance and relevance to the research question and hypotheses of 
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the study. The literature review was exhaustive, and I turned up only sparse literature 
involving the use of power in government organizations that have undergone radical 
human resources practice reforms. While searching for articles to include, I identified and 
used both seminal and the most relevant current literature related to the variables of the 
study. Lastly, I will address the research design and methodologies used in the study. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I conducted an exhaustive search of literature relating to the social power theory, 
patronage, political corruption, and job satisfaction. The majority of information I 
gathered was from the Walden University Library, Google Scholar, and JSTOR 
databases. Through the Walden University Library, I accessed the following databases: 
Political Science Complete, Business Source Complete, Military and Government 
Collection, PsycInfo, PsycArticles, PsyCRITIQUES, PsycEXTRA, PsycTests, and 
Thoreau. The selection of these databases was the result of the relevant content they 
contained.  
I used key terms to search the aforementioned databases. The Political Science 
Complete, Military and Government Collection, and Thoreau databases were used to find 
articles related to civil reforms movement, patronage, and political corruption, while the 
PsycInfo, PsycArticles, PsyCRITIQUES, PsycEXTRA, PsycTests, JSTOR, Google 
Scholar, and Thoreau databases were used to find articles related to social power and 
influence. The key terms I used for finding articles related to social power and influence 
theory included social power, influence, bases of power, social theory and social 
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structure, social influence and power theory, the psychology of social impact, supervisor 
influence, supervisor power, and interpersonal influence. 
When practical, I limited the research reviewed to that published the last 7 years. 
However, relevant literature involving civil service reforms in Florida and NPM was 
from the past 25 years. My literature search also yielded articles relating to social 
influence encompassed by French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory to 
current articles involving the application of the bases of social power. I used older 
literature, dating back to 1935, when relevant. Seminal work reviewed involving the 
social power theory included French and Raven. Related seminal works reviewed 
included the social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), equity theory (Adams, 1963), 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), social impact theory (Latané, 1981), the need theory 
(McClelland, 1987), LMX theory (Dansereau et al., 1975), motivation-hygiene theory 
(Herzberg, 1959), and operant behavior theory (Skinner, 1938). 
Theoretical Basis 
The theoretical basis of the study was the bases of social power theory (French & 
Raven, 1959). Social agents use power to create psychological changes in the target of 
the influence attempt that alters how they perceive the social agent, organization, and 
beliefs (French & Raven). The psychological changes occur over time and are dependent 
on overcoming counter forces to achieve the changes (French & Raven, 1959). Over 
time, the bases of power were differentiated as harsh and soft power tactics (Pierro et al., 
2008; Pierro et al., 2012). The difference between harsh and soft tactics is the degree of 
autonomy the target has in deciding to abide by the social agent’s influence attempt 
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(French & Raven, 1959). Harsh power tactics include “coercion, reward, legitimacy of 
position, equity, and reciprocity” (Pierro et al., 2012, p. 41). Harsh power tactics are often 
associated with less favorable organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 
2013). Soft power tactics include “expert, referent, informational, and legitimacy of 
dependence” power (Pierro et al., 2013, p. 42). The use of soft power tactics is associated 
with improvements in organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 2013). My 
major hypothesis in this study was that since the passage of the Service First Initiative 
(2001), Florida’s politicians and political appointees are more likely to use the harsh 
power tactics.  
Scholars have paid scant attention to how politicians and political appointees in 
Florida have used power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The 
changes to Florida’s Civil Service System amounted to changes to the employee-
employer (Bowman & West, 2007; Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). 
According to Mintzberg (1983), the most commonly employed typology used to study 
the use of power is the bases of social power theory. French and Raven’s (1959) seminal, 
bases of social power theory focused on the relationship between the supervisor and 
employee. French and Raven indicated that the work would need further development 
through additional research. Their original bases of power included: coercive, expert, 
legitimate, referent, and reward power. Raven (1965) added informational power as a 
base of power a few years later. Subsequently, additional research expanded the model to 
14 power bases in the IPIM (Raven, 1993). French and Raven’s bases of power theory 
provided me with a theoretical framework to study the sources of power that Florida’s 
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politicians and political appointees use in their attempts to influence state employees. The 
IPIM allowed for the further differentiation of French and Raven’s bases of social power. 
Organizations do not operate in a vacuum and are dependent on their leaders to 
employ social power to influence employees in a manner that is conducive to positive 
organizational and individual outcomes. Pfeffer (1981) stated the manner in which power 
is exercised impacts nearly all aspects of individual and organizational outcomes. The 
changes to the human resources practices that are a result of the Service First Initiative 
(2001) changed the employer-employee relationship and altered the dynamics of how 
leaders influence others to accomplish tasks (French & Raven, 1959). The study 
addresses how the changing dynamics of the employer-employee relationship affected the 
use of different bases of social power. The theory will assist in building on prior research 
by determining how radical human resources reforms affect the use of the individual 
bases of social power. French and Raven’s bases of social power theory and Raven’s 
(1992) IMIP provides a framework for answering the extent the individual bases of social 
power usage by politicians and political appointees after the passage of the Service First 
Initiative. Also, the demographic factors that are predictors of the uses of the different 
power bases can be accessed. Finally, perceptions of politicians, political appointees, and 
state employees as to the usage of the various power bases can be measured  
The bases of social power theory is one of the most frequently used theoretical 
basis in research involving the use of power in organizational settings (Mintzberg, 1983). 
The development of the interpersonal power interaction model expanded the original 
bases of social power (Raven, 1992, 1993). Bachman, Smith, and Slesinger (1966) used 
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French and Raven’s (1959) bases of social power theory to measure supervisor’s bases of 
power and investigated the relationship between the amount of control, performance, and 
satisfaction. Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) used the framework to 
determine patterns in the use of social power and the extent of their usage by supervisors 
in gaining compliance from employees.  
Elias (2007) employed a modified IPI model to determine what university 
students believed was the appropriate uses of the bases of power by college faculty in a 
classroom setting. Pierro, Raven, Amato, and Bélanger (2013) investigated the role of 
leadership style has on the extent of usage of the bases of social power had on the 
organizational commitment of employees. The studies addressed the extent of each base 
of social power, and they are generally consistent in that harsh power tactics lead to less 
effective organizational and individual outcomes. 
Literature Review 
The social exchange theory is related to the basis of social power theory in that 
the foundation of the theory focuses on the ability of individuals to influences the actions 
of others through a social exchange process. Emerson (1976, p. 335) stated that “George 
Homans, John Thibault, Harold Kelley, and Peter Blau” were the main contributors in 
developing the social exchange theory. Homans (1958) stated the social exchange theory 
involved an exchange between individuals that can involve material or non-material 
goods. The major premise of the social exchange theory is that people conduct a 
cost/benefits analysis to maximize profits or benefits involving individual or group 
settings (Homans). The theory hinges on the use of reinforcement of behaviors at a level 
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that is consistent with maintaining or increasing the behaviors at desired levels. Too little 
or too much reinforcement of behavior results in diminishing returns (Homans). When 
the cost of social interactions increases and the profits decreases, individuals are more 
likely to be influenced to change the behaviors (Homans). Homans also stated that 
individuals within groups attempt to maximize their profit and take actions to ensure 
others in the group do not receive profits they did not earn. 
The equity theory was also a closely related theory that was originally developed 
to focus on the inequities derived out of the employer-employee relationship. Adams 
(1963) described the employer-employee relations as a series of exchanges of material 
and nonmaterial goods. Adams stated individual and social perceptions influence group 
inputs/outputs and exchanges between individuals. The equity theory is comprised of four 
major cornerstones that include; (a) individuals look to fulfill their potential of outcomes, 
(b) groups develop equity among members and work to ensure group acceptance, (c) 
individuals and groups become distressed from inequity and those who attain more than 
their equitable share may feel guilt, and, (d) the motivation to restore equity increases as 
the degree of inequity increases (Adams, 1965). When individuals or groups feel that 
they do not receive an equitable return on their investments or receive an unfair amount 
of return for this investment, they become distressed (Adams). Individuals are more 
likely to take actions that increase outcomes when faced with inequities then reducing 
outcome to reduce inequities (Adams, 1965 & Nord, 1973).  
The expectancy theory focus on how individuals are influenced and motivated in 
accomplishing tasks. The expectancy theory is also commonly known as the vie theory 
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(valence, instrumentality, and expectancy). The expectancy theory is a cognitive process 
theory. Vroom (1964) stated that individuals are influenced and motivated by expectancy, 
valence, and instrumentality. According to Vroom, motivation = valence x expectancy. 
Expectancy is the value an individual placed on the ability to complete a task and their 
expectancy of achieving a reward or reducing penalties (Vroom, 1964). Expectancy is 
subjective and derived from an individual’s belief in their competency, organizational 
support, having the necessary resources, experience, and relevant information needed to 
accomplish the task (Vroom, 1964). Valance is the value the individual places on the 
outcome of completing a task (Vroom, 1964). Valence can be either intrinsic or extrinsic. 
Vroom stated valence could be positive or negative influences on the individuals. 
Instrumentality involves the probability of achieving the completion of tasks and the 
belief that higher effort will result in higher rewards (Vroom, 1964). Vroom stated 
individuals react in a manner that is consistent with their past experiences, belief system, 
and perceptions of what actions will provide positive or negative outcomes or rewards.  
 The social impact theory is related to the theoretical framework of the study as it 
addresses how individuals are influenced and motivated. The social impact theory, 
developed by Latané (1981), described the theory as having three laws that affected 
social interactions between individuals. Social interactions involve the activities or 
experiences that confront individuals on a daily basis (Latané, 1981). The effect of social 
interactions between individuals can be to some degree predicted through the uses of 
mathematical equations (Latané, 1981). The first principle, I = f(SIN, holds that as the 
numerical level of social forces increase it will affect the strength (S), immediacy (I), 
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and, number (I) of sources (Latané, 1981). The second principle, I = sN^t, holds social 
impact is the result of the multiplicative sum of power (t), by the number of people (N), 
the scaling constant (s) (Latané, 1981). The third principle, I = f(1/SIN), hold that is the 
result of multiplication and or division of the impact (Latané, 1981). In other words, the 
greater the strength and contiguity increases the social impact on the targets (Latané, 
1981). The social impact theory helps to explain the how targets of influence attempts 
will respond in given social situations. 
The need theory (three need theory) holds that individuals have three motivational 
needs of achievement, power, and affiliation (McClelland, 1987). McClelland borrowed 
from Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs theory and applied it to management settings. 
According to McClelland the need for achievement of leaders manifests itself in their 
penchant for tasks that are of moderate difficulty and avoid organization jobs that carry a 
minimal or excessive risk (McClelland, 1987). Leaders who have a high need for 
affiliation engage in tactics that cultivate social relationships and value collaboration with 
co-workers and clients (McClelland, 1987). Individuals with high power needs are more 
disciplined, competitive, and motivated by the need to improve their social and 
organizational position (McClelland, 1987). McClelland discovered that 86% of the 
population has a combination of these needs. Leaders in top management positions have a 
high level of the need for power as witnessed by their need to succeed in their abilities 
(McClelland, 1987). Individuals that have strong achievement needs are seldom picked 
for the higher management positions and are more likely to be good middle managers 
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(McClellan, 1987). Individuals with a need for affiliation are happier in non-leadership 
roles within organizations settings (McClelland, 1987). 
The basis of the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory is the dyadic leader and 
subordinate relationship. Dansereau, Graen, & Haga (1975) developed the LMX theory 
and over the year has undergone several revisions since its initial inception. The central 
premise of the LMX theory is that leaders and subordinates enter into a relationship and 
the quality of that relationship influences subordinate’s work experiences (Damsereau et 
al., 1975). One major component of the relationship is the emotional attachment that 
develops resulting from the level of mutual trust and respect developed (Damsereau et al., 
1975). The effectiveness of the leader-subordinate relationship is dependent on the 
development of a satisfactory level of trust and respect level (Damsereau et al., 1975). 
Damsereau et al., found that there was a differentiated relationship between the superiors 
and the individual members of their work units, resulting in superiors devoting a 
disproportionate about resources and time cultivating and maintaining a small cadre of 
individuals to assist in completing organizational goals and priorities. The supervisor is 
then more likely to use their formal authority in addressing those who are not members of 
the small cadre of trusted assistants (Damsereau et al., 1975). 
The operant behavior theory is related to the theoretical framework of the study in 
that it explains why individuals behave in a given manner. Skinner (1938) stated 
respondent behavior resulted from visible stimuli, while operant behavior is the result of 
stimuli that are not visible. Skinner’s (1938, 1963) seminal work involving the operant 
conditioning of rats through the use of both positive and negative reinforcements and 
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punishment, instead of reflexes, provided evidence on how organisms react. Over a 
period, as organisms develop “terminal performance” based on trial and error through the 
use of reinforcements and punishments (Skinner, 1963). A stimulus is a powerful tool 
used to control behavior in organisms. The use of positive reinforcements increases the 
likelihood of the organism achieving the desired behaviors (Skinner, 1938, 1963). 
Removing the negative also reinforces increases in the likelihood of the organism 
achieving the desired behaviors (Skinner, 1938, 1963). The uses of punishments are 
designed to reduce behaviors that are not appropriate (Skinner, 1963). The result of the 
use of reinforcements and punishments is behavior modification. Leaders used this 
behavior modification to shape the behavior of employees to meet organizational and 
policy goals. 
The motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg two-factor theory) holds that two 
factors influence employees job motivation (Herzberg, 1959). According to Herzberg, 
employees are motivated by hygiene (extrinsic) and motivational (intrinsic) factors. 
Herzberg described hygiene or extrinsic factors those factors related to job conditions, 
such as financial rewards, benefits, policies, organizational culture, and employment 
conditions. Extrinsic factors are not motivators. However, they could be the cause of or 
used to prevent employee dissatisfaction (Herzberg, 1959). Herzberg identified hygiene 
factors as dissatisfies that are needed to prevent dissatisfaction. Hygiene factors fulfill 
physiological needs of individuals (Herzberg, 1959). Motivational or intrinsic factors are 
satisfiers that relate to the nature of an individual job, such as the freedom in their work 
environment, meaningful work, and ability to advance their professional lives and 
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personal growth (Herzberg, 1959 & 1974). Herzberg stated that appropriate intrinsic 
rewards lead to increased employee motivation and satisfaction. Job satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction are a by-product of the different work factors Herzberg. The motivational 
or intrinsic factors are psychological needs of individuals for achievement, personal and 
professional growth, recognition, responsibility, and meaningful work (Herzberg). 
Godstadt and Kipnis (1970) used an experimental study, 2 X 2 factorial design, to 
investigate the use of the bases of power by supervisors, in response to subordinate 
issues. Burke and Wilcox (1971) conducted surveys of employees to rank their reason for 
compliance with the supervisor’s usage of the bases of social power. Brewer and Wann 
(1998) used an experimental design, with a Likert scale to determine the effectiveness of 
a model through the use of the expert, legitimate, and referent bases of power, in 
observational learning. Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery, and Wesolowski (1998) used 
surveys to investigate the effect social power has on procedural justice, job satisfaction, 
and organizational commitment. The major strength of the study is the use of Hinkin and 
Schriesheim’s (1989) measures, which does not involve the use of ipsative scales. 
Friedkin (1993) conducted a longitudinal case study to determine how social power 
related to organizational issues resolution. The data collection method involved 
respondents using rank order measures. Erchul, Raven, and Wilson’s (2004) surveyed 
school using a modified Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI; Raven et al., 1998) to 
determine the use of hard or soft power bases by school psychologists. Schwarzward, 
Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) also investigated the use hard or soft power tactics 
within organizations and surveyed the respondents completed an adapted IPI (Raven et 
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al.,). Lines (2007) surveyed employees of a telecommunications company to determine 
the relationship between expert power and position power tactics us to install successful 
strategies. The authors stated the failure to address all the bases of power limited the 
research findings. The studies that used ipsative scales suffer from validity and reliability 
issues.  
The dependent variables are the bases of social power; coercive, expert, 
informational, legitimate, reward, and referent power. Based on the literature review, all 
or some of the power bases are relevant variables. The independent variables include age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, education, the length of service, and political ideology/affiliation 
and they play a role in how social agents view subordinates (Mundate and Bennebroek 
Gravenhorst, 2003; Erchul, Raven, & Wilson, 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty and Erchul, 2009, 
Hollibaugh, Horton, & Lewis, 2014). 
The current literature review provided evidence that the new public management 
reforms (NPM) resulted in radically reforming civil service systems government entities 
to varying degrees at the local, state, and federal levels across America over the last two-
plus decades. The reoccurring themes derived from the current literature review showed 
that the goals of the reforms are to hold public employees more accountable to executive 
control, decentralize of personnel systems, and the elimination of tradition merit 
protections Battaglio, 2010, Gertz, 2008; Gertz, 2008; Kellough & Nigro; Kim and 
Kellough, 2014; & Hays & Sowa, 2006). The reforms altered the employer-employee 
relationship (Bowman, Gertz, G., Gertz, S.,& Williams, 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; 
Crowell & Guy, 2010). The reforms that are politically motivated lead to increased levels 
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of patronage and corruption (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Bowman, 2007; Crowell & 
Guy, 2010; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 2015;  Koven, 2007; Maranto & Johnson, 2008). 
Lastly, there is a lack of consensus among scholars, and public service practitioners of the 
effectiveness of the reforms have achieved the objectives (Bowman, et al., 2003; 
Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010). 
Holding government employees more accountable to executive control is 
achieved by the reducing or eliminating traditional merit protections, use of at-will 
employment practices, and decentralization of personnel systems (Bowman, 2002; Nigro 
& Kellough, 2008; West & Bowman, 2004). Public service employees’ motivations are 
different than private sector employees and the Service First Initiative (2001) altered 
employer-employee relationship (Bowman, et al, 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; and 
Crowell & Guy, 2010). Politicians used NPM principles and Service First Initiative 
reforms to increase executive control over government employees, resulting in the 
increased usage of patronage practices (Bearfield, 2009; Dahlstrom, Lapuente, & Teorell, 
2012).  
Civil Service Reform 
The article, “A Broader Look at the Accountability Movement, Some Grim 
Realities in State Civil Service System, reported on research into the impact reforms to 
civil service had on the management of human resources in all 50 states (Hays & Sowa, 
2006). The reforms have redefined the employer-employee relationship (Hays & Sowa, 
2006). The study investigated if radical reforms in states like Florida and Georgia were 
spreading to other state governments as well. The authors used telephone surveys of 
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human resources management offices of all 50 states and focused on changes involving 
human resources management practices (Hays & Sowa, 2006). The study found the 
widespread support that the human resource management practices were being 
fundamentally changed, through the use of tactics designed to improve accountability, 
decentralization, eroding employee due process rights, and a movement toward at-will 
employment (Hays & Sowa, 2006). Hallmarks of traditional civil service systems were 
falling by the wayside and replaced with more flexible human resource management 
practices. The movement towards at-will employment allowed politicians and political 
appointees greater flexibility to hire and appoint individuals who have the same political 
ideologies. The study was relevant to the current research as the changed employer-
employee relationship changes how leaders view employees and can alter the choice of 
what power base the leaders choose to employ. 
The radical civil service reform movement ushered in by the NPM movement s 
opened Pandora’s box and the door to the return of the spoils system, by way of at-will 
government employment (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Condrey and Battaglio reviewed 
research on the radical civil service reform movement and documented lessons learned 
from Georgia, Florida, and Texas. They found there was no credible measure of the 
reform effectiveness due to maturity issues (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Some early 
lessons involving radical civil reforms found that at-will employment was expanding in 
all states in varying degrees and the projected improvements in employee performance 
has not been achieved as promised (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Approximately half of 
HR practitioners believed recruitment and retention of employees suffered and failed to 
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achieve promised improved performance and efficiency (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). 
Condrey and Battaglio found that older HR practitioners are more likely to view the 
reforms negatively, and young HR practitioners tended to view the reforms positively. 
HR practitioners from larger agencies support the reforms at a higher rate than those from 
smaller agencies practitioner (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). Political ideologies did not 
affect HR practitioners support for the reforms and those who experienced abusive 
managers being less likely to support at-will employment (Condrey & Battaglio, 2007). 
The use of at-will employment is at the core of the reforms and politicians and appointees 
can use to build political support from government employees. The study was relevant to 
the current research as at-will employment reduces restrictions that prevented politicians 
and political appointees from engaging in patronage employment practices. 
There is a threat of a large-scale return of patronage as a result of the civil service 
reforms with the movement towards decentralized government HR practices have been 
sweeping the country over the last 25 years. The reform movement advocated moving to 
at-will employment and discarding traditional civil service protections (Feeney & 
Kingsley, 2008). At-will employment has led to disastrous public service outcomes when 
political supporters, who are not qualified or under qualified for government positions are 
hired (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). There is evidence of at-will federal employees during 
President George Bush administrations attempted or altered government reports to match 
the political ideology of the administration (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). Traditional merit 
protections have proven to be the most effective method to prevent public corruption and 
patronage (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008). At-will employment practices allow politicians to 
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appoint political supporters who share the same political ideologies regardless of their 
qualifications. The study was relevant to the current research as leaders decide which 
power base to use to influence the target of influence attempt, based on their views of the 
target of the influence attempt. Whalen and Guy (2008) investigated the trend of 
broadbanding in the civil service systems in the states of Florida, South Carolina, and 
Virginia. Broadbanding involves reducing the salary grades and expanding the pay bands 
within the civil service system (Whalen & Guy, 2008). Proponents of broadbanding argue 
that it gives managers the ability to promote or reassign workers and move toward pay 
for the performance-based system, improving government effectiveness (Whalen & Guy, 
2008). Broadbanding critics argue the practice leads to favoritism, pay inequity, job 
dissatisfaction, increased stress, performance issues, and justification for reducing 
staffing levels (Whalen & Guy, 2008). The majority of states rejected implementing 
broadbanding policies based on the cost-benefit analysis (Whalen & Guy, 2008). The 
study surveyed managers in Florida, South Carolina, and Virginia state agencies with low 
turnover rate The survey asked the respondents questions centered on how broadbanding 
had (a) improved flexibility in job assignments and salary administration, (b) enabled pay 
for performance, and (c) enabled later movement within and across department” (Whalen 
and Guy, 2008). The study found a common theme of instituting broadbanding practices 
was to link employee pay with performance (Whalen & Guy, 2008). Whalen and Guy 
found the pay for performance efforts had not achieved the desired results, as managers 
with not been given the latitude to reward high performing individuals. The study was 
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relevant to the current research as the broadbanding efforts in Florida has not proven to 
be effective in improving employee performance. 
Gertz (2008) examined the emergence of at-will employment in public service 
from its origins. The concept of at-will employment was derived from English common 
law when employment was contractual and in the absence of defined terms, one year was 
presumed to be the length of the contract (Gertz, 2008). A New York Court in 1891 ruled 
it was legal to terminate employees mid-term of employment contract (Gertz, 2008). 
Before the 1960’s, collective bargaining was the primary tool employees used for setting 
terms and conditions of employment (Gertz, 2008). Abuses of at-will employment 
practices forced politicians and the courts to place restrictions on the use of at-will 
employment practices by way of prohibiting firing employees for union activities, anti-
discrimination legislation, judicial exceptions, public policy and contract exceptions, and 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception (Gertz, 2008). However, 
over the last 30 years, government leaders expanded the use of at-will employment 
through reduction or elimination of employee due process rights (Gertz, 2008). Courts 
have ruled that reclassification of career service employees to at-will classification does 
not deprive them of any property interest (Gertz, 2008). The article was relevant to the 
current research as Florida’s politicians and political appointees take arbitrary and 
capricious personnel actions against state employees by firing them without due process. 
Kaifeng and Kassekert (2009) investigated a link between civil service reforms 
and federal government employee jobs satisfaction. The authors noted that high levels of 
job satisfaction improved employee and organizational outcomes through the reduction of 
47 
 
negative behaviors (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). Over the last two decades, NPM 
reforms resulted in the reduction or elimination of traditional civil service merit 
protections by exempting some federal agencies from the Federal Service System 
(Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). The exempted federal agencies engaged in non-traditional 
strategies of outsourcing work, at-will employment, and managing for results policies. 
The issues of employee trust in leadership and perceived effectiveness of performance 
appraisals moderate the NPM reforms effect on job satisfaction (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 
2009). The authors examined secondary data from the 2006 Federal Human Capital 
Survey and 2006 Federal Workforce Information Data to determine the effect NPM 
reforms had on federal employee job satisfaction (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). The study 
provided evidence of a negative association between employee job satisfaction and NPM 
reforms and contracting out (Kaifeng & Kassekert, 2009). Yang & Kassekert (2009) 
discovered a positive association between individual NPM tenants and employee job 
satisfaction (Yang & Kassekert, 2009). The findings of the study were relevant to the 
current research as employee job satisfaction has a bearing on the organizational and 
individual outcome, and there is a negative association between managing-for-results 
reforms and jobs satisfaction. The State of Florida’s Service First Initiative (2001) 
incorporates NPR reforms and affects state employees. 
Moynihan and Roberts (2010) investigated politicization of the federal executive 
branch under President George W. Bush’s administration. Politicization is used to 
increase executive control of government bureaucracy and can be traced back to 
President Andrew Jackson, mainly through the use of patronage appointments (Moynihan 
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& Roberts2010). The politicization movement of the executive branch gained strength 
during the administrations of President’s Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan (Moynihan 
& Roberts, 2010). When President George W. Bush took office, he appointed political 
supporters who were loyal to his political agenda, disregarding the merit of their 
qualifications for the position (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010). In one infamous example of 
President George W. Bush’s was the decision to appoint political loyalist over more 
qualified and competent individuals. Michael Brown and senior agency staff at the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency during the time of Hurricane Katrina were prior 
political operatives and loyalist who had no to little emergency management experience 
and were responsible for the federal government’s disastrous response (Moynihan & 
Roberts, 2010). Other examples included replacing senior U.S. attorneys with political 
loyalist with little experience in key positions within the justice department, replacing 
immigration judges with partisan judges, and using political affiliation/ideology in 
screening job applicants (Moynihan & Roberts2010). The Coalitional Provisional 
Authority was the agency responsible for the reconstruction of Iraq, was staffed by 
mostly “young, inexperienced, unrealistic” political loyalist (Moynihan & Roberts, 2010, 
p. 573). There also is evidence that political loyalist altered government reports and 
ignored scientific evidence, to match the administration’s political agenda (Moynihan & 
Roberts, 2010). The study was relevant to the current research concerning the dangers of 




Rubin and Kellough (2012) investigated the effects that civil service reforms 
impact employee behaviors and the association between alternative personnel systems, 
procedural justice perceptions, and complaints filed by employees in fifty-one federal 
government agencies (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). The author’s defined alternative 
personnel systems as those with personnel systems other than traditional civil service 
systems (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). Rubin and Kellough used Leventhal’s (1980) six 
criteria of voice, correctability, bias suppression, accuracy, ethicality, and consistency. 
The dependent variable was the number of formal employee complaints filed with an 
agency. Rubin and Kellough found that there were no significant correlations between 
alternative personnel systems, procedural justice, or the number of complaints filed. 
However, complaints in agencies that implemented alternative personnel systems in 2005 
had 41.4% fewer complaints in 2006 than comparative agencies (Rubin & Kellough, 
2012). Agencies with alternative personnel systems saw an initial increase in the number 
of complaints, followed by a decrease in the number of complaints filed by employees. 
(Rubin & Kellough, 2012). There was not a significant association between perceptions 
of procedural justice and agencies with alternate personnel systems (Rubin & Kellough, 
2012). The finding does not account for systematic differences that showed reduced 
employee complainants in agencies with alternative personnel systems as the highest and 
lowest rated agencies had alternative personnel systems (Rubin & Kellough, 2012). The 
study was relevant to the current research on employee perceptions of higher levels of 
procedural justice within their agency, results in a higher level of compliance. 
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The decentralizing of human resources practices in civil service has been a central 
theme of domestic and international government reform movements. Domestic and 
international reforms efforts have achieved varying degrees of success. Sundell (2014) 
systematically investigated the effectiveness of reforms in 106 countries. Using data from 
the Quality of Government (Teorell, et al., 2013), researchers discovered countries with 
lower merit requirements have higher levels of patronage, and those countries with higher 
merit requirements have lower levels of patronage appointments (Sundell, 2014). 
Decentralizing human resources functions increase the likelihood of patronage based on 
political ideology/affiliation occurring in hiring and promoting government employees. 
When the risk of patronage appointment is high, there is a potential that politicians and 
political appointees would use the coercive and reward power bases on potential 
employees and current employees to punish non-supporters and reward their supporters. 
McGrath (2013) investigated factors that led to the adoption of radical civil 
reform in the U.S. States since 1996. The author presented a summation of the major 
developments leading to the development of the federal civil service system and 
significant reform attempts. These developments included from the excess of the spoils 
system, passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act (1883), Civil Service Reform 
Act (1978), to the adoption of civil service by state governments (McGrath, 2013). In 
1996, the State of Georgia instituted radical reforms to its Civil Service System through 
decentralization, deregulation, and removal of traditional merit protection for state 
employees (McGrath, 2013). Other states reformed their civil service systems to some 
degree since Georgia’s reforms of 1996. McGrath found that the degree of civil service 
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reforms in states was dependent upon factors related to the political strength of the 
governor, partisan strength and composition of the legislative, special interest group 
involvement, and electoral dominance of a political party. Florida, with the passage of the 
Service First Initiative (2001) reformed its Civil Service System through decentralization, 
deregulation, and removal of traditional merit protection for state employees. The study is 
relevant to the current research as the Republican Party of Florida have controlled the 
Office of Governor and held super majorities in the legislative branch of government 
since 2000. The Service First Initiative allows Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees to reward political supporters with jobs or promotions, as a result of the 
removal of merit protections and loss of due process rights. 
Hausser (2013) questioned McGrath’s (2013) narrow conceptualization of merit 
and the unfavorable views of human resource decentralization. Hausser stated that 
researchers often overlook the fact that merit requires government employees to be 
qualified, in addition to providing employee protections. The makeup of the government 
workforce must change with the dynamic shift in the work design and adopt new human 
resource management (HRM) practices (Hausser, 2013). Throughout the history of civil 
service, there have been alterations to HRM systems and employee due process rights, 
without removing merit principles (Hausser, 2013). As government organizations move 
forward with HRM reforms, they need to mindful a broader definition of merit and 
ensure those protections remain in place (Hausser, 2013). The article was relevant to the 
research as to the design and implementation of the reforms affect employee perceptions 
and their responses to influence attempts. 
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Repucci (2014) addressed the failure of civil service reforms to meet the 
objectives of improving governance due to its ad hoc and misguided approach from an 
international perspective. Repucci stated that civil service reforms need to be addressed 
in the context of:] 
“…understanding the local context, political will and government ownership, 
weak governance in the country as a whole, systems of patronage in the civil 
service, appreciation of the long-term costs nature of civil service reform and the 
impact of reform costs on the programme’s sustainability” (p. 207).  
The ability to sustain civil service reforms require the prioritization of reforms, the 
participation of a broad range of stakeholders, and the incremental institution of reforms 
(Repucci, 2014). Repucci insights into designing effective civil service reforms in the 
international community apply to the civil service reform movement in America. The 
consensus among scholars and practitioners is that the reforms have not achieved the 
stated objectives. The study was relevant to the current research as the State of Florida 
political leaders used their super majorities in the Florida Legislature to pass the Service 
First Initiative (2001), with the help of Florida Tax Watch, a special interest group. The 
process cut out key stakeholders out of the process. 
Kim and Kellough (2014) investigated the perceptions of human resource 
directors in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, and South Carolina about at-
will employment in their state. The authors conducted 268 web-based surveys and 12 
traditional mail-based surveys of HR directors in the states listed above (Kim & 
Kellough, 2014). Survey questions concerned aspects of civil service reforms, 
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demographic and background information involving the HR directors. The survey 
consisted of 8 statements regarding at-will employment, with four being positive 
assessments and four being negative assessments of at-will employment (Kim & 
Kellough, 2014). The authors the variables of sex, race/ethnicity, political/ideology, 
private sector experience, length of manager’s experience in the public sector, degree of 
belief that at-will employment is used to promote patronage, belief that employees feel 
they can trust the organization will treat them fairly, and a dummy variable to indicate 
what state the respondents were from (Kim & Kellough, 2014). The study found that 
respondents generally agree with the positive statements, but only the statement of “helps 
ensure employees are responsive to the goals and priorities of agency administrators,” 
found that the majority of respondents agreed on (Kim & Kellough, 2014, p. 228). The 
variables of female and race/ethnicity were not significantly related to positive 
statements, and conservative HR directors believed that at-will employment increased 
employee productivity (Kim & Kellough, 2014). The findings of the study were relevant 
to the current research as the demographic variables play a role in how individuals 
perceived the exercise of power within a government organization. 
Verkuil (2015) addressed the deprofessionalization of state governments through 
the move to at-will employment practices. The premise of at-will employment is that it 
ensures employees are more accountable to organizational outcomes. State governments 
in just over half of the U.S. states have embraced the concept of at-will employment to 
varying degrees (Verkuil, 2015). One of the challenges state government must overcome 
the differences in the goals of private sector organizations and state governments. At-will 
54 
 
government employees, in essence, are political employees and are not afforded 
traditional merit protections. The reclassification of public employees to at-will 
classification reduces the career employees and replaces them with political appointees 
(Verkuil, 2015). As the maturation of reforms grows, the loss of career employees 
becomes more pronounced, and they take their expertise and corporate knowledge with 
them. The article was relevant to the current research in that Florida expanded its usage 
of at-will employment through the Service First Initiative (2001). Florida’s governor and 
political appointees have fewer restrictions to reward political supporters and punish 
those who do not possess the same political ideology/affiliation, in the execution of their 
executive duties. 
Service First Initiative 
The Service First Initiative (2001) literature review revealed reoccurring themes 
from the civil service reforms known as NPM. The first recurring theme is the desire to 
make public employees more accountable to executive control and improve performance 
(West & Bowman, 2004; Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The second theme was a movement 
towards at-will employment for Florida State employees through the elimination or 
reductions of traditional merit protections, altering the employee-employer relationship, 
and decentralization of personnel systems (Bowman, 2002; Nigro & Kellough, 2008; 
West & Bowman, 2004). The third theme found that the reforms are grounded in political 
ideology (Bowman, 2002; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Williams & Bowman, 2007). The 
fourth reoccurring theme is that the Service First Initiative (2001) reforms impacted 
employees job satisfaction and outcomes (Bowman & West, 2006; Bowman, Gertz, G., 
55 
 
Gertz, S., & Williams, 2003; Crowell & Guy, 2010). The fifth reoccurring theme is a lack 
of evidence demonstrating the reforms achieved the stated goals (Bowman & West, 2006; 
Bowman, et al., 2003; Crowell & Guy, 2010). Finally, the Service First Initiative reforms 
have resulted in patronage employment practices increasing in Florida State employment 
(Bowman, 2002; Bowman, et al., 2003; Bowman & West, 2006; Crowell & Guy, 2010). 
Bowman (2002) stated that the merit protections found in Florida Civil Service 
were at risk due to the civil service reform movement. Bowman stated that civil service is 
not ineffective as described by politicians, who use the civil service reform mantra as a 
vehicle to achieve political power. At-will government employment fell out of favor as a 
result of the spoils system that dominated federal government employment until the good 
government movement ushered in the concepts of modern civil service (Bowman, 2002). 
The concept of merit was instituted to protect government employees from abuses by 
politicians (Bowman, 2002). The radical civil service reform movement seeks to 
eliminate due-process rights of government employees and replace it with “…partisan 
allegiance, political responsiveness, and personal connections…” (Bowman, 2002, 93). 
Governor Jeb Bush championed the civil service reform movement in Florida along with 
a coalition of business special interest groups, culminating in the Service First Initiative 
(2001). The Service First Initiative passed the Florida Senate and House of 
Representatives with the partisan support of the dominant political party (Bowman, 
2002). Florida was limited in its efforts to move towards at-will employment for all state 
employees as it was only able to move just over 16,000 supervisory employees to at-will 
employment classification (Bowman, 2002). Bowman questioned the rationale towards 
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the use of at-will employment as government, and business employment practices differ, 
and there is no consensus as to whether civil service or at-will employment practices are 
the most beneficial. At the time of the publication of the article, there was evidence of 
political patronage hiring taking place in Florida’s employment practices. The article was 
relevant to the current research as the move to at-will employment in Florida allows 
politicians to hire state employees based on political affiliation/ideology.  
Bowman, Gertz, G., Gertz, S., and Williams (2003) investigated the effects the 
Service First Initiative (2001) had on Florida government employee attitudes. The authors 
conducted telephone surveys of 457 SES employee who are at-will employees and 
responded to thirty eight agree-disagree statements and multiple-choice questions as the 
data collection instrument (Bowman, et al., 2003). The results of the study provided 
insight into employee perceptions of the implementation of Service First Initiative, work 
environment, and the future impact of reforms (Bowman, et al., 2003). In regards to 
implementation of the Service First, only 42% believed Service First was communicated 
effectively to state employees, and the majority (57%) thought the goal was to provide 
flexibility to hire, fire, reward and punish employees (Bowman et al., 2003). Only 50% of 
respondents believed Service First made employees more responsive while 61% of 
respondents did not believe the lack of job protections made employees work harder 
(Bowman et al., 2003). Respondents (49%) would recommend state employment to 
others, and 65% believed their agency was a good place to work (Bowman et al., 2003). 
The majority of respondents (55%) were not happy with their compensation, and 72% did 
not believe financial resources were available to reward high performers (Bowman et al., 
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2003). Most employees (80%) did not believe they could do more with less, and 43% 
believed their agency had inflated senior management ranks (Bowman et al., 2003). As to 
the future impact of reforms, only 18% of respondents believed that Service First made 
employees more productive (Bowman et al., 2003). The study was relevant to the current 
research on the perceptions of SES affect how they employ the bases of social power in 
influence attempts.  
West and Bowman (2004) examined the perspective of Florida’s stakeholders in 
analyzing the Service First Initiative (2001) reforms. Florida reforms are related “(a) 
power, legitimacy, and issue urgency; (b) immediate, dependent, discretionary, or 
dormant status; and (c) interest definition” (West & Bowman, 2004, p. 24). Instrumental 
analysis views government employees as a tool to accomplish organizational goals and is 
hard HRM (West & Bowman, 2004). Normative analysis (Soft HRM) focused on 
employee development (West & Bowman, 2004). The instrumental hard HRM approach 
involved the shifting just over 16,000 employees to at-will employment classification, 
watered down due process rights, eliminated bumping rights, reformed hiring process, 
and instituted new training, performance appraisal and classification system (West & 
Bowman, 2004). The developmental soft HRM approach included the performance 
appraisal and the pay and classification system (West & Bowman, 2004). The reforms 
were designed to reduce or eliminate employee rights and protections, increase 
government efficiency, and to make employees more responsive to executive leadership 
(West & Bowman, 2004). The hard instrumental HRM reforms removed positive aspects 
of government employment, as evidenced by 18% of new at-will employees did not 
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believe the goals of the reforms are achievable (West & Bowman, 2006). The study was 
relevant to the current research in that perception of employees about politicians and 
political impact the decision to embrace influence attempts. 
Bowman and West (2006) conduct a qualitative study into the Service First 
Initiative (2001) changes to Florida Civil Service System that transferred over 16, 000 
supervisors to the SES from the CS classifications. The authors conducted semistructured 
telephone interviews with management and supervisory employees from Florida’s 
Department of Transportation, Department of Environmental Protection, and Department 
of Children and Families (Bowman & West, 2006). The interview questions related to the 
effects of Service First Initiative had on government human resource practices in Florida 
(Bowman & West, 2006). Several themes emerged from the study. First, HR managers 
were more likely to view the reforms positively as they believed the reforms improved 
recruitment, allowed for greater manager flexibility, increased public service 
attractiveness while having little effect on pay, loyalty, or productivity (Bowman & West, 
2006). SES respondents were divided on whether the reforms are improved recruitment 
(Bowman & West, 2006). Most SES respondents believed the reforms were a tool to 
downsize state government (Bowman & West, 2006). The majority of SES respondents 
agreed the reforms had little to no effect on pay, performance, productivity or service 
(Bowman & West, 2006). The majority of SES respondents felt patronage increased as a 
result of the reforms as employees were less likely to report problematic behavior due to 
the fear of losing their jobs. The study was relevant to the current research regarding the 
59 
 
implementation of the reforms effected employer and employee perceptions of each other 
and influences the choice to uses the bases of social power in influence attempts. 
Williams and Bowman (2007) addressed Florida’s civil service reforms and at-
will employment from the perspective of late philosopher George Santayana. Modern 
civil service's origins are rooted in the good government movement that led to the 
passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act (1883) and attempted to limit the ability of 
politicians use of the spoils system in governance (Williams & Bowman, 2007). The 
current reform movement is not based on the excesses of politician’s in the execution of 
official duties, but in political ideology (Williams & Bowman, 2007). Florida’s Service 
First Initiative (2001) was a way to modernize civil service and place emphasis on 
employee performance (Williams & Bowman, 2007). Service First Initiative supporters 
in Florida’s Senate and House of Representatives employed tactics to limit debate and 
stacked legislative committees, placed restrictions on amendments, and partisan hearings 
(Williams & Bowman, 2007). George Santayana stated “Chaos is the name for any order 
that produces confusion in our minds.” as cited in Williams and Bowman (2007, p. 69). 
Florida’s drive for reform of its merit system did create chaos as it was one of the most 
efficient civil service systems and the arguments for supporting the reforms was 
ambiguous (Williams & Bowman, 2007). The reforms of the Service First Initiative have 
created confusion and have not produced the stated goals. This article was relevant as it 
shows the Service First Initiative reforms to be politically motivated. 
Nigro and Kellough (2008) reviewed progress in the civil service reform 
movement since the Winter Commission Report (1993), in the United States. The Winter 
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Commission Report called for the deregulation of personnel policies, reducing job 
classifications and titles (broadbanding), restricting veterans preference and minority 
hiring, improve labor relations, align personnel management towards with management 
and organizational goals, and provide a focus on organizational outcomes (Nigro & 
Kellough, 2008). The Winter Commission Report also recommended that organizations 
improve career and training opportunities by increasing training and education by 3 
percent of the budget, pay reform based on skills, and provide financial incentives for 
new skills (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). States engaged in civil service reforms to varying 
degrees in the ensuing years. Georgia and Florida were two states that radically reformed 
their civil service system but to different degrees. Georgia moved to total at-will 
employment for all new hires after 1996, while Florida moved to reduce or eliminate 
traditional merit protections in 2001 (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The states have not 
followed the central components of the Winter Commission’s recommended reform, 
instead, have used the reforms to punish public employees and labor unions. The article 
was relevant to the current research as civil service reforms altered the employer-
employee relationship and allowed politicians and political appointees the ability to 
reward and punish employees through the remove of traditional merit protections. 
Crowell and Guy (2010) investigated the effects of human resources reforms that 
resulted from the Service First Initiative (2001). Crowell and Gay’s (2010) qualitative 
study used a grounded theory approached and focused on the perceptions of Florida State 
employees and managers of the implementation of the Service First Initiative and the 
outsourcing Florida’s HR functions. The authors conducted face to face interviews with 
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state employee and managers to understand their experiences regarding the reforms. The 
themes that emerged from the interviews centered on performance incentives, recruitment 
and selection, broadbanding, patronage hiring, and employee morale (Crowell & Guy, 
2010). Respondents described performance incentives (bonus) as ineffective as they 
believe the performance initiative (bonus) program is not fair or objective (Crowell & 
Guy, 2010). Respondent believed that recruitment and selection suffered as a result of 
qualifications and experience no longer matter in the selection of employees and hurt the 
diversity of the workforce (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Broadbanding involved reducing over 
4500 employee classifications to 280. Broadband resulted in lower pay ranges and hurt 
recruitment of employees (Crowell & Guy, 2010). Most respondents believed patronage 
hiring has returned and hurt their respective agency operational effectiveness and 
efficiency (Crowell & Guy, 2010. Lastly, employee morale has suffered as a result of the 
loss of employment security and the negative impact on benefits from the passage of the 
Service First Initiative. The study was relevant to the current research as politicians, and 
political appointees have greater flexibility to uses rewards and punishments to achieve 
policy goals. 
Public Service Motivation 
The literature review of public service motivation (PSM) provided evidence that 
government employee motivation is different than private sector employee motivation 
and resulted in the motivators behind PSM. This article was relevant to the current study 
as the PSM of politicians, political appointees, and state employees play a role in the 
exercise of social power and willingness of employees to comply with influence attempts. 
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Caillier (2015) conducted a study to determine the association between public 
service motivation (PSM and mission valence on “job satisfaction, extra-role behaviors, 
and turnover intentions”(p. 1228). PSM is the motivation individuals have for public 
service, and mission valence relates to the degree of importance individuals attach to the 
mission of an organization (Caillier, 2015). Caillier surveyed local, state, and federal 
government employees via the web-based survey company SurveyMonkey PMS, mission 
valence, turnover intentions, and extra-role behaviors were measured using Likert-type 
scales, 5-item short-scale, Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan’s (2008) 3 item scale, Kuvass’ 
(2006) 3 items scale, and Balfour and Wechsler (1996) 3 item scale, respectfully 
(Caillier, 2015). The findings provided evidence of PSM positively affected mission 
valence (β = 0.352, p ˂ .001), extra-role behaviours (β= 0,498, p ˂ .001) (Caillier, 2015). 
PSM did not have an effect job satisfaction (p ˂ 0.05) and job satisfaction negatively 
affected turnover intentions (β = -0.481, p ˂ .001), and had a positive effect on extra-role 
behaviours (β = 0.133, p ˂ .001 (Caillier, 2015). The results of the study were relevant to 
the current research as the PSM of politicians, political appointees, and government 
employees affect how the bases of social power are employed. 
Caillier (2016) conducted a study into the role of public service motivation (PSM) 
plays in goal clarity, organizational commitment, and extra-role behaviors. The author 
conducted a survey of government employees on the local, state, and federal levels using 
the web-based survey company SurveyMonkey (Caillier, 2016). Respondents were asked 
their level of agreement with four multi-item measures using a Likert-type scale, ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Caillier, 2016). The multiple mediations 
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used in the study required the use of the single model and structural equation modeling in 
the data analysis (Caillier, 2016). The study found that PSM and goal clarity are 
positively associated (B= .115; p ˂ .001), goal clarity had a positive relationship with 
organizational commitment (B = .449; p ˂ .001) and extra-role behavior (B = .115; p ˂ 
.001 (Caillier, 2016). The findings indicate that when employees understand the goals of 
their organization, it increases their PSM (Caillier, 2016). The clarity of goals leads to 
increased levels of organizational commitment and extra-role behaviors (Caillier, 2016). 
The finding of the study was relevant to the current research as to the level of PMS of 
politicians, political appointees, and government employees affect how the bases of 
social power are employed, and the effectiveness of an influences attempt. 
Patronage 
Patronage employment practices in America has a long and convoluted history, 
and some of the patronage tactics have changed over time. One of the recurring themes 
identified from the literature review on patronage is that civil service reforms are used by 
politicians to change patronage employment practices and derive greater control over 
government employees (Bearfield, 2009; and Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2012). 
The second theme identified is that reforms increase the likelihood of patronage practices 
and corruption (Bearfield, 2009; Dahlstrom et al.,2012) 
The article “What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination”, is a review of the 
existing scholarship on patronage (Bearfield, 2009). Historically, politicians used 
patronage as a reward to build and maintain political support. Patronage tactics included 
appointing supporters to government jobs, boards, commissions, and awarding 
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government contracts to supporters. The article challenged long-held assumptions that 
patronage is the study of the political party machinery and evil, which the author believed 
is outdated in modern society (Bearfield, 2009). Bearfield identified the four types of 
modern patronage as organizational, democratic, tactical, and reform patronage. Bearfield 
defined organizational patronage as traditional patronage practices. Tactical patronage 
involves the use of patronage in overcoming political obstacles through building alliances 
with others to achieve tactical goals (Bearfield, 2009). Democratic patronage involves 
equal access to government jobs and promoting representative government workforce 
(Bearfield, 2009). Reform patronage is the use of the reform refrain to appeal to the 
voters that they will change the patronages practices of past officeholders (Bearfield, 
2009). The use of reforms tactics to reform the workings of government opens a new 
door for patronage in government employment. Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees can use democratic patronage to build and maintain political support. The 
article was relevant to the current research as for how leaders view of the target of the 
influence attempt to determine what base of power the leaders chooses to employ. 
The article, The merit of meritocratization: Politics, bureaucracy, and the 
institutional deterrents of corruption, reports the finding of a study into the bureaucratic 
and political impediments to public service corruption (Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and 
Teorell, 2012). The study involved surveying 520 experts in public administration from 
fifty two nations on their perceptions of corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). The study 
found bureaucratic professionalism was the most efficient method of reducing public 
corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). Additionally, merit principles applied to the 
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recruitment of government employees were found to be the most effective corruption 
deterrent (Dahlstrom et al., 2012). However, the formal recruitment examinations and 
career protections were found to be not relevant in preventing political corruption 
(Dahlstrom et al., 2012). The meritocratic bureaucratic recruitment features and removal 
of political influence provide the best tools for the reduction of government corruption 
(Dahlstrom et al., 2012). Without merit principles and bureaucratic professionalism, 
politicians are free to appoint anyone to government positions regardless of competency, 
which leads to increased levels of corruption. Merit in hiring and employment and 
promotional practices has been the most effective measure in the prevention of 
corruption. The study was relevant to the current research as politicians and political 
appointees who operate in human resources systems having reduced merit protections are 
susceptible to use increased levels of harsh power tactics. Politicians and political 
appointees are more likely to use the coercive and reward power bases to punish potential 
and current employees that are not supportive of the leader’s views and reward their 
supporters. 
Application 
Patronage employment practices in America has a long and convoluted history, 
and the tactics of the patronages have changed over time. One recurring theme identified 
from the literature review on patronage is that civil service reforms are used by 
politicians to change patronage employment practices and derived greater control over 
government employees (Bearfield, 2009). The second theme identified is that reforms 
increase the likelihood of patronage practices and corruption (Bearfield, 2009). The third 
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theme identified is that NPM reforms are politically motivated (Koven, 2007; Maranto & 
Johnson, 2008; Battaglio &  Condrey, 2009; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 2015). The 
fourth theme identified is that there is a lack of consensus on the NPM reforms achieving 
its goals (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009; Coggburn, et al., 2009; Green, Forbis, Golden, 
Nelson, & Robinson, 2006). The fifth theme identified is that patronage practices result in 
negative organizational and individual outcomes (Bowman & West, 2007; Gallo & 
Lewis, 2012; Hollibaugh, 2015; Lewis, 2009; Lui & Mikesell, 2014;  Perry, Engbers, & 
Jun 2009; Wilson, 2006). 
Theriault (2003) investigated the role public pressure has on federal politicians 
enacting reforms that reduce their power and authority. The author stated the prevailing 
view of congressional research holds that congressional members main focus is to get 
reelected and use government institutions and adopt rules that facilitate their reelection 
(Theriault, 2003). Politicians seldom adopt reforms or implement rules or laws that are 
contrary to that end (Theriault, 2003). The passage of the Pendleton Act (1883) was an 
exception to the trend as it eliminated mandatory political contributions and introduced 
the concept of merit in the hiring and promotions of government employees (Theriault, 
2003). The Pendleton Act's (1883) passage was the result of the public’s frustration with 
government inefficiency, political party politics, and public pressure by scholars 
(Theriault, 2003). The author tested the exploitations for reform using multivariate 
analysis and provided evidence that senators and congressmen support for the reforms 
significantly increased as petitions from constituents and the presence of local affiliates 
of the Civil Service Reform League, post offices, and customs houses in the Senate or 
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Congressional Districts (Theriault, 2003). Republicans and lame duck member of 
Congress were more likely to support reforms (Theriault, 2003). Public pressure played a 
significant role in forcing politicians to implement reforms that were contrary to their 
political interests. The study was relevant to the current research in that politicians 
seldom take actions that limit their ability to exercise power and authority unless public 
pressures and the threat of rival political parties likely to gain control of patronage 
appointments. 
Green et al. (2006) investigated the at-will employment attraction to government 
entities in the State of Utah. The exploratory study interviewed 30 appointed and career 
service employees involved in county, local, and state government in the greater Salt 
Lake area (Green et al., 2006). The respondents knew about at-will employment practices 
and were asked questions regarding what influenced their thoughts of at-will employment 
(Green et al., 2006). The finding of the study indicated that the majority of respondents 
did not completely understand at-will employment, respondents were confused about 
their subordinate’s status, at-will employment is not their primary concern, and there was 
a diversion of views on how to implement at-will employment (Green et al., 2006). 
Politicians expect increased responsiveness from career employees, ignore tension most 
of the time, are frustrated with resistance from middle-manager, and believe experts 
should have merit protections (Green et al., 2006). Local government officials disliked 
the procedures and employee merit protections; politicians disliked executive merit 
systems (Green et al., 2006). The majority of respondents felt managers lacked courage 
and lacked training for the positions; managers failed to initiate disciplinary at the 
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appropriate time, and politicians were concerned with the cost of disciplinary actions 
(Green et al., 2006). The majority of respondents believed that employees were motivated 
by merit job protections that fostered trust among politicians, managers, and employees 
(Green et al., 2006). Lastly, the respondents felt the at-will employment pattern in the 
state is sporadic and not a well-planned movement within the state (Green, et al., 2006). 
The article was relevant to the current research on the perceptions of politicians, political 
appointees, and employees of each other affect the bases of social power used in and 
compliance with influence attempt.  
Battaglio and Condrey (2006) conducted a study into the reforms in state and 
local governments through four models of public service human management reforms. 
The four models are the traditional, reform, strategic, and the privatization/outsourcing 
models (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). State and local governments have found it difficult 
to reform human resource management practices and have taken varied approaches to 
reform efforts (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). The most efficient approach to achieving 
reforms is an incremental approach, as it allows stakeholders to build trust, confidence, 
and respect that human resource departments can administer the functions of human 
resources systems (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Georgia approach to reform followed the 
reform model while Florida used both the reform and privatization/outsourcing model 
(Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). New York approach towards reform employed the 
traditional and strategic models (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). Louisiana approached 
involved a combination of the traditional, reform, and strategic models (Battaglio & 
Condrey, 2006). Jefferson County, Alabama used the traditional model and Chapel Hill, 
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North Carolina, used the strategic model (Battaglio & Condrey, 2006). One difficulty 
involved in implementing reforms is that reforms based on political motivation and more 
likely to meet resistance and cause employees to leave government jobs. The study was 
relevant to the current research as the State of Florida approached reforms through the 
reform model and met with stiff resistance from employees.  
Wilson (2006) investigated the consequences of the movement to at-will 
employment and racial inequality in the public sector. Federal and state governments 
have actively engaged in promoting economic opportunities for minorities, especially 
African Americans, to overcome discrimination in the private sector (Wilson, 2006). 
However, African Americans are underrepresented in managerial ranks in state and local 
governments and over-represented in lower level jobs (Wilson, 2006). Inequities between 
Whites and African Americans are less pronounced in the public sector, as African 
Americans earn “80 to 95%” of what whites earn in the public sector (Wilson, 2006). In 
the private sector, African Americans earn “68 to 75%” of what whites earn (Wilson, 
2006). Traditional benefits of working in the public sector include job security, tenure, 
and job satisfaction (Wilson, 2006). Moving to at-will employment threatens the benefits 
of traditional employment (Wilson, 2006). The author argues at-will employment is 
likely to have a disproportionally negative effect on African Americans, based on 
evidence of discriminatory at-will employment practices in the private sector (Wilson, 
2006). The loss of job satisfaction and organizational commitment disproportionally 
impact African Americans in at-will employment environments (Wilson, 2006). The 
article was relevant to the current research, as the ethnic background of employees is a 
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factor of how individuals perceive each other and their choice of what influence tactic to 
use.  
Koven (2007) conducted a case study of the systemic patronage practices hiring 
and employment practices in Kentucky under Republican Governor Ernie Fletcher's 
administration. The case study presents tangible evidence on how politicians and political 
appointees use patronage to build and maintain political support. Investigating a 
complaint alleging criminal violations involving the hiring practices by the governor and 
his political appointees, Kentucky’s Democratic attorney general found evidence of 
abuses involving Kentucky’s merit laws (Koven, 2007). The investigation reviewed the 
governor’s administration was using the Local Initiative for a New Kentucky office to 
review and track civil service job applicants for the state’s Transportation Cabinet and 
developed a list of employees “recommended for transferring, demotion, or firing” 
(Koven, 2007, p..289). Many of the recommended job candidates were unpaid advisors to 
Governor Ernie Fletcher. The governor and nine of his current and past political 
appointees ended up indicted for “twenty-two felony” and “forty-eight misdemeanor” 
criminal charges (Koven, 2007, p. 290). The governor promptly pardoned everyone, 
except himself (Koven, 2007). The study shows the danger of at-will employment based 
on political affiliation or ideologies. The study was relevant to the current research as to 
the manner to which politicians and their political appointees use the bases of power to 
build and maintain political support could increase the usage of hard power tactics. 
Maranto and Johnson (2008) examined the radical civil service reform movement 
in the U.S. states and then ranked the best and worst states for radical civil service 
71 
 
reforms. Key concepts of radical civil service include ending employee seniority rights, 
merit, move state employee to at-will employment positions, to allow managers greater 
discretion in personnel decisions to remove low performers (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). 
Radical civil service reforms are risky in that they have the potential to result in 
patronage employment and corruption of public officials. The authors identified 
patronage demand variables as political culture and tolerance, corruption, and the state 
and nature of the state party organizations (Maranto & Johnson,2008). Political 
environment variables are the effectiveness of media to report patronage and the presence 
of a two-party system with a strong minority political party, and the bureaucratic capacity 
of the state (Maranto & Johnson, 2008). The study showed that state with antiquated 
political cultures, high levels of tolerance towards corruption, and a weak minority 
political party, should refrain from implementing radical civil service reform until 
investments in institutional reforms addressing the weaknesses in the political culture of 
the state (Maranto & Johnson,2008). The article was relevant to the current research in 
that instituted radical civil reform, the full effects of those reforms are just now reaching 
maturity. 
Battaglio and Condrey (2009) investigated the impact of civil service reforms on 
trust between the State of Georgia’s employees and management since the passage of 
radical civil reform in 1996. The authors conducted mailed surveys to 534 Georgia HR 
professionals and had 274 respondents from “88 state agencies, authorities, commissions, 
and boards” (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009, p. 290). The study found HR professionals 
believed that the change to at-will employment increases the usage of spoils and 
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negatively affects HR professionals trust in government (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). 
The movement to at-will employment also negatively affected HR professional’s views 
of job security and decrease the incentives to file whistleblower complaints (Battaglio & 
Condrey, 2009). In regards to procedural justice, HR professionals are less likely to trust 
in management or organization in HR decisions (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). 
Interestingly, the characteristics of respondents did not have a significant impact on any 
measure of trust (Battaglio & Condrey, 2009). The study was relevant to the current 
research as it provides evidence that civil reforms alter the employer-employee 
relationship and changes the employee perceptions of their supervisors and the 
organization. 
Coggburn et al. (2009) investigated the attitudes of government HR professionals 
from Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Mississippi on their commitment towards employment 
at will (EAW). The authors conducted mail surveys of HR professionals and asked 
respondents to answer questions related to at-will employment practices in their 
respective states (Coggburn et al., 2009). The authors employed a “5 point Likert-type 
scale” to measure the level of agreement with the research questions (Coggburn, et al., 
2009, p.195). The survey found respondents believed that EAW made employees 
responsive to agency administrators, provided the motivation to improved employee 
performance, and respondents believed that EAW makes the HR functions more efficient 
(Coggburn et al., 2009). The respondents also believed EAW allows for greater flexibility 
in HR functions and EAW represented essential elements of public service management 
(Coggburn et al., 2009). The respondents believed to a greater extent that employees have 
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been terminated as a result of changing objectives, meeting agency shortfalls, and down-
sizing (Coggburn et al., 2009). Respondents disagreed to a greater extent that EAW was 
used for patronage hiring practices and termination of employees because of personality 
conflicts (Coggburn et al., 2009). The study was relevant to the current research on the 
perceptions of HR professionals in conflict with government employee’s perceptions of 
EAW. 
Liou and Korosec (2009) conducted a study on the strategies used to implement 
reforms to state governments human resource management practices. The reforms are 
part of the broader new public management movement over the last two-plus decades. 
The authors focused their study on the areas of down-sizing government, work design, 
and changes to the systems of government (Liou & Korosec, 2009). The authors 
conducted mail surveys of 223 state government administrators in administration, 
information technology, and acquisition fields and had a response rate of twenty-three 
percent (Liou & Korosec, 2009). The survey questions related to employee, structural, 
and system changes and used a Likert Scale to measure the responses. Liou and 
Korosec’s findings indicated there was a wide discrepancy in the level of implementation 
of the 12 reform strategies between the states. However, the study found that senior 
public managers tended to take a conservative approach to implement reforms (Liou & 
Korosec, 2009). Public managers are likely to implement wholesale reforms than 
piecemeal reforms (Liou & Korosec, 2009). Senior managers are less likely to support 
reforms that require a long-term commitment (Liou & Korosec, 2009). States with sound 
capital management processes are less likely to support costly reform strategies (Liou & 
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Korosec, 2009). States that successfully employ technology to eliminate layers of 
government have improved the delivery of government services (Liou & Korosec, 2009). 
The findings of the study were relevant to the current research as state governments use a 
variety of strategies to implement reforms and politicians, and political appointees can 
replace senior public managers that are more resistant to change. 
Lewis (2009) theorized the use of patronage appointments negatively affects 
policy implementation and agency competence. The majority of existing scholarship 
holds the political appointments allow presidents far greater flexibility in controlling 
federal bureaucracy and implementing policy goals (Lewis, 2009). There is evidence to 
suggest that politicalizing of the executive branch of government make it more difficult 
to control the federal bureaucracy and implementing policy goals (Lewis, 2009). 
Presidents are under intense pressure to engage in patronage appointments and make 
appointments that are harmful, as witnessed in the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina (Lewis, 2009). The author stated that 
there must be a balance of political appointees and career executives as political 
appointees can infuse the agency with new energy (Lewis, 2009). Political appointees 
have less government tenure, expertise, and experience in government, which in turn 
negatively affect the agency’s performance (Lewis, 2009). Presidential usage of large 
numbers of political appointees makes a trade-off between competence and political 
responsiveness that can lead to disastrous results (Lewis, 2009). As patronage 
appointments increase in government agencies, top-level career employees leave the 
agency and take their corporate knowledge with them. The article was relevant to the 
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current study as the Service First Initiative (2001) moved approximately 16,000 to at-will 
employment positions, effectively making them politically appointees. 
Perry, Engbers, and Jun (2009) investigated the return to pay-for-performance in 
the federal government after being abandoned by Congress in a decade earlier. Pay-for-
performance is a central tenant of the new public management reform movement, a 
practice that has shown a little demonstrable effect on employee performance (Perry et 
al., 2009). Perry et al. reviewed studies involving pay-for-performance and discovered 
that it seldom delivers on its promises. The study found that it did not garner intermediate 
changes to employee perceptions needed to change employee motivation (Perry et al., 
2009). Pay, performance appraisals, and organizational factors affect employee 
motivations and may negatively affect the validity of pay-for-performance perceptions 
(Perry et al., 2009). Pay-for-performance strategies are more appropriate for jobs that 
have concrete and measurable goals, compared to higher level jobs (Perry et al., 2009). 
The implementation of pay-for-performance systems failure is a result of the failed 
implementation process and the institutional difference between public and private 
organizations (Perry et al., 2009). The motivations of public service employees are 
different the private sector employees and pay-for-performance and could lower public 
employee motivation (Perry et al., 2009). Leaders must consider contextual, 
organizational factors to ensure they are compatible with the pay-for-performance system 
before implementation. The renewed interest in pay-for-performance systems is 
somewhat surprising as evidence does not support its effectiveness in improving personal 
or organizational outcomes. The article was relevant to the current research as Florida 
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instituted a pay-for-performance scheme that has subject to allegations of favoritism and 
patronage.  
Hamilton (2010) investigated the practice of patronage and political influence in 
the state of Illinois. Patronage in the state of Illinois has persisted since the early 1900s 
despite court rulings prohibiting patronage, changes in state laws, and court-monitoring 
of hiring practices (Hamilton, 2010). Patronage practices in Illinois included requiring 
employees to engage in political work, patronage staffing, forcing employees to make 
political contributions, creation or reclassification of new positions, temporary 
appointments, manipulating eligibility and exempt lists, use of appointments, 
manipulation of the hiring process, and poor record keeping (Hamilton, 2010). Most 
violations of court-ordered anti-patronage measures are considered civil violations, but 
violations of state law can be criminal. Patronage was found to be so ingrained in Illinois 
public service that it raised to the level of criminal wrongdoing and those federal 
prosecutors using federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to address 
corruption in the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office (Hamilton, 2010). During the 
investigation by federal prosecutors discovered widespread corruption involving a 
trucking scandal relating to pay to play scheme that benefited Chicago Mayor Daley’s 
campaign (Hamilton, 2010). State level corruption was commonplace under the 
Administrations of Governors Ray and Blagojevich, who also operated pay to play 
schemes which ultimately led to convictions on corruption charges (Hamilton, 2010). 
Patronage leads to corrupt and unethical behavior of politicians and their political 
appointees and causes citizens to lose trust in government (Hamilton, 2010). The article 
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was relevant to the current study as Florida’s HR reforms have the potential for the return 
of patronage as politicians and political appointees attempt to make more employees 
more accountable to their policy agenda and goals. 
Gallo and Lewis (2012) investigated the consequences of Presidential patronage 
had on the performance of federal agencies. Gallo and Lewis compared the performance 
of federal agencies and agencies run by career executives and campaign or political party 
loyalist during the administration of President George W. Bush. The authors used the 
Rating Assessment Rating Tool scores; that was used to measure government 
performance during the Administration of George W. Bush (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). 
Patronage appointees have less experience in government, possess different backgrounds, 
experiences, and their tenure was shorter than career executives (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). 
Government programs run by all types of appointees received lower overall scores than 
those run by career executives while campaign or political party appointees had even 
lower scores (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). Agencies run by career executives had the highest 
government performance scores in the study. The study was relevant to the current 
research as Florida’s governor can make political appointments regardless of 
qualifications, based on political ideology/affiliation.  
Moynihan and Hawes (2012) stated that reforms to government administrative 
structures are designed by political leaders to instill “behavioral expectations” that 
employees are expected to follow. The authors examine performance data as a measure of 
response to the administrative reforms (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The performance 
data included the 2009-2010 Texas Superintendent Survey and Texas Education Survey 
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(Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The results of the study showed that as stakeholder 
influence, involvement in partnerships, increased use of networking, the uses of 
respondent performance data increases (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The environmental 
complexity of respondent that operated in affected to what degree superintendents use of 
performance data. As the superintendent’s in harmonious districts were less likely to use 
performance data (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). Finally, the level of stakeholder conflict 
increased, usage of performance data increased (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). The findings 
were relevant to the current study as the Service First Initiative (2001) reform goal of 
making employees more responsive, provide employees with guidelines and behaviors 
they are required to follow. 
Devolution of federal government public assistance and workfare program has 
increased patronage practices in the second-order agencies in the Texas Rio Grande 
Valley (Harvey, 2013). Harvey (2013) investigated issues involving second-order 
devaluation programs implementation and the success and failures of the programs. The 
researcher employed a comparative case study analysis in the investigation of the 
workfare programs in the poverty-stricken counties of Maverick and Starr, Texas 
(Harvey). Texas is an at-will employment state, and traditional civil service protections in 
the hiring and promotion of employees are not available to workfare program employees. 
Harvey discovered the dominant local political party control's workfare programs 
resulting in second-order devaluation, and, therefore, control patronage jobs and benefits 
associated with the programs. Areas with weak political parties receive less federal and 
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state resources than those with strong political parties. The less centralized control of the 
workfare program led to increases the of level patronage employment practices. 
Brewer and Walker (2013) investigated how public service reforms changed the 
use of reward and punishment and how it impacted organizational performance. The 
study involved five local English governments and to ensure causality the author’s 
created a time lag of approximately six months between the dependent and independent 
variables (Brewer & Walker, 2013). The study used the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment Core Service performance (CSP) measures of; (a) remove manager, (b) 
reward manager, (c) developmental culture, (d) internal political climate, (e) deprivation, 
(f) diversity, (g) population change, (h) CSP 2003, and, (i) CSP 2005 as the dependent 
variables (Brewer & Walker, 2013). Organizational level results provided evidence that 
developmental culture was positive and statistically significant, prior performance was 
statistically significant, and political climate was negative and not significant (Brewer & 
Walker, 2013). Reward manager was negative and statistically significant and is not 
affected by the inability to reward top managers with higher pay does not affect 
performance (Brewer & Walker, 2013). In regards to the intra-organizational variation, 
the results showed that corporate officers believe the personnel constraints that affect the 
ability to remove or reward managers are less restrictive than others in lower levels of the 
government organization (Brewer & Walker, 2013). The findings of the study were 
relevant to the current research in that the perceptions of individuals of personnel 
constraints predictors of what bases of social power to employ in influence attempts. 
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Lui and Mikesell (2014) conducted an empirical study of public corruption and its 
impact on spending in the U.S. states. The authors used public official conviction data for 
federal conviction laws violations published by the U.S. Justice Department’s Public 
Integrity Section, in the study (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). Lui and Mikesell hypothesized 
that states with higher rates of public official corruption convictions would have a higher 
overall state spending. The study found public officials corruption was a significant 
factor in higher levels of state spending on capital, highways, construction, wages and 
salaries, correction, and police protection (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). States with lower 
levels of official public corruption spent more on education, public welfare, and hospitals 
then state with higher levels of public corruption (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). Florida ranked 
in the top 10 of the most corrupt states from 1976 to 2008 (Lui & Mikesell, 2014). The 
study is relevant to the current research as Florida’s passage of the Service First Initiative 
(2001) removed the merit principle for its human resource practices. The principle of 
merit has been the most effective measure in the prevention of corruption. Florida’s 
politicians and political appointees can now act unethically in the execution of the duties, 
with a less chance of being detected. 
American presidents build political support and loyalty through the use of 
patronage appointments since the beginning of this nation. Hollibaugh, Horton, and 
Lewis (2014) studied types of presidential appointments and tested a theory involving the 
placement of different types of appointees within their administration. Hollibaugh et al., 
found that President Obama appointed less qualified individuals to positions that require 
less expertise and appoint them to policy and agenda positions. Appointees possessing 
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campaign and political experience find themselves usually appointed to larger 
government agencies (Hollibaugh et al., 2014) Appointees with an ideology that aligns 
with an agency’s ideology are more likely appointed to that agency (Hollibaugh et al. 
(2014). The study was useful in explaining how Florida politicians and political 
appointees use patronage to build and maintain support based on political 
ideology/affiliation. 
Hijal-Moghrabi, Sabharwal, and Berman (2015) investigated how ethics is related 
to organizational performance in states with at-will employment (EAW) structures. Hijal-
Moghrabi et al, conducted a stratified random sample of supervisors, managers, and long-
term employees of government agencies from Florida, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 
The author used a 7 point Likert-types scales ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree” to measure the dependent variables of “perception of performance” and 
the independent variable of the ethical environment (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015, p. 11). 
The author used job satisfaction, age, tenure in government, and job security as control 
variables in the study (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The study showed employees are 
cognizant of ethical requirements (88.9%), managers act by ethical standards (78.9%), 
managers comply with ethical guidelines (89.1%), and managers and supervisors follow 
ethics codes and laws 85.9% (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The study revealed that only 
(40%) of respondents believed that their organization provided appropriate whistleblower 
protection (Hijal-Moghrabi et al., 2015). The article was relevant to the current research 
in that the perceptions of managers, supervisors, and employees how politicians, political 
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appointees, and employees impact what bases of social power to use in influence attempts 
and compliance with the influence attempt.  
Hollibaugh (2015) investigated the trade-offs between cronyism, neutral 
competence, patronage, and performance in federal executive appointments. American 
Presidents have long argued they needed to appoint loyalist that are responsive to their 
policy agenda to be effective in achieving political goals (Hollibaugh, 2015). Neutral 
competence is considered a hindrance to achieving political goals. One-third of all 
presidential appointments do not require congressional approval and are more likely to be 
patronage appointments, without regard to competency, to reward party faithful and 
accomplish policy goals (Hollibaugh, 2015). When Congressional approval is required, 
patronage appointees are less likely to have the same degree of political ideology as those 
who non-patronage appointees (Hollibaugh, 2015). The research suggested that 
executives are less likely to use patronage appointments when they are required by the 
confirmation process to choose between patronage and neutral competence (Hollibaugh, 
2015). The study was relevant to the current research in that Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees are more likely to choose patronage over neutral competence in 
hiring or promotion of state employee. 
Bowman and West (2007) stated the employee-employer relationship is 
undergoing a fundamental change in the public sector. The at-will employment has 
thrown traditional merit protections by the wayside and making employees more 
responsive to their employer. The movement to at-will employment gives employers 
unbridle power over employees. Bowman and West hold that the move toward at-will 
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employment in the public sector removes employee protections from politically 
motivated adverse actions of their employer and promotes patronage practices to return 
on a grand scale. At-will employment raises ethical issues in regards to virtues, rules, and 
at-will employment practices that policymakers must answer (Bowman & West, 2007). 
Failure to address one or all ethical issues lead to leadership failures and decline of good 
governance. The article was relevant to the current research as the manner in which 
politicians and political address the at-will employment ethical issues impact employee 
perceptions.  
The literature review involving civil service revealed demographic characteristics 
are important variables in determining how supervisors use their bases of power. The 
independent variables are demographic data of age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the 
length of service, and the political ideology/affiliation of Florida’s politicians, political 
appointees, and state employees. The dependent variables include expert, coercive, 
informational, legitimate, referent, and reward of social power. French and Raven (1959) 
stated social agents choose to employ the bases of power based on the relationship with 
the target of the influence attempts. Pfeffer (1981), Kellough and Nigro (2006), and Hays 
and Sowa (2006) stated civil service reforms alter the employment relationship. 
Researchers have studied the effect of social power as it relates to its use and status 
(Magee & Frasier, 2014), political ideology (Hollibaugh, Horton, & Lewis, 2014), effect 
on leadership styles (Pierro, Raven, Amato, & Bélanger’s, 2013), and the group 
influences tactics have on intergroup and interpersonal power in organizations (Aiello, 
Pratto, & Pierro, 2013).  
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The independent variables include age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, the 
length of service, and political ideology/affiliation, and they all play a role in how social 
agents view subordinates. French and Raven (1959) stated the relationship between the 
social agent and the target of the influence attempt are the basis for the influence attempt 
and the power tactic usage. The demographics of subordinates and supervisors affect how 
they view each other, choices of power strategies to use, and the level of conformity with 
the influence attempt (Erchul et al., 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty & Erchul, 2009; Garbel, 
2011; Magee & Fraiser, 2014). For the most part, prior research has failed to correlate the 
usage of the social power tactics and the demographic makeup of the of the influence 
attempts.  
The NPM movement ushered radical reforms to civil service systems across local, 
state, and federal governments in the United States over the last two and a half plus 
decades. The goals of the reforms were to make government employees more 
accountable to executive control, improve employee performance through the practice of 
at-will employment practices, to eliminate or reduce traditional merit protections, and the 
decentralization of personnel systems. The reforms alter the employer-employee 
relationship, affecting how employers and employees perceive each other. The reforms 
also have an impact on what power tactics politician and political appointees use to 
influence government employees. The state of Florida instituted radical civil service 
reform with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Government employees’ 
motivations are different than private sector employees in that they have a deep-rooted 
desire to make a difference and help others, as compared to private sector employees who 
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more motivated by self-concerns. The reforms impacted employee job satisfaction and 
employee outcomes. Politicians use the civil service reforms to change the patronage 
employment practices to their benefit. There is evidence that the reforms are politically 
motivated and based on political ideologies, and the use of patronage employment 
practices are increasing as a result of the civil service reform. Patronage increases the 
likelihood of corruption and results in negative organizational and individual outcomes. 
Since the inception of the NPM movement and the passage of the Service First Initiative, 
there is no consensus among scholars and public service practitioners of the reforms 
achieving the stated goals. 
Research Design 
The literature review revealed existing research has failed to investigate how the 
changes to the employer-employee relationship that resulted from the Service First 
Initiative (2001) affected the use of the bases of power by Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees. The review required reviewing literature related to radical reforms to 
government human resources practices and the use of power in government and other 
organizational settings. Condrey and Battaglio (2007) conducted a quantitative study 
using a survey design to determine the perceptions of individuals with significant human 
resources duties within the state of Georgia’s government agencies, to determine their 
views on the reforms. The use of a quantitative method was appropriate as it allows for 




Erchul, Raven, and Whichard (2001) used a quantitative survey design to 
determine the effectiveness of Raven’s (1993) 11 bases of social power in consulting 
resistant teachers. The researchers investigated the effectiveness of the power bases from 
the perspective of teachers and school psychologists (Erchul et al., 2001). The study used 
the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) as a measurement scale to access the effectiveness of the 11 
of 14 bases of social power. The study provided evidence that gender was a significant 
factor in how respondents rated the use of harsh and soft power tactics as females 
psychologists believe soft tactics are more effective than their male counterparts (Erchul 
et al., 2001). The study addressed Research Subquestion 1 and 3 as to how demographic 
factors that are predictors bases of power usage and the perceptions of how politicians 
and political appointees use of the bases of social power in the execution of their duties. 
Aiello et al., (2013) used a quantitative survey design in two studies that 
investigated influence tactics within organizations. In the first study, the researchers had 
the respondents who had subordinate roles within the organization complete the Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale and the Italian version of the IPI (Raven et al., 
1998). The results of the study showed the respondents perceived they used the soft 
power tactics more often than they used the harsh power tactics (Aiello et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the study also found the level of subordinate compliance to harsh power 
tactics is related to their SDO, and the compliance with harsh power tactics reinforced the 
legitimacy and the effectiveness of their usage (Aiello et al., 2013). The second study 
surveyed supervisors of a different organization and followed the same procedures as the 
first study. The result of the second study was consistent with the first study. The usage 
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of the harsh power tactics was dependent on the SDO levels of the supervisor (Aiello et 
al., 2013). The research was related to the current study’s null and alternative hypotheses 
as to the likelihood of the use of harsh or soft power tactics by politicians and political 
appointees. 
Pierro, et al., (2008) investigated the degree of compliance to hard and soft bases 
of power tactics that occur as a result of intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientations 
of individuals using a quantitative design in four studies. In the first study, the 
participants completed the Work Preference Inventory (WPI; Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, 
&Tighe, 1994) to access intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Pierro et al., 2008). 
Participants also completed the IPI (Raven, et al., 1998) to assess the compliance with the 
bases of power (Pierro et al., 2008). The study discovered a positive correlation between 
harsh and soft power tactics. The harsh power tactics were positively associated with 
extrinsic motivation (b = .42, p˂ .01) and negatively association (b = -. 18, p ˂ .01) with 
intrinsic motivation (Pierro, et al., 2008). Soft power compliance was positively related to 
intrinsic motivation (b = .17 p ˂ .01) (Pierro et al., 2008). The second study used the 
same procedures as the first study, the exception being the participants completed the 
Desirability for Control (DC) instead of the WPI. The study found that hard power tactics 
were significantly negatively related to DC (pr = - .22. p ˂ .05), and soft power tactics 
were significantly positively (pr =43, p ˂ .001) related to DC (Pierro, et al., 2008). The 
third study showed that subordinates were more responsive to soft power tactics (r = .55 
p ˂ .001 (Pierro et al., 2008). The study also found a positive association between the 
hard power tactics compliance and getting along scores (b = .38, p ˂ .001) of participants 
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(Pierro et al., 2008). The use of soft power tactics was positively related to the getting 
along scores (b = .19, p ˂ .05) and negatively related to participants getting along (b = - 
.25. p ˂ .01) scores (Pierro et al., 2008). The final study investigated how the self-esteem 
of subordination affected the power tactics. Again, the study showed subordinates were 
more responsive to soft power tactics then hard power tactics. Subordinates response to 
harsh power tactics (pr =-.40 p ˂ .001) was found to have a negative association with the 
self-esteem, and soft power tactics (pr = . .22, p ˂ .01) was positively related to their self-
esteem (Pierro et al., 2008). The results of the studies directly relate to the research 
questions and the alternative hypotheses in the current study. 
Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, and Ochana-Levin (2004) used a quantitative design to 
investigate compliance with power tactics in routine and non-routine work settings. The 
researchers had respondents from four diverse organizational settings completed one of 
three modified IPI (Raven et al., 1998) that was appropriate for their role in their 
respective organizations (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The IPI scales included the IPI 
usage scale – Worker’s Format, IPI usage scale – Supervisor’s Format, and the IPI  
compliance scale – Worker’s Format (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The results of the study 
provide evidence that use of power tactics and compliance with power tactics usage was 
related to the type of organization (Schwarzwald et al., 2004). Interestingly, usage and 
compliance with the harsh power tactics were more frequent in organizational settings 
that were primarily performed routine tasks, than organizational settings that primarily 
performed complex tasks. The results of the studies directly relate to the research 
questions and the alternative hypotheses in the current study, as this researcher expects 
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there will be differences in the usages of hard and soft power tactics between the various 
Florida state agencies and departments. 
Lines (2007) used a quantitative stratified sampling design to investigate the 
relationship between the expert and positional power bases and their effect on 
implementing strategic organizational change in a large European telecom firm. The use 
of the stratified sampling allowed for the representation groups from different functional 
areas and divisions within the organization (Lines, 2007). The stratified sampling reduces 
the cost of conducting the research. Using the quantitative stratified sampling design will 
ensure that inclusion of all of Florida’s state agencies and departments in the study 
involving the use of the bases of social power by Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees. Also, it will increase the validity of the research. 
Methodology 
The quantitative methodology is the appropriate method when there is a large 
finite research population. The use of the qualitative methodology is not conducive to for 
conducting research involving a large finite population. Studies done by Aiello et al., 
(2013), Condrey and Battaglio (2007), Erchul et al., (2001), Lines (2007), Pierro et al., 
(2008), and Schwarzwald et al., 2004) all involved large finite research populations and 
are appropriate for the uses of a quantitative methodology. The use of a cross-sectional 
survey and stratified sampling allowed for representation of groups from different 
functional areas and divisions within the organization (Aiello et al.,, 2013; Condrey & 




The Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed the State of Florida's human 
resources practices. The primary goals of the reforms included; making state employees 
more responsive to executive leadership, improving government efficiency, and 
improving public service (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The reforms changed the employer-
employee relationship (Hays, 2006; Sowa, 2006). Existing research had failed to 
investigate the changes to the employer-employee relationship and how it changed the 
way politicians and political appointees employ the bases of power since the passage of 
the Service First Initiative. French and Raven (1959) stated that social agents use power 
to create psychological changes in the target of the influence attempt that alters their 
perceptions of the organization, social agent, and beliefs over time. How the social agent 
and target of the influence attempt view each other impacts the choice of a power base to 
employ and the level of conformity (Erchul et al., 2004; Elias, 2007; Getty & Erchul, 
2009). In Florida, evidence of the reforms being effective has failed to materialize (Nigro 
& Kellough, 2006). The exercise of power within an organization impacts every facet of 
organizational and individual outcomes (Pierro et al., 2013). There has been no scholarly 
investigation into Florida’s politicians and their political appointees usage of the bases of 
social power since the passage of the Service First Initiative. The study attempted to 
determine if Florida’s politicians and political appointees use of harsh power tactics in a 
manner that is inconsistent with other organizational settings. 
Social power is used by social agents to influence the target of the influence 
attempt to produce a psychological change involving their beliefs, values, mindset, and 
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intentions of the target. The use of social power affects nearly all facets of organizational 
and individual outcomes. How social agents employ the bases of social power is 
dependent on how the social agent views the target of the influences attempt. The 
majority of supervisors and subordinates prefer the use of soft power tactics over the use 
of hard power tactics in a wide cross-section of organizational settings. The use of soft 
power tactics are related to positive organizational and individual outcomes, while the 
use of hard power tactics is related to negative organizational and individual outcomes.  
The study of the use of social power has involved a wide range of organizational 
settings and is rich in content. The studies failed to address how the use of social power 
changed in government organizations that went through radical civil service reform and 
the resulting altered employee-employer relationship. The study addressed the 
predominates bases of social power used by Florida politicians and political appointees 
and compared those results with the result of studies of other organizational settings to 
determine if they are disproportionately using harsh power tactics more often the used in 
other organizational settings. 
Chapter 1 introduced the study by explaining the research problem; the purpose of 
the study, and its significance. Chapter 2 presented the theoretical framework of the bases 
of social power theory and reviewed existing literature to exam the role the bases of 
social power impacts organizational and individual outcomes. Chapter 3 explained the 
quantitative design and the methodology for the study. The methodology was used to fill 
the gap in the literature on how Florida’s politicians and political appointees exercise the 
base of social power after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Chapter 4 
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presents the research results. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the interpretation of the results 
of the research and the role the results and their social change implications. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation study was to determine the extent that 
Florida’s politicians and political appointee’s exercise the individual bases of social 
power (French & Raven, 1959) since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). 
The Service First Initiative civil service reforms have altered the employer-employee 
relationship (Hays and Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Existing scholarship has 
failed to investigate the altered employer-employee relationship resulting from the 
passage of the Service First Initiative. Understanding to what extent Florida’s politicians 
and political appointees exercise the bases of social power will provide a framework for 
understanding what effects the changes to the employer-employee relationship have had 
on government HR practices in the state of Florida. Using French and Raven’s (1959) 
bases of social power theory, I attempted to determine whether the use of the different 
bases of power by politicians and political appointees are inconsistent with other 
organizational settings. 
In this chapter, I will present the logic behind the research design and the 
methodology of the study. In the chapter, I will also address the role of the researcher and 
provide a description of the research population, setting, summary of data collection 
procedures, data analysis, trustworthiness, and protections of participant rights. This 
chapter will also include an explanation of the instrumentation, operational descriptions 
of the variables, and ethical issues related to this study. I will conclude the chapter by 
providing a summary of the research, methodology, and transition to Chapter 4.  
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The Service First Initiative (2001) reforms radically altered the employer-
employee relationship. The extant research did not address the effects of the reforms on 
the application of the bases of social power by Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees. The use of a qualitative design in this study would have been impractical due 
to the large research population. Use of the quantitative, cross-sectional survey design 
was ideal for the large finite research population I had in this study. The quantitative, 
cross-sectional survey design allows for the collection of data at a point in time, subgroup 
comparisons, and data that are unable to be observed (Liu, 2008). Quantitative, cross-
sectional surveys take less time to conduct and are more economical than longitudinal 
studies (Liu, 2008). French and Raven’s (1959) and Raven’s (1965) bases of social power 
and political affiliation/ideology are not physically observable. The use of the 
quantitative, cross-sectional survey design also aligned with the research question and 
subquestions in the study. 
The role of the researcher in any study is an important consideration that needs to 
be carefully examined to avoid potential bias. I disseminated the surveys to Florida SPS 
employees and politicians who held statewide offices. I also collected and analyzed the 
data from the surveys. 
The research population consisted of 88,046 CS, SES, and Senior Management 
Service employees in Florida’s SPS. Florida’s governor, lieutenant governor, attorney 
general, CFO, and commissioner of agriculture and consumer services are included in the 
study population because they held elected statewide offices with executive branch 
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duties. The population was finite and appropriate for the use of cross-sectional surveys to 
ensure the inclusion of all sampling units (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008).  
The work addresses of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and employees 
are public record as defined by Florida’s Sunshine Laws. I used SPS employees’ work 
addresses to contact and recruit participants. I sent possible participants a package 
consisting of a cover letter, informed consent, and the survey via the U.S. mail requesting 
their participation, and a stamped, business reply envelope (see Appendix H).  
The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the 33 statements in Raven’s (1992) IPIM. 
I used the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) tomeasure the usage of the bases of social power by 
Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and the employee’s perceptions of the usage of 
the bases of social power. I used the Political Predisposition Measure (PPM) to identify 
the political affiliation/ideology of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and SPS 
employees (Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005). The PPM (Fredico et al., 2005) is a 2-item, 
7-point Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). I 
developed a questionnaire to collect the demographic characteristics of the research 
population, including gender, age, race or ethnicity, education/job qualifications, pay 
bands, and department/agency. The data analysis was conducted using the SPSS software 
program. My analysis included an independent sample t test to test the mean between the 
independent variables (see Green & Salkind, 2014). The standard error correction for the 
population subsets of the sampling units and nonresponse errors were also accessed. 
Kalaian and Kasim (2008) and Creswell (2009) identified the major internal 
threats to validity as history, maturation, regression, selection, mortality, diffusion of 
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treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, testing, and 
instrumentation. The internal threats of history, maturation, regression, mortality, 
diffusion of treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, and 
testing are not major threats to this study because they are related to experimental studies 
that occur over an extended period (see Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). I used a 
cross-sectional survey that did not include a pretest. The main threats to the internal 
validity of this study involved participant selection. I employed a stratified, cross-
sectional survey design in which all members of the research population had the same 
probability of being included in the survey. The members of the research population who 
opted out or failed to complete the survey were treated as nonresponses. 
There were no ethical issues involving the work environment of the researcher, 
conflict of interest, power differentials, or incentive justification involved in this study. 
Survey participation was voluntary and anonymous. Vulnerable and protected 
populations were not targets or participants in the research. Participants’ confidentiality 
was a major concern of the study. I advised the participants that informed consent, data 
collection, and identities would be anonymous. I obtained Walden University 
Institutional Review Board approval before conducting the research. 
Research Design 
I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:  
Research Question. What extent do Florida politicians and political  
appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of  
their leadership duties?  
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Research Subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are  
predictors of the use of individual bases of social power?  
Research Subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the  
individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees? 
Research Subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and  
political appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power? 
There were 11 independent and 11 dependent variables involved in this study. 
The independent variables were the demographic characteristics of Florida’s politicians 
with statewide executive branch duties and political appointees, which included political 
predisposition; gender; age; education; years of employment; employing department; 
agency; or autonomous organization; employment classification; pay band; pay level; and 
race or ethnicity. Demographic characteristics directly influence how politicians and 
political appointees view state employees and their choice to employ a particular base(s) 
of social power and influence. The 11 dependent variables were the items of the IPI (see 
Raven et al., 1998): reward impersonal; coercive impersonal; expert; referent; 
informational; legitimacy of position; legitimacy of reciprocity; legitimacy of 
dependence; legitimacy of equity; personal reward; and personal coercion power. 
The goal of the research was to determine the extent to which Florida’s politicians 
and political appointees use the individual bases of social power. The research design for 
the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design. In this study, I used 
demographic and survey data collected from Florida’s politicians, political appointees, 
and government employees. The research questions were designed to investigate the 
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relationship between variables and the research population and to determine the extent 
that Florida’s politicians and political appointees used the bases of social power and the 
predictors of social power base usage. The large research population negated the use of 
experimental strategies and the longitudinal designs because they would have made the 
study cost prohibitive. The use of a cross-sectional survey design allows for the 
measurement of data that is not observable (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
French and Raven’s (1959) and Raven’s (1965) bases of social power and political 
affiliation/ideology are not physically observable.  
The use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design allowed for the 
economical collection of data from a large research population. Kraska (2010) stated the 
design of a study must take into account the research goals, operational definitions, 
variables, assumptions, limitation, and data collection procedures in determining the 
research plan. Survey and experimental strategies are the primary research strategies in 
quantitative research (Creswell, 2009; Harwell, 2011). Surveys research collects a 
representative sample from the research population (Kraska, 2010). Creswell (2009) 
stated that there are two types of survey designs, longitudinal and cross-sectional. 
Longitudinal research designs are effective in studying changes that take place over an 
extended period. Longitudinal studies take time to evolve and are not as economical to 
conduct as cross-sectional surveys. Time constraints involved in this dissertation study 
precluded the use of a longitudinal design in this study. The cross-sectional survey 
allowed for the collection of data at a point in time, subgroup comparisons, and data that 
could not be observed (Liu, 2008). Cross-sectional surveys take less time to conduct and 
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are more economical than longitudinal studies. Cross-sectional data limits the ability to 
test causal relationships between variables.  
There has not been a large-scale study into the altered employer-employee 
relationship that is the result of the radical civil service reforms on the usage of the bases 
of social power by politicians and political appointees (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & 
Nigro, 2006). The current study attempted to determine if the harsh power tactics are 
used at a disproportional rate when compared to other organizational settings by 
politicians and political appointees in the state of Florida, after the passage of the Service 
First Initiative (2001). The lack of scholarship into the use of the bases of social power 
after radical civil service reform was mainly a result of maturation issues. Not enough 
time had passed since the passage of the reforms to understand the full effects the reforms 
had on the usage of the bases of social power. It has been seventeen years since the 
passage of the Service First Initiative and maturation issues are not a factor in the current 
study, as enough time has passed to understand what effect the reforms had on the usage 
of the bases of social power. The cross-sectional survey design allowed for the use of a 
large-scale study in a timely and economical manner (Creswell, 2009). The cross-
sectional survey design provided the data needed to determine if Florida’s politicians and 
political appointee’s use of the bases of social power was consistent with other 
organizational settings, which have not undergone radical civil service reforms.  
The study was a quantitative cross-sectional survey design that used demographic 
and survey data collected from Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and SPS 
employees. The research questions investigated the relationship between variables and 
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the research population, to determine the extent Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees use the individual bases of social power and the predictors of social power 
bases usage. The large research population negated the use of experimental strategies, as 
it would make the study cost and time prohibitive (Creswell, 2009). The study could not 
use a longitudinal design as it would require multiple data collections over a period and is 
impractical for the study. Liu (2008) stated that the use of a cross-sectional survey design 
allowed for the measurement of data that is not observable, allowed for the collection of 
data at a point in time, and subgroup comparisons. French and Raven’s (1959) and 
Raven’s (1965) bases of social power and political and affiliation/ideology are not 
physically observable. The use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design was 
aligned with the research questions in the study. 
The goal of the study was to conduct a large-scale study into the use of the social 
power bases by Florida’s politicians with executive branch duties and their political 
appointees, and SPS employees after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) and 
determine the predictors of the use of the different bases of social power. Creswell (2009) 
stated that the use of the quantitative cross-sectional survey design allows for the 
economical collection of data from a large finite research population. The research 
population consisted of state of Florida employees in the SPS system and elected 
politicians with executive branch duties. The longitude design is impractical for the use in 
the current study as it requires multiple data collection periods over an extended time. 
Researchers use experimental designs when the researchers are trying to determine if a 
treatment influences the outcomes. The use of the experimental design did not align with 
101 
 
the goals of the study (Creswell, 2009). Qualitative designs are appropriate when 
researchers are trying to explore and understand the meaning a person or group place of 
the phenomenon under investigation.  The use of the cross-sectional design provided a 
one-time snapshot of the use of the bases of social power by Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Creswell, 2009). The cross-
sectional survey design answered the research questions on the extent of the bases of 
power usage, and the predictors of the usage of the bases of social power, by Florida’s 
politicians and political appointees. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher in any study is an important consideration that needs to 
be carefully examined to avoid the potential pitfall of researcher bias. Researcher bias 
reduces the validity of the research. In quantitative research, the role of the researcher is 
limited as the participant’s act independent of the researcher. I disseminated the surveys 
to the state of Florida politicians who hold statewide offices with executive branch duties, 
political appointees, and SPS employees. I also collected and analyzed the data.  
I was an adjunct instructor at Pensacola State College from 2010 to 2017 
Pensacola State College is a member of the Florida State College and University System, 
and its employees are not of Florida’s State Personnel System Florida Department of 
Management Services (DMS, 2015). At the time of the data collection, there were no 
Pensacola State College students enrolled in courses taught by me. I had no supervisor or 
instructor relationship involving power over any known participants.  
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Potential researcher bias may involve my having predisposed assumptions, 
discretion in participant selection, and data analysis. Potential researcher bias in the 
current study is limited to the areas of collection, analysis of collected data, and reporting 
the research findings. To control for potential bias in the current study, I collected, 
analyzed, and reported the findings in agreement with valid statistical and analytical 
procedures. 
There were no ethical issues involving my work environment, conflict of interest, 
power differentials, or incentives justification issues involved in this study. Survey 
participation is voluntary and anonymous. Vulnerable and protected populations were not 
targets or participants in the research. I advised the participants that informed consent, 
data collection, and identities would be anonymous. The researcher obtained Walden 
University IRB approval before conducting the research. 
Methodology 
The research population was finite and included 88,046 CS, SES, SMS classified  
employees, and politicians with statewide executive branch duties (Florida DMS, 2015). 
The politicians with statewide executive branch duties include the governor, lieutenant 
governor, attorney general, chief financial officer, and agriculture and consumer services 
commissioner (F.S. Ch. 14-19). The researcher excluded state employees of Florida’s 
State University System, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, and Other 
Pay Plans as they are not SPS employees. The researched also excluded contract and 
temporary employees due to there is no reliable database with their contact information. 
Elected Florida State Senate and House of Representatives members are excluded from 
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the study as they do not have any executive branch duties. The research population 
changed almost on a daily basis due to attrition, new hires, and retirements, therefore, the 
exact number of the research population was defined after contacting Florida’s 
Department of Management Services. The research population consisted of 88,046 
Florida SPS employees. 
Sampling and Setting 
The finite research population allowed for the inclusion of all the sampling units 
in the research population to be included in the sampling frame. The sample included 
members from the State of Florida 31 departments, agencies, and autonomous 
organizations governed by the State Personnel System (Workforce Report, 2015) and 
politicians with statewide executive branch duties. The finite research population allowed 
all members of the research population to have the same probability to be included in the 
sample (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I stratified the respondents by their 
respective departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations. The stratified cross-
sectional survey sampling aligned with the goals of the research involving the usage of 
the bases of social power.  
The sample included members from Florida’s SPS employees. The employees 
were sent the survey via their work mail addresses along with an enclosed business reply, 
self-addressed envelope. Sampling frame errors are a concern in survey research. 
Probability sampling greatly reduces sampling errors and results in the inclusion of all 
sampling units (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The major threat to the study is 
nonresponse errors.  
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The sampling frame consisted of all members of Florida’s SPS and Florida’s 
elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties. The SPS included all 
employees of the CS, SES, SMS classification system in Florida 31 departments, 
agencies, and autonomous organizations (Workforce Report, 2015). Employees in the 
SES and SMS classifications are political appointees. Politicians with statewide executive 
branch duties include the governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, chief financial 
officer, and the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services commissioner 
(F.S. Ch. 14-19). Those Florida State employees excluded from the sampling frame are 
employees in the State University, Justice Administration, Legislature, Florida Lottery, 
and Other Pay Plans. Those excluded from the study because they are not members of 
SPS. The study also excluded contract and temporary employees due to the lack of 
reliable database(s) with current contact information and their transient nature. Excluded 
from the study are Florida State Senators and the House of Representatives member, as 
they do not have any executive branch duties. 
The sample included employees from the State of Florida 31 departments, 
agencies, and autonomous organizations governed by the (Workforce Report, 2015). The 
study had a large finite population, and members of the population had the same 
probability of being surveyed. The respondents are stratified by their respective 
departments, agencies, and autonomous organizations. The sample size of each subunit of 
the population must be large enough to be representative of the research population 
(Frankfort-Nachmian & Nachmias, 2008). Cohen (1992) stated that samples must be 
large enough to support statistical power analysis for the specified power level and effect 
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size.  G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate the 
significant effect size of each stratum, using a confidence level of 95%, Type 1 error rate 
(ɑ), at 80% power level. It is critical to the validity of the study that the survey data from 
the sample is sufficient to provide samples that meet the criterion described. 
Procedures 
The state of Florida maintains active rosters of all SPS employees that include 
their employment classification, occupation, pay band, and agency, department, or 
autonomous entities. The rosters are public and were obtained via a public records 
request. Participants were sent the survey via the U.S. mail requesting their participation 
alone with business-reply envelope, requesting their participation in the survey. 
Participants were sent a reminder postcard 10 days after the initial survey mailing. The 
study used two data collection instruments and a questionnaire to record the participant’s 
answers to the research questions. I developed a questionnaire developed was used to 
identify demographic characteristics of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and 
state employees. While not inclusive of all possible demographic characteristics, the 
demographic characteristics of gender, age, race or ethnicity, education, pay bands, 
department/agency, the political ideology/affiliation of politicians, political appointees, 
and state employees, are predictors of the use of individual bases of social power (French 
& Raven, 1959). The PPM was used to identify the political affiliation/ideology of 
Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and state employees (Federico et al., 2005a). 
The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the supervisor-subordinate relationship and the use 
of the bases of social power. 
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Prospective participants were sent the survey via work mail addresses. 
Accompanying the survey was an introductory letter requesting their participation in the 
survey and the informed consent form. Participants were asked to return the survey, in a 
business-reply envelope.  
The data collection process involved the collection of demographic data via a 
researcher developed questionnaire and their responses to the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), 
and the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a). The participant’s department or state agency was 
confidential, and the participating employee responses are anonymous. 
The introductory letter requesting SPS employee participation in the survey also 
advised participants that they could exit the study at any time without penalty. The 
informed consent form advised participants that participation in the survey was 100% 
voluntary and no one at that state of Florida or Walden University would treat them 
differently for deciding not to participate in the survey.  
The state of Florida maintains contact information of all state employees, and it is 
public record. The contact information includes the employee’s name, agency, 
employment location, work address, and employment classification. I submitted a public 
records request for all SPS employee’s names, agency, employment location, work 
address, and employment classification prior to the collection of data. 
Instrumentation 
The study used two published data collection instruments. The first instrument 
used was the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), and was used to measure the of usage of the bases 
of social power by politicians and political appointees. The second published instrument 
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used in the study is the PPM (Federico et al, 2005a), and it was used to measure the 
political affiliation/ideology of SPS members and politicians with statewide executive 
branch duties.  
The bases of social power theory (French and Raven, 1959) was the appropriate 
framework for the determining if the altered employer-employee relationship had 
affected the usage of the bases of social power by politicians and political appointees 
since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Raven (1992) further delineated 
the original social power taxonomy by publishing the IPIM. Raven et al., developed the 
IPI scale in response to methodological and substantive issues involving existing 
instruments that limited the validity of existing research into the measurement of the use 
of the base of social power. The IPI instrument includes two scales for measuring 
subordinate and supervisor’s perceptions of the usage and compliance with influence 
attempts (Raven, 1998). The PPM (Federico et al, 2005) instrument was ideal for 
determining the political affiliation/ideology of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, 
and state employees. The PPM consists of a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very 
Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative) (Federico et al., 2005a).  
The use of the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) is allowed for “non-commercial 
research and education purposes without seeking written permission” (see Appendix A). I 
received permission to use the IPI from the authors, Dr. Raven, Dr. Schwarzwald, and Dr. 
Koslowski.   
Raven (et al., 1998) established the content validity of the IPI in two different 
studies. The first study involved calculating the intercorrelations between the four items 
108 
 
hypothesized in each of the 11 power bases, resulting in one factor in each base was 
dropped from the model (Raven et al., 1998). The researchers conducted a principle 
component analysis and factor analysis on remaining items. The mean scores of the 
power bases, resulting in the presence of a two-factor solution, Factor I accounted for 
34.6% of “soft or weak” base and Factor II accounted for 24.7% of “hard or strong” base 
variance (Raven et al., 1998, pp. 316-321). Raven et al. (1998) then conducted a small 
space analysis of response to the scale items, resulting in the determination of the 
adequacy of the two-dimensional structure (coefficient of alienation = .14). Discriminant 
analyses of mean compliance scores indicated that only the total sample met the 
recommended ratio (Raven et al., 1998). The second study addressed the consistency of 
the IPI scale between the two studies involving different cultures. The internal 
consistency within the power tactics had acceptable alpha coefficients (.63 to .88, Raven 
et al., 1998). The authors of the PPM established content validity by conducting a 
Cronbach’s alpha (.84) analysis for the measure (Federico et al., 2005a). Cronbach’s 
alpha scores lower than a critical value than of ˂ .70 are not reliable (Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 2008).  
The IPI Raven (et al., 1998) was developed using two research populations with 
diverse cultures. The first study’s research population consisted of 317 university 
students in the state of California and the second study’s research population consisted of 
101 Israeli hospital employees (Raven et al., 1998). The Hebrew version of the IPI 
(subordinate form) was given to the Israeli research population, instead of the original 
109 
 
version (Raven et al., 1998). PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) was used in a study to 
determine support for military action against Iraq (Federico et al, 2005b). 
Operationalization of Variables 
There are 11 independent and 11 dependent variables involved in this study. The 
independent variables are the demographic characteristics of Florida’s politicians, 
political appointees, and state employees which include political predisposition; gender; 
age; education; years of employment; employing department; agency; or autonomous 
organization; employment classification; pay band; pay level; race or ethnicity; and the 
political ideology/affiliation of the elected officials, political appointees, and state 
government employees. The demographic characteristics influence how change agents 
view the target of the influence attempt and the choice of the base of social power to 
employ. The 11 dependent variables are the 11 dependent variables are the items of the 
IPI (Raven et al., 1998): reward impersonal; coercive impersonal; expert, referent; 
informational; legitimacy of position; legitimacy of reciprocity; legitimacy of dependence 
; legitimacy of equity; personal reward; and personal coercion power. 
The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) measures the 33 items in the 11 delineated power 
bases of Raven’s (1993) IPIM and will be used to measure the dependent covariates. The 
IPI (Raven et al., 1998) used in this study is the original version of the subordinate and 
supervisor’s formats. PPM will be used to measure the independent variable of political 
affiliation/ideology of Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and SPS employees 
(Federico et al., 2005a). The PPM is a Likert-type scale that ranges from 1(Very Liberal) 
to 7 (Very Conservative), and responses are averaged. As the score increases, it indicates 
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the higher level of conservatism (Federico et al, 2005a). The demographic characteristics 
independent variables are measured by the use of a survey questionnaire I developed. The 
demographic variables and dependent variables were then correlated.  
The means, standard deviation and ranks for the eleven power tactics for the 
power tactics for Florida’s politicians, political appointees, and CS employees was 
determined independently of each other. The IPI (Raven et al., 1998) provided a rating 
instead of a ranking and reduced the methodological issues related to ipsative measures 
used in previous studies. The demographic variables were correlated with the dependent 
variables to determine significant correlations. 
Data Analysis 
The study used two different statistical software packages to analyze data from 
the cross-sectional survey of Florida’s elected politicians, political appointees, and state 
employees in Florida’s SPS. G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) was used to determine the 
proper sample size for each statistical test used and for state agencies and departments 
needed to ensure a representative sample. The SPSS version 22.0 was used to conduct 
statistical analysis of data from the stratified cross-sectional survey of Florida’s elected 
politicians, political appointees, and state employees in Florida’s SPS. 
The data from the cross-sectional survey of Florida’s elected politicians, political 
appointees, and employees in Florida’s SPS required careful analysis to ensure the 
inclusion of only the target populations in the data set. The first issue was to obtain a 
representative sample from all of Florida’s State agencies and departments. The 
researcher used of G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) to calculate the significant effect 
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size of each stratum, using a confidence level of 95%, type 1 error rate (ɑ), at 80% power 
level. The usage of social power tactics and demographic data was correlated. The 
researcher conducted an independent samples t-test to test the mean between the 
independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). Reported independently are the means, 
standard deviations, and rank of the eleven power tactics for subordinates and 
supervisors. Factor analysis of the independent variables was conducted to reduce the 
independent variables as necessary. Multiple regression analysis between the independent 
and dependent variables was conducted to examine the relationship between the 
variables. 
H0: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians 
and political appointees are more likely to uses harsh bases of social power to achieve 
policy goals.  
H1: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians 
and political appointees are more likely to uses soft bases of social power to achieve 
policy goals.  
I imported the data collected from the stratified cross-sectional survey of Florida’s 
elected politicians, and SPS employees into the SPSS Software program. SPSS was used 
to perform statistical analysis and testing of the hypothesizes. The type of data collected 
in the survey include the independent variables of political ideology/affiliation and 
demographic data consisting of gender, age, race or ethnicity, and education. The 
researcher also collected data on the usage of the dependent variables of coercive, expert, 
legitimate, referent, reward and informational power. The independent and dependent 
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variables data were correlated. Factor analysis was performed to identify clusters within 
the variables and reduce variables as necessary. I conducted an independent samples t-
test to test the mean between the independent variables (Green & Salkind, 2014). The 
correlation, factor analysis, and independent t test provides a basis for answering the 
main research question, what extent do Florida politicians and political appointees use of 
the individual base of social power employed in the execution of the leadership duties? 
Threats to Validity 
Creswell (2009) and Kalaian and Kasim (2008) stated that the threats to external 
validity included the interaction of selection and treatment, the interaction of setting and 
treatment, and interaction of history and treatment. The interaction of selection and 
treatment threatens external validity by having a narrowly defined research population. 
The inability to generalize findings to other organizational settings because the 
characteristics of participants are different. Interaction of history and treatment internal 
validity threats arise out of an inability to generalize the results to the past or future 
events (Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). The current study involves a research 
population of approximately 90,000 politicians, political appointees, and state of Florida 
government employees. The research population included state of Florida politicians with 
executive branch duties, and all members in the CS, SES, and SMS classifications in 
Florida’s SPS. The use of the stratified cross-sectional survey and probability sampling 
ensured that a representative sample is obtained that can be generalized to other 
organizational settings that have undergone radical reforms to the civil service system. 
Stanley and Campbell, 1963; Onwuegbuzie ,2000; and Creswell, 2009 identified the 
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major internal threats to validity as history, maturation, regression, selection, mortality, 
diffusion of treatment, compensatory/resentful demoralization, compensatory rivalry, 
testing, and instrumentation. The internal threats of history; maturation; regression; 
mortality; diffusion of treatment; compensatory/resentful demoralization; compensatory 
rivalry; and testing are not major threats to the current study as they are related to 
experimental studies that occur over an extended period (Stanley & Campbell, 1963; 
Onwuegbuzie,2000; Creswell, 2009). The instrumentation used in the current study does 
not include a retest. The main threats to the internal validity of the study involved 
selection. The study employed a stratified cross-sectional survey design that included all 
members of the research population having the same probability of being included in the 
survey. The members of the research population who opted out or failed to complete the 
survey, are treated as nonresponses. 
Construct validity involves ensuring that the instrument used to measure a 
concept or construct measures what it intended to measure (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias stated the instrument(s) used in the 
study must show validity by relating the instrument(s) to the theoretical framework and 
provide evidence that it is both empirically and logically correlated. Statistical conclusion 
validity is the result of investigators using inadequate statistical power or violation of 
statistical assumptions in their studies. The researcher ensured the reliability of the IRI 
(Raven et al., 1998) and the PPM (Federico et., al. 2005b) by conducting analysis 
utilizing Cronbach's alpha (α). Field (2013) stated that Cronbach’s alpha (α) is the most 
commonly used measure of scale reliability. The research used Cronbach’s alpha (α) to 
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ensure the reliability of the measurement instruments. The researcher ensured that the 
alpha coefficients (α) for the scales would be compared to the lower limit of α coefficient 
≥.70, as prescribed by Cronbach (1951) 
Ethical Procedures 
Florida State Statute (F.S. 668.6076) states that work addresses of all state of 
Florida employees and politicians are public records and are available through a public 
records request. As of this time, there are no other permission requirements need to 
obtain the work addresses of Florida SPS employees. 
Walden University has set strict guidelines for research conducted under its 
purview. The research must also follow the federal regulations involving human 
participants, and the researcher must complete ethics training. Researchers must complete 
the Protecting Human Research Participants ethics training course, provided by the 
National Institute of Health. I completed the required ethics training and provided a copy 
of the certificate of completion. Walden University requires that researchers complete the 
course within the previous 5 years of the research. The next step in the process was the 
requirement to gain approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). No research activity occurred past the proposal stage, without IRB approval. 
The protection of human participants during the recruitment of prospective 
participants is an important consideration in the research process. The major concern in 
the recruitment of participants involved initial contact via their work addresses. The state 
employees recruited for the study were mailed a package to the work address requesting 
the participation in the survey. I mailed the participants a package that contained an 
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introductory letter, the survey, the informed consent form, a business-reply envelope, and 
were requested to return the survey in the business-reply envelope (Appendix A & B). 
The study did not involve at risk or vulnerable populations. No recruitment of 
participants occurred until approval to conduct the research was received from Walden 
University’s Institutional Review Board. Walden University’s approval number for this 
study is # 03-29-17-0450230, and it expired on March 28, 2018. 
The major ethical concerns relating to the data collection involves the collection 
of demographic data from participants. The demographic data collection includes the; 
gender, age, race or ethnicity, education/job qualifications, pay bands, 
department/agency, the political ideology/affiliation of politicians, political appointees, 
and state employees. The survey results have the potential to be shared with all 
participants, politicians, and political appointees. Ensuring confidentiality of participants 
is important in protecting participants from adverse actions in the workplace. The actual 
names of the participants are not used or published to ensure participant confidentiality. I 
advised the participants that their participation was voluntary, and they could opt out of 
the survey at any time without adverse effects. The data collected from the participants 
will be stored in a password protected database on an external hard drive and locked in a 
safe in my office. 
The data collection process involved the collection of demographic data from 
participants, their responses to the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), and the PPM (Federico et al., 
2005a). The participants were sent the stratified cross-sectional survey via the U.S. mail 
to their work addresses in a package that contained a business-reply envelope. Upon 
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collection of data, the participant’s department or state agency is confidential, and the 
participating employee responses will be anonymous.  
The data from the study was protected and archived on a password-protected hard 
drive and a printed copy that is locked in my office safe. I will maintain the data for 5 
years at the minimum. upon approval and acceptance from Walden University, will make 
the study available to respective department and agency leaders and the elected 
politicians in the executive branch. The study will not name or identify individual 
participants or their department or agency. 
I was an adjunct instructor at Pensacola State College and may come into contact 
with a very limited number of participants in the study, who may become students during 
the data collection process. I was also on the Board of Directors of the First Judicial 
Circuit Law Enforcement Association, Inc., a nonprofit organization whose membership 
consists of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. State of Florida law 
enforcement officers are part of the research population and have the potential to be 
participants in the study. There are 15 members of the First Judicial Circuit Law 
Enforcement Association, Inc., who are Florida State law enforcement officers. 
Currently, I have no supervisor or instructor relationships that involve power over any 
known prospective participants at this time. At the time of the data collection, there were 
no current state employees or Florida state law enforcement officers in any classes I 






The quantitative cross-sectional survey design was used to determine the extent 
Florida’s politicians and political appointees used the harsh and soft bases of social 
power since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The research population 
was finite and consisted of 88,046 employees in Florida’s SPS and elected politicians 
with statewide executive branch duties. The study employed an email cross-sectional 
survey method. The instrument used to collect data involving the use of the bases of 
power is the IPI (Raven et al., 1998). The PPM was used to collect data on participant’s 
political affiliation/ideology (Frederico et al, 2005). Statistical analysis included factor 
analysis, correlation, independent t-test, multiple regression, means, and standard 
deviations. The study does not involve any at risk or vulnerable groups. The ethical 
concerns in the study involve the protection of participants. I completed the required 
National Institutes of Health Protecting Human Research Participants ethics training 
course and ensured the confidentially of participants and participants. I obtained Walden 
University IRB approval before conducting any research. 
Chapter 1 provided a detailed introduction to the study. Chapter 2 included a 
review of the of the literature involving the research methodology, research design, and 
theoretical framework. Chapter 3 presented the research methodology that was used to 
collect data, the analysis of the data, and the presentation of the findings. Chapter 4 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine the extent that Florida’s 
politicians and political appointee exercised the individual bases of social power (see 
French & Raven, 1959) and to determine what the predictors of usage of the bases of 
social power are. I also attempted to determine whether Florida’s politicians and political 
appointees have used the hard and soft power tactics at a dispositional rate compared to 
other organizational settings since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The 
Service First Initiative changed the employer-employee relationship, and existing 
scholarship neglected to investigate the altered employer-employee relationship. The 
results of this study provided a framework for understanding the extent that politicians 
and political appointees exercised the bases of social power and the impact changes had 
on the employer-employee relationship and HR practice. The research was divided into 
the following one research question, three subquestions, and hypotheses: 
I conducted this study to attempt to answer the following:  
Research Question 1. What extent do Florida politicians and political  
appointees use the individual bases of social power in the execution of  
their leadership duties?  
Research Subquestion 1: What are the demographic factors that are  
predictors of the use of individual bases of social power?  
Research Subquestion 2: How do state employees rank the use of the  
individual bases of social power by politicians and political appointees? 
119 
 
Research Subquestion 3: What are the perceptions of politicians and political 
appointees and their uses of the individual bases of social power? 
H0: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees are more likely to uses harsh bases of social power to achieve policy 
goals. 
H1: Since the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001), Florida’s politicians and 
political appointees are more likely to uses soft bases of social power to achieve policy 
goals.  
The research method unfolded as I described in Chapter 3. The research method 
used in the study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey because it allowed for the 
economical collection data from a large research population. I employed a stratified, 
random sampling design to ensure all SPS employees of Florida’s 31 departments, 
agencies, and autonomous organizations had the same probability of being represented in 
the survey. The research population consisted of 88,046 Florida SPS) employees in the 
CS, SES, Senior Management Service employment classifications and the five elected 
politicians with statewide executive branch duties that are members of the Florida 
Cabinet. I submitted a public records request to the state of Florida DMS for the SPS 
employee’s demographic data that included employee’s work mailing addresses. Florida 
Statute 119.0741(4) exempted 4,291 SPS employees from the public records request.  
My initial expectation for the study was that there would be participants from all 
of Florida’s 31 agency, department, or autonomous entities and the five elected 
politicians with statewide executive branch duties. There were only participants from 23 
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of the 31 agencies, departments, or autonomous entities, and there were no responses 
from Florida’s elected politicians. The low number of responses from the Exempt (53) 
and Senior (three) employment classifications resulted in the combining of the two 
employment classifications into an independent variable named political appointees. The 
low response rates in some of the agencies, departments, and autonomous agencies 
resulted in combining them into four categories based on their functional areas of 
responsibilities with: (a) the Agency for Health Care Administration, Agency for Persons 
with Disabilities, Department of Children and Families, Department of Health, 
Department of Education, and School for the Deaf and Blind being recoded into an 
independent variable named social services and education; (b) the Department of Military 
Affairs, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Department of Juvenile Justice 
being recoded into an independent variable named criminal justice/military; (c) the 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Department of Economic 
Opportunity, Public Service Commission, Department of Financial Services, Department 
of State, Department of Revenue, Department of Legal Affairs, Department of Business 
and Professional Regulation, and the Department of Veterans Affairs being recoded into 
an independent variable named administrative; and (d) the Department of Environmental 
Protection, Department of Emergency Management, Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles, and the Department of Transportation recoded into an independent 
variable named other. 
I began Chapter 4 with an introduction to the study and problem statement, and 
this will be followed by an explanation of the data collection and methodology process, 
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the research population, and sample demographics. The appropriated statistical 
assumptions related to the study will then be explained, followed by the data analysis. 
The chapter will end with a summary. 
The study did not require a pilot study because it was not applicable. The 
measurement instruments used in this study, the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) and the IPI 
(see Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky, 1998), have been validated to measure what I 
sought to measure. The PPM (Federico, 2005a) established content validity by 
conducting a Cronbach’s alpha (.84) analysis of the measure. Raven et al. (1998) 
established the content validity of the IPI via two studies with internal consistency within 
the power tactics having acceptable alpha coefficients (.63 to .88). 
The data collection for this study involved a cross-sectional survey of 5,000 
Florida SPS employees and the five Florida cabinet officials. I sent the informed consent 
form, invention to participate letter, survey, and a business reply envelope via the U.S. 
mail to the randomly selected potential participants at their work mailing addresses, 
requesting their participation in the survey. Reminder postcards were mailed to all 
participants 10 days after mailing the surveys. The data collection period lasted 30 days. 
The survey consisted of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998), the PPM (Federico et al., 2005a), 
and a questionnaire regarding the participant's demographic characteristics. Participation 
in the study was voluntary. 
I found that Florida’s political appointees use the social power tactics in a manner 
that is consistent with other organizational settings because they used the soft power 
tactics more than the harsh power tactics (Aiello et al., 2013; Erchul et al., 2001; French 
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& Raven, 1959, Pierro et al., 2008; Pierro, et. al., 2012; Schwarzwald et al., 2004 ). 
Additionally, the independent variables of age and race-African American were 
significant predictors of the use of the power tactics by Florida’s political appointees. 
SPS employees ranked the use of the social power tactics similar to the political 
appointees ranking of the use of social power tactics with the use of the soft power tactics 
over the harsh tactics. The overall goal of the research question 1 was to determine the 
extent Florida’s political appointees and supervisors used the social power tactics in 
comparison to other organizational settings. With the research question, I focused on the 
results of the factor analysis, multiple regression, means and standard deviations, and the 
assumptions of the statistical analysis conducted. Addressing research question 2 
provided the results of the multiple regression and assumptions of the statistical analysis 
of the 11 social power tactics, while addressing Research question 3 provided the results 
of the career service employee rankings of the social power tactics. Research question 4 
was a redundant question because it asked the same question as the research question and 
was therefore eliminated from the study. 
 The results of the research question show that Florida’s political appointees do 
use the soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics. The results of subquestion 1 show 
that legitimacy of reciprocity power tactic was not a statistically significant model while 







This study was a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design and did not use any 
treatment or intervention. I used measurement instruments that previously had contact 
validity established if previous research. Therefore, there was no need to conduct a pilot 
study. 
Data Collection 
In this study, I collected data from a stratified, cross-sectional survey of 5,005 
Florida SPS employees and the five elected Florida cabinet officers. I sent a public record 
request to the Florida DMS and requested the work mailing addresses and demographic 
information on all Florida SPS employees. Participants were then selected by the use of a 
representative sampling method. I mailed the informed consent form, an invention to 
participate letter, the survey, and a business reply envelope via the U.S. mail to 5,005 
SPS employees in the CS, SES, and Senior Management Service classifications and the 
five Florida cabinet officers at their work mailing addresses. Participants were also sent a 
reminder postcard requesting the participation in the survey 10 days after the surveys 
were mailed out. The data collection period lasted 30 days after mailing the surveys. The 
response rate was 7.07%, resulting in 354 responses from the SPS employees. There were 
no responses from elected politicians with statewide executive branch duties.  
I conducted the data collection as described in Chapter 3 with the following 
exceptions: 11 SPS employees contacted me via e-mail and stated they had received the 
reminder postcard but had not received the initial survey. I verified the SPS employee’s 
address and sent the SPS employee a new survey at their request. Thirteen SPS 
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employees contacted me stating they had not received the survey and would like to 
participate in the survey. The SPS employees that requested to participate in the survey 
were mailed a survey. 
There was a total of 354 respondents to the survey, with 196 males (55.4%) and 
154 females (43.5%) respondents to the survey (see Table 1). The overall response rate 
was 7.07%. The survey contained ten demographic question to determine the 
demographic characteristics of the sample. The demographic questions were optional and 
resulted in the demographic variables of pay band and level being dropped from the 
survey due to low response rates of 46.6 and 24.9 percent respectively.  
The major threats to external validity involve the interaction of selection and 
treatment, the interaction of setting and treatment, and interaction of history and 
treatment (Creswell, 2009; Kalaian & Kasim, 2008). The research population included 
88,046 Florida state personal system employees in the career, exempt, and senior 
management employment classifications, and the five State of Florida politicians with 
executive branch duties. To avoid external validity issues the researcher employed a 
stratified cross-sectional survey with probability sampling to obtain a representative 
sample. The combination of using a large research population, probability sampling, and 
the utilization of a stratified cross-sectional survey negated the major threats to external 
validity.  
The mean age of the participants was 41-45 years (see Table 1). The education 
level of participants with 70 high school or GED (19.9%), 46 associate degree (13.9%), 
142 Bachelors degree (40.5%), 91 Masters degree (25.9%), and two Ph.D. or terminal 
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degree (.6%) (Table 2). The mean of participant's political predisposition is 4.13 (Table 
3). The participants functional area grouping included 67 participants in the 
administrative agencies (18.9%), 97 participants in the criminal justice-military agencies 
(27.4%), 121 participants in the social service-educational agencies (34.2%), and 63 
participants in the other agencies (17.8%) category (Table 4). The race/ethnicity of the 
respondents was 63 Black or African American participants (18.1%), eight American 
indian and alaska native participants (2.3%), 19 asian participants (5.5%), two native 
hawaiian or other pacific islander participants (.6%), 10 hispanic participants (2.9%), 210 
white non-hispanic participants (60.3%), and 36 participants who reported more than one 
race/ethnicity (10.3%)(Table 5). The participants gender with 196 males (55.4%), 154 
females (43.5%), and four no responses (1.1%)(Table 6). There are 296 CS employees 
(83.6%) and 56 political appointees (15.8%) who responded to the survey (Table 7). 
Results 
There are 296 CS employees (83.6%) and 56 political appointees (15.8%) who 
responded to the survey (Table 7). The participants are from 23 of 31 Florida state 
agencies, departments, and autonomous entities (Table 8). Allen (2017) stated there are 
six assumptions multiple regression: (a) There is a linear relationship between variables, 
(b) multivariate normality is assumed, (c) errors terms of variable are not correlated, (d) 
variance of the model is equally distributed and homoscedasticity is assumed, (e) there 
should be an absence of influential observation, and (f)) there should be no or little 
multicollinearity in the regression model. The central limit theorem states that large 
samples do not violate normality (Field, 2013). The correlation matrix variables were 
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minimally correlated, which reduced the issue of multicollinearity. The tolerance levels 
ranged from .233 for social services and education and a high of .941 for political 
predisposition and gender-female. The VIF ranged from a high of 4.48 for social services 
and education and a low of 1.06 for political predisposition. The multicollinearity 
assumption was not violated. The data were screened for outliers, heteroscedasticity, and 
non-linearity. Figures 1-22 show the histogram and normal p-plot of regression 
standardized residuals.   
The four basic assumptions involving independent samples t-test include: (a) case 
represent a random sample from a defined population and the score are independent of 
each other, (b) the independent variables must be nominal, and the dependent variable 
must be interval, (c) the independent samples t-test assumes the scores of the testing 
variable are normally distributed, and (d) the population variance is equal (Allen, 2017). 
The assumptions were not violated.  
Research question 1 asked, what extent do Florida politicians and political 
appointee’s use of the individual base of social power employ in the execution of the 
leadership duties? Before conducting any analysis related to the research questions or 
hypotheses, a factor analysis utilizing maximum likelihood and varimax rotation was 
conducted on the responses to the 11 items on the IPI scale. The results for the factor 
analysis explained 40.48 % of the total variance. The results are consistent with the 
original research (Raven et al., 1998) with the harsh power statistically significant 
predictors of the power tactics (impersonal reward, personal coercion, legitimate 
reciprocity, legitimacy of position, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy equity) and soft 
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power tactics (expert, informational, referent, the legitimacy of dependence, and personal 
reward) being identified (Table 9). The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy was .795 and was above the recommended value of 0.50 and is classified on 
the high side of “middling” (Field, 2013). The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
statistically significant (p < .001) and indicated that there was no basis for further 
reduction.  
The political appointees ranked the use of informational power (M  = 5.18,  SD = 
1.13), legitimacy of position (M = 5.09,  SD = 1.04), legitimacy of dependence ( M = 
5.07, SD = 0.96), referent power (M 4.83 SD 1.02), expert power (M 4.58 SD 1.42), 
personal reward (M  = 4.30, SD = 1.20), impersonal coercive (M = 4.27,  SD = 1.69), 
legitimacy of reciprocity (M = 4.04, SD = 1.09), personal coercion (M - 3.90, SD = 1.23), 
impersonal reward (M  = 3.54,  SD = 1.46), and legitimacy of equity (M = 2.91, SD = 
1.52) (Table 10). Overall, political appointees ranked the usage of the soft power tactics 
(M = 4.79, SD .70) harsh power tactics (M = 3.54, SD .72) (Table 23). The rankings of 
the power tactics are consistent with previous research (see Raven, et al., 1998; Erchul, et 
al., 2001; Schwarzwald, et al., 2004; Pierro, et al., 2008; Pierro, et. al., 2012; and Aiello, 
et al., 2013). 
A standard multiple regression involving the forced entry method was performed 
to examine the usage of the social power bases by the political appointees. The multiple 
regression indicated political appointees use of referent (β = .16, t (2.82) = p .005) and 
legitimacy of dependence (β = .12, t (2.06) = p .041) power tactics are statistically 
significant overall (Tables 11 -21).  
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Research Question 2 asked, what are the demographic factors that are predictors 
of the use of individual bases of social power? Multiple regression analysis was 
employed to examine the predictors of the use of 11 social power tactics from the 
independent variables. criminal justice/military was the control variable and the 
independent variables of age, education, political predisposition, employment 
classifications of social services and education, administration, and other, race-African 
American, race-other minority, White non-Hispanic gender, and political appointees.  
The overall model for reward Impersonal power was statistically significant (F 
(10, 326) = 4.674, p <.001, with an R² of .125. The predictor variable of age (β¹ = -.261, t 
(326) = -4.69, p < .001), indicated that as age increases by one-year, political appointees 
are -.261 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal 
justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The predictor 
variable of social services and education (β⁴ = .308, t (326) = 2.81, p .005) was 
statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional 
grouping are .308 times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the 
criminal justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The 
predictor variable administrative (β⁵ = .216, t(326) =  2.36, p .019 was statistically 
significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .22 
times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal 
justice/military function group likely to uses reward impersonal power. The predictor 
variable of race – African American (β⁷ = -.140, t (326) = -2.53, p .012 was statistically 
significant and indicated that political appointees in the functional grouping are -.140 
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times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal 
justice/military function group likely to uses reward informational power. The predictor 
variables of age, social services and education, administrative, and race – African 
American are statistically significant predictors of the use of impersonal reward power 
(Table 11).  
The overall model for coercive impersonal power was statistically significant (F 
(10, 326) = 1.911, p .043, with an R² of .026. The predictor variable of race – african 
American (β⁷ = -.116. t (326) = -2.02, p .044) was statistically significant and indicated 
that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per 
standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group 
likely to uses coercive impersonal power. Gender-female (β⁹ = -.110, t (326) = -1.98, p 
.049) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the 
functional grouping are -.110 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses coercive 
impersonal power. The predictor variables of race – African American and gender-female 
are statistically significant predictors of coercive impersonal power (Table 12).  
The overall model for Expert power was statistically significant (F (10, 326) = 
3.363, p <.001, with an R² of .066. The predictor variable of age (β¹ = -.214, t (326) = 
3.78, p <.001) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in 
the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses expert power 
(Table 13).  
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The overall model for referent power was statistically significant (F (10, 326) = 
3.713, p .001, with an R² of .075. The predictor variables of age (β¹ = -.186, t (326) = -
3.294, p .001) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in 
the functional grouping are -.186 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. 
The predictor variable of race – African American (β⁷ = -.126, t (326) = -2.25, p .025) 
was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional 
grouping are -.126 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the 
criminal justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. The predictor 
variable of race – other minority (β⁸ = -.200, t (326) = -3.483, p .001) was statistically 
significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.200 
times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal 
justice/military function group likely to uses referent power. The predictor variable of 
political appointees (β¹⁰ = .160, t (326) = 2.821, p .005) was statistically significant and 
indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.160 times more 
likely per standard deviation than in the criminal justice/military function group to use 
referent power (Table 14).  
The overall model for Informational power was statistically significant (F (10, 
326) =, 4.724, p <.001, with an R² of .127. The predictor variables of age (β¹ = -.244, t 
(326) = -4.39, p <.001) was statistically significant and indicated that the political 
appointees in the functional grouping are -.116 times less likely per standard deviation 
than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses 
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Informational power. The predictor variable of race – African American (β⁷= -.172, t 
(326) = -3.103, p .027) was statistically significant and indicated that the political 
appointees in the functional grouping are -.172 times less likely per standard deviation 
than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses 
Informational power. The predictor variable of gender-female (β⁹ = -.108, t (326) = -
2.033, p .043) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in 
the functional grouping are -.108 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to uses informational 
power (Table 15).  
The overall model for legitimacy of position power was statistically significant (F 
(10, 326) =, 3.039, p .045, with an R² of .055. The predictor variables of political 
predisposition (β³ = .123, t (326) = 2.217, p .027) was statistically significant and 
indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .123 times more 
likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military 
function group to uses legitimacy of position power. The predictor variable of gender-
female (β⁹ = -.110, t (326) = -1.979, p .049) was statistically significant and indicated that 
the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.110 times less likely per standard 
deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group likely to 
uses legitimacy of position power (Table 16).  
The overall model for legitimacy of reciprocity power was not statistically 
significant (F (10, 326) =, 1.831, p .054, with an R² of .053. The predictor variables of 
age (β¹ = -.124, t (326) = -2.148, p .032) was statistically significant and indicated that 
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the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.124 times less likely per 
standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function 
group likely to uses legitimacy of reciprocity power. The predictor variable of political 
predisposition (β³ = .144, t (326) = 2.593, p .010) was statistically significant and 
indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .114 times more 
likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military 
function group likely to uses legitimacy of reciprocity power (Table 17).  
The overall model for legitimacy of dependence power was statistically 
significant (F (10, 326) =, 4.634, p <.001, with an R² of .124. The predictor variables of 
age (β¹ = -.294, t (326) = 5.272, p < .001) was statistically significant and indicated that 
the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.294 times less likely per 
standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function 
group likely to uses legitimacy of dependence power. The predictor variable of race – 
african American (β⁷ = -.127, t (326) = -2.293, p .022) was statistically significant and 
indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.127 times less 
likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military 
function group likely to uses legitimacy of dependence power. The predictor variable of 
political appointees (β¹⁰ = .115, t (326) = 2.056, p .041) was statistically significant and 
indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are .115 times more 
likely per standard deviation than in the criminal justice/military function group to use 
legitimacy of dependence power (Table 18). 
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The overall model for legitimacy of equity power was statistically significant (F 
(10, 326) =, 3.188, p .001, with an R² of .089. The predictor variables of age (β¹ = -.123, t 
(326) = -2.158, p .032) was statistically significant and indicated that the political 
appointees in the functional grouping are -.123 times less likely per standard deviation 
than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy 
of equity power. The predictor variable of social services and education (β⁴ = -.291, t 
(326) = -2.597, p .010) was statistically significant and indicated that the political 
appointees in the functional grouping are -.291 times less likely per standard deviation 
than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy 
of equity power. The predictor variable of administrative (β⁵ = -.260, t (326) = -2.768, p 
.006) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the 
functional grouping are -.260 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity 
power. The predictor variable of Other (β⁶= -.230, t (326) = -2.421, p .016) was 
statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional 
grouping are -.230 times less likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the 
criminal justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor 
variable of race - other minority (β⁸ = .177, t (326) = 3.067. p .002) was statistically 
significant and indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.177 
times more likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal 
justice/military function group to uses legitimacy of equity power. The predictor variable 
of gender-female (β⁹ = .109, t (326) = 2.005, p .046) was statistically significant and 
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indicated that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.109 times more 
likely per standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military 
function group to uses legitimacy of equity power (Table 19).  
The overall model for personal reward power was statistically significant (F (10, 
326) =, 2.220, p .016, with an R² of .035 (Table 20). The predictor variables of age (β¹= -
.196, t (326) = -3.407, p .001) was statistically significant and indicated that the political 
appointees in the functional grouping are -.196 times less likely per standard deviation 
than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses personal 
reward power. The predictor variable of race – African American (β⁷ = -.119, t (326) = -
2.071, p .039) was statistically significant and indicated that the political appointees in 
the functional grouping are -.119 times less likely per standard deviation than political 
appointees in the criminal justice/military function group to uses personal reward power. 
The overall model for personal coercion power was statistically significant (F (10, 
326) =, 1.896, p .045, with an R² of .055 (Table 21). The predictor variable race – African 
American (β⁷= -.209, t (326) = <.001), p < .001) was statistically significant and indicated 
that the political appointees in the functional grouping are -.209 times less likely per 
standard deviation than political appointees in the criminal justice/military function group 
to uses personal coercion power. 
Research question 3: How do state employees rank the use of the individual bases 
of social power by politicians and political appointees?  The civil service employees 
ranked the usage of the power bases by the political appointees as follows: informational 
power (M = 5.06,  SD = 1.13), legitimacy of dependence (M = 5.01,  SD = 1.20), 
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legitimacy of position (M  = 4.72,  SD = 1.32), expert power (M = 4.65, SD = 1.50), 
impersonal coercive (M = 4.35,  SD = 1.56), referent power (M = 4.30,  SD = 1.45), 
personal reward (M = 4.23,  SD = 1.42), legitimacy of reciprocity (M = 3.95, SD = 1.31), 
personal coercion (M =  3.71,  SD = 1.52), impersonal reward (M  = 3.62,  SD = 1.78), 
and legitimacy of equity power (M = 2.85, SD = 1.05) (Table 22). Overall, SPS 
employees ranked the usage of the soft power tactics (M = 4.65, SD 1.09) harsh power 
tactics (M = 3.31, SD .74) and is constant with previous research (Table 22). State 
employees slightly differed in their perception of the usage of the bases of social power 
by political appointees. Notably, state employees ranked the usage of legitimacy of 
dependence, expert, and impersonal coercive power bases in higher positions then the 
political employees. Conversely, they ranked the usage of legitimacy of position, 
referent, and personal reward power bases in lower positions then political appointees. 
State employees ranked the usage of informational, legitimacy of reciprocity, personal 
coercion, impersonal reward, and legitimacy of equity the same as political appointees.  
Research question 4 question is redundant as research question one asks the same 
question. 
Post-hoc analyses of the multiple logistical regression: Fixed model, R² deviation 
from zero was conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.2 and result in f² = .02, α = 0.05, β = 
0.9999005. The means and standard deviations for the likelihood of usage of the social 
power tactics by political appointees and SPS civil service employees were calculated 
and compared. The results are similar with a few minor variations in the ranking and is 
consistent with prior research 
136 
 
Presentation of the Results 
All tables, charts, figures, and descriptions are presented by order presented in the 
chapter. The tables, charts, figures, and descriptions are cited in the study as there are 
presented in the chapters for the ease of reading. The tables, charts, figures, and 
descriptions are found in the List of Tables and List of figures.  
Summary 
The analysis of research question one shows that political appointees prefer to use 
the soft power tactics over harsh power tactics and it consistent with studies of other 
organizational settings. Therefore, the null hypotheses is rejected and the alternate 
hypotheses is accepted.  
The results of research question 2 analysis indicated that political appointees use 
of Referent (β = .16, t (2.82) = p .005) and legitimacy of dependence (β = .12, t (2.06) = p 
.041) social power bases was significant overall. Within each of the individual power 
bases there were statistically significant predictors of social power usage. Independent 
variables of age and race-African American were significant in the power bases. Age was 
found to be significant predictor in four of the harsh power tactics and four of the soft 
power tactics. Age was a significant predictor of the use the harsh power tactics of 
impersonal reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of 
reciprocity. Age was also a significant predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of 
referent power, informational power, legitimacy of dependency power, and personal 
reward power. The independent variable of race-African American was a significant 
predictor in significant predictor in four of the harsh power tactics and three of the soft 
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power tactics. The race-African American independent variable was a significant 
predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, 
legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power. race-African American was 
a significant predictor in the usage of the hard power tactics of impersonal reward power, 
impersonal coercive power, and personal coercion power.  
The analysis of research question three shows that Florida SPS career service 
employees rank the usage of the soft power tactics over harsh power tactics and it 
consistent with the political appointees and studies of other organizational settings 
(Raven, et al., 1998; Erchul, et al., 2001; Schwarzwald, et al., 2004; Pierro, et al., 2008; 
Pierro, et. al., 2012, 2004; and Aiello, et al., 2013). However, SPS career service 
employees did rank soft power tactics lower than the political appointees did (Table 24).   
Research Subquestion 3 was a redundant question and eliminated from the study.  
The question asked the same question as the Research Question. The removal of the 
question helped clarify the findings of the study..  
Conclusion 
The study addressed the usage of the bases of social power tactics by Florida’s 
political appointees in the SPS after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The 
Service First Initiative (2001) radically reformed Florida’s Civil Service System by 
reducing traditional merit protection and reclassified just over 16,000 CS employees to 
the Selected Exempt employment classification (Summary of Service First, 2001). The 
reclassification to the Selected Exempt employment classification essentially made those 
employees political appointees. The stated goal of the Service First Initiative was to make 
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SPS employees more responsive to government executives (Nigro & Kellough, 2008). 
The Service First Initiative changed the employee-employer relationship and had not 
been studied. French and Raven (1959) stated that how one perceives the target of the 
influence affects the power tactic used to influence the target of the influence. The study 
also investigated what are the predictors of the usage of the social power tactics. The 
instrument used to collect the data included the interpersonal power inventory (Raven et 
al., 1998), political predisposition measure (Federico et al.,) and a questionnaire relating 
to the participant's demographic characteristics.     
The responses to the survey were used to determine that Florida’s political 
appointees use the soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics and is consistent with 
other organizational settings. The independent variables of age is a significant predictor 
of the use of the soft power tactics of referent power, informational power, the legitimacy 
of dependency power, and personal reward power. Age is also a significant predictor of 
the use of the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, the 
legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. Race-African American is a 
significant predictor in the usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information 
power, the legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power. Race-African 
American was a significant predictor in the usage of the hard power tactics of impersonal 
reward power, impersonal coercive power, and personal coercion power.  
Chapter five focused on the study’s interpretation of the results that are presented 
in Chapter four. Chapter five will explain the premise of why the study was conducted 
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and the findings of each research question and social change implications. Chapter five 
also present recommendations for both action and additional research. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to examine the usage of the bases of social power 
(French & Raven, 1959) by Florida’s politicians and political appointees to determine 
whether their harsh and soft power tactics usage is consistent with other organizational 
settings after the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). I also wanted to determine 
what the predictors of the use of the harsh and soft power tactics are and how state 
employees ranked the use of the social power tactics by political appointees. The Service 
First Initiative radically reformed Florida’s SPS and changed the employer-employee 
relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). Previous research has failed 
to investigate what effect the changes had on the bases of social power usage by Florida’s 
politicians and political appointees. The results of this study provided a framework with 
which to understand the extent of the usage of the bases of social power after the passage 
of the Service First Initiative. 
The theoretical framework of the study was comprised of French and Raven’s 
(1959) bases of social power theory and the IPIM (Raven, 1992). I used the IPI (Raven et 
al., 1998) to measure the usage and identify the predictors of the harsh and soft power 
tactics and how state employees ranked the usage of the power tactics by political 
appointees. The PPM (Federico et al., 2005a) was used to determine the political 
predispositions of SPS employees. I developed a questionnaire to collect demographic 
data from the participants.  
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I employed a quantitative, stratified, cross-sectional design in this study, and the 
study population was 5,005 political appointees, civil service employees in Florida’s SPS, 
and Florida cabinet officers. There were 11 dependent variables that consisted of the 
power tactics of the IPIM. The independent variables were the participant’s age; 
education; political predisposition; employment classifications of social services and 
education, administration, and other; race; gender, and political appointees. I mailed the 
informed consent form, invention to participate letter, survey, business reply envelope, 
and reminder postcard to participants via their work mailing addresses. The data 
collection period lasted 30 days with a response rate of 7.07%. The responses to the 11 
IPI scale items were subjected to a factor analysis in which I used maximum likelihood 
and varimax rotation. The means and standard deviations of the 11 items on the IPI scale 
were calculated to determine the usage of the individual bases of social power. I also 
performed a standard multiple regression involving the forced entry method to examine 
the usage of the social power bases by the political appointees, with the criminal 
justice/military functional group being the control variable. 
The findings of the study revealed that political appointees used soft power tactics 
over harsh power tactics and were consistent with prior research in other organizational 
settings. CS employees ranked the usage of the power tactics by political appointees in a 
similar manner as political appointees with some minor ranking differences. Multiple 
regression indicated political appointees’ usage of referent and legitimacy of dependence 
power tactics is statistically significant overall. Age is a statistically significant predictor 
of the usage of the soft power tactics of expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of 
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dependency, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, 
legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity. The social services and education 
variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactics of 
reward impersonal and legitimacy of equity power. The administrative variable is a 
statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of 
equity. Race – African American is a statistically significant predictor of that usage of the 
soft power tactics of referent, information, legitimacy of dependence, and personal 
reward power and the harsh power tactics of impersonal reward, expert, legitimacy of 
equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity power. The race – other minority variable is a 
statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of referent power and 
the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity power. The gender - female variable was a 
statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic of information power 
and the harsh power tactics of legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive impersonal, and 
legitimacy of equity power. The political appointees variable is a statistically significant 
predictor of the use of the soft power tactics of referent and legitimacy of dependence 
power. The political predisposition variable is a statistically significant predictor of the 
use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of reciprocity power. The predictor variable of 
education is not a statistically significant predictor of any of the 11 power tactics. 
The findings of this study indicate that political appointees use soft power tactics 
over harsh power tactics. The findings are consistent with studies of other organizational 




Interpretations of the Findings 
The reforms of the Service First Initiative (2001) were in keeping with the NPM 
doctrine that advocated at-will employment, the decentralization of human resource 
practices, and the elimination or reduction of employees’ due process rights (Bowman, 
2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The Service First Initiative altered 
the employee-employer relationship in Florida’s SPS (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & 
Nigro, 2006). Prior research identified evidence of patronage hiring and firings 
employment practices resulting from the passage of the Service First Initiative (Battaglio 
& Condrey, 2009; Bowman, 2002; Crowell & Guy, 2010; Harvey, 2013; Hollibaugh, 
2015; Koven, 2007; Maranto & Johnson, 2008; Williams & Bowman, 2007). At-will 
employment practices have resulted in numerous political supporters being rewarded with 
government positions with questionable qualifications (Feeney & Kingsley, 2008; 
Moynihan & Roberts, 2010; Sundell, 2014). In this study, I found that the independent 
variables of political affiliation and political appointees are not statistically significant in 
the use of impersonal reward, personal reward, personal coercion, and impersonal 
coercion power. The findings of this study do not align with the results of prior research 
on the use of reward power in patronage employment practices in Florida’s SPS.  
Dahlstrom et al. (2012) found that politicians and their political appointees are 
more likely to use coercive power to punish potential and current employees who are not 
supportive of their views, while using reward power on their supporters. The findings of 
this study did not support Dahlstrom et al.’s findings because Florida’s political 
appointees use of coercive and reward power was not statistically significant. My data 
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analysis showed that political appointees’ use of referent (β = .16, t (2.82), p = .005) and 
legitimacy of dependence (β = .12, t (2.06), p = .041) power tactics as statistically 
significant overall (Tables 11–21). There was no evidence in the data analysis that 
political appointees or political predisposition were statistically significant predictors of 
the usage of the soft power tactic of personal reward power or the harsh power tactics of 
reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and personal coercion power. The findings of 
this study do not support the prior research on the use of coercive or reward power in 
patronage employment practices in Florida’s SPS.  
As evidenced by the literature review, supervisors tend to prefer the use of soft 
power tactics over harsh power tactics in their attempts to influence subordinates (Aiello 
et al., 2013; Erchul et al., 2001; French & Raven, 1959; Pierro et al., 2008, Pierro et al., 
2012; Schwarzwald et al., 2004). The results of this study were consistent with previous 
research in that political appointees prefer the use of soft power tactics over harsh power 
tactics. I found that the altered employee-employer relationship did not affect the political 
appointees’ use of the soft or harsh power tactics.  
French and Raven (1959) stated that social change agents’ use of influence 
method(s) is dependent on how they perceive the target of the influence attempt, the 
organization, and their beliefs. In this study, I investigated independent variables that 
have an impact on the change agent’s perceptions of the target of the influence attempt. I 
found that as the independent variable of age increases by 1 year, political appointees 
were less likely to use the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, legitimacy of 
reciprocity, and legitimacy of equity power and the soft power tactics of expert, referent, 
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informational, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward. The independent variable 
of political predisposition showed that criminal justice/military political appointees were 
less likely to use the legitimacy of position and legitimacy of reciprocity power tactic. 
The independent variable of social services/education political appointees showed that 
criminal justice/military political appointees were less likely to use reward impersonal 
power and more likely to use legitimacy of equity power.  
The independent variable of administrative showed that criminal justice/military 
political appointees were less likely to use reward impersonal power and more likely to 
use the legitimacy of equity power. The predictor independent variable of the other 
functional grouping showed that criminal justice/military political appointees are more 
likely to use legitimacy of equity power. Criminal justice/military political appointees are 
more likely to use the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and 
personal coercion and the soft power tactics of referent, informational, legitimacy of 
dependence, and personal reward power.  
The race-African American independent variable showed that criminal 
justice/military political appointees were more likely to use the harsh power tactics of 
reward impersonal, coercive impersonal, and personal coercion. The race-African 
American variable also showed they are more likely to use the soft power tactics of 
referent, informational, legitimacy of dependence, and personal reward power in attempts 
to influence African Americans compared to Whites. The variable is a major predictor of 
the use of the power tactics.  
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The race-other minority independent variable showed that criminal 
justice/military political appointees were more likely to use the harsh power tactics of 
referent and legitimacy of equity in influence attempts. The race-other minority was not 
associated with the use of the soft power tactics.  The variable was not a major predictor 
of the uses of the different power tactics.  
The gender-female independent variable showed that criminal justice/military 
political appointees are more likely to use coercive impersonal, informational, legitimacy 
of position, legitimacy of equity power on female employees when compared to male 
employees. Criminal justice/military independent appointees are more likely to use 
referent power and legitimacy of dependence power tactics then CS employees. The 
results of this study further showed the independent variable of education was not 
statistically significant predictor of any of the power tactics.  
Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations identified in the study. As identified in Chapter 1, 
the first limitation involved nonresponse bias due to the limited number of research 
participants. A larger number of responses would most likely provide a better cross-
section of career service and political appointees in Florida’s SPS. The histograms scores 
and p-plot of regression standardized residual are nearly identical and may be the result 
of nonresponse bias (Figures 1-22). It is a matter of question as to what effect a larger 
response from the research population would significantly change the findings of the 
study. The second limitation involved the bias that results from the wording of the 
questions of the survey. Even with utilizing the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) as the survey 
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instrument, several respondents made handwritten comments on the returned surveys 
indicating that they did not believe the survey questions to be valid and therefore 
reducing the response rate. The third limitation involved that the study did not investigate 
the motivational factors that influence Florida’s politicians and political appointee’s use 
of bases of social power and the 11 power tactics. Additional research should be 
conducted to determine the motivational factors behind the uses of the power tactics.  
The forth limitation involved the use of the cross-sectional design did not allow a pretest-
post-test comparison (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). The inability to conduct a 
pretest of the before the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001) results in causation 
to be logically inferred (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Finally, the fifth 
limitation involved the low number of independent variables used in the study to predict 
the usage of the individual power tactics. Additional independent variables would 
increase the likelihood of the discovery of additional predictors of the usage of the power 
tactics. 
The study showed that Florida’s political appointees use the power tactics in a 
manner that is consistent with other organizational settings, after the passage of the 
Service First Initiative (2001). Political appointees used and preferred soft power tactics 
over the harsh power tactics. French and Raven (1959) stated change agent’s usage of the 
powers tactics is affected by how the change agent perceives the target of the influence 
attempt. Eleven independent variables were identified as potential factors that might have 
a effect on the political appointee’s perceptions of their subordinates. The study identified 
predictors of the usage of the eleven power tactics of the IPI (Raven, 1998). The study 
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determined that the independent variables of age and race – African American are major 
predictors of the usage of the 11 power tactics.  
Future research involving the predictors of the use of the power tactics should 
attempt to determine the motivations behind the usage of power tactics. Age and race -
African American are identified as two major predictors of the use of the power tactics. 
Motivations can be subliminal, and supervisors may not be aware of possible 
discriminatory motivations in their choice of power tactic to use. Follow on research 
should investigate the independent variables of age and race -African American to 
determine if discrimination is the cause of the usage of the tactics.  
Age is a statistically significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of 
expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of dependency, and personal reward power and 
the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity, and legitimacy of 
equity. The social services and education variable is a statistically significant predictor of 
the use of the harsh power tactics of reward impersonal and legitimacy of equity. The 
administrative variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power 
tactic is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of 
legitimacy of equity. Race – African American is a statistically significant predictor of 
that usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information power, legitimacy of 
dependence power, and personal reward power and the harsh power tactics of impersonal 
reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of reciprocity. The race 
– other minority variable is a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power 
tactic of referent power and the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of equity. The gender - 
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female variable was a statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactic 
of information power and the harsh power tactics of legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive 
impersonal, and legitimacy of equity power. The political appointees variable is a 
statistically significant predictor of the use of the soft power tactics of referent and 
legitimacy of dependence. The political predisposition variable is a statistically 
significant predictor of the use of the harsh power tactic of legitimacy of reciprocity. The 
predictor variable of education is not a statistically significant predictor of any of the 
power tactics.  
The finding of this study indicate that political appointees use soft power tactics 
over harsh power tactics. The finding also show political appointees use of social power 
is consistent with organizational settings. The null hypotheses was rejected, and the 
Alternate hypotheses was accepted.  
Implications for Social Change 
The study investigated the gap in the literature that existed as a result of the 
changed employer-employee relationship caused by the radical civil service reforms in 
Florida with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). Researchers identified 
radical reforms to civil service systems as a cause of the changed employer-employee 
relationship (Hays & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). The study provides a 
framework for organizations to address the shortcomings of the radical reforms and the 
failure achieve to achieve the objectives of the reforms. The study advances the 
knowledge of the use of the bases of social power in unique organizational settings that 
have undertaken radical civil service reforms. The study identified the extent politicians 
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and political appointee’s use the individual bases of social power tactics as related to the 
changed employer-employee relationship. The identification of the prominent usage of 
each power base will help identify areas where organizations can identify leadership 
training protocols designed to teach politicians and political appointees the appropriate 
use of the bases of social power and improve their leadership skills, employee loyalty, 
employee responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
Across the nation, there are additional calls for radically reforming civil service 
systems at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Research on past reforms 
has shown that the goals of reforms have largely not achieved the desired outcomes 
(Nigro & Kellough, 2008). The study benefits the field by identifying the extent each 
base of power is used in government organization after the radical reforms to the human 
resource practices in Florida. Leaders engage in a wide variety of power bases to 
influence organizational members (French & Raven, 1959). The results of the study can 
then be compared to other organizational settings to differentiate differences in the usage 
of the bases of power by leaders. By comparing the result of the study to other types of 
successful organizational settings that have radically reformed their human resource 
practices, leaders can identify areas of the reforms that are not conducive to achieve 
policy goals and organizational effectiveness. The identification of over reliance on harsh 
or soft power tactics provides a framework for leaders to develop leadership training 
programs that ultimately improve leadership skills, organizational climate, employee 
loyalty, employee responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
151 
 
The findings of the study present broader implications for positive social change, 
besides the determination of the extent each social power usage. Not only does the study 
provide empirical data on the usage of each power base, but it also allows policy maker 
to discern the differences in the uses of power bases when compared to other 
organizational settings. Policy makers are then able to identify leadership traits that have 
negative influence on organizational and personal outcomes. The application of the social 
power bases influences almost every imaginable organizational outcome (Pfeffer, 1981). 
The study provides a base of knowledge that will help policymakers determine how the 
application of the bases of social power influences positive or negatives organizational 
outcomes. By understanding the application of the different bases of power on 
organizational outcomes, policymakers contemplating additional reforms can develop 
strategies and training procedures that improve leadership skills, employee loyalty, 
responsiveness, and government efficiency. 
Based on the findings of this study, all governmental organizations should 
identify how the power tactics are employed within-in their organization by political 
leaders, political appointees, supervisors, and employees to ensure there is not an over 
reliance with the usage of the harsh power tactics. The over reliance on the usage harsh 
power tactics have been identified with negative organizational and personal outcomes, 
while the usage of the soft power tactics has been identified with positive organizational 
and personal outcome. The finding of the study identified predictors of the use of the 
eleven power tactics. The findings of provide a framework for the development of 
targeted leadership training that addresses the negative and positive effects to the usage 
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of the power tactics and dependent variables that have been identified as statically 
significant in the usage of harsh and soft power tactics.  
The prospect of future research into the use of the application of social power is 
grounded in what are the predictors of the application of the power tactics across different 
organizational settings. For example, the criminal justice/military grouping tends to use 
the harsh power tactics a higher rate than the other political appointee functional 
groupings. Future research should investigate to determine if the criminal justice/military 
function grouping’s reliance on the use of the harsh power tactic can be reduced and 
therefore lead to improved organizational and individual outcome. For that matter, all 
leaders use of the harsh power settings could be reduced and lead to improved 
organizational and individual outcomes, and the improvement in the delivery of 
government services. The broader implications for positive change involve the 
identification of leadership traits that both positively and negatively impact the 
application of social power and to allow policymakers, executives, political appointees to 
develop or undertake strategies and training to improve leadership abilities, 
organizational commitment, employee responsiveness to leaders, and government 
efficiency. 
Conclusion 
The study investigated a neglected area of research in the use of the bases of 
social power in government civil service organizations that had undergone radical civil 
service reforms know as new public management (NPM), Florida radically altered is civil 
service with the passage of the Service First Initiative (2001). The reforms altered the 
153 
 
employee-employer relationship by reclassifying low-level supervisor as at-will 
employees, decentralization of HR practices, elimination or reduction of the employees’ 
due process rights (Bowman, 2002; Hayes & Sowa, 2006; Kellough & Nigro, 2006). 
Florida’s reclassification of low-level supervisors as at-will employees effectively made 
them political employees. The literature review found that supervisors and subordinates 
in other organizational settings that had not radically reformed their HR practices 
preferred the use of soft power tactics over the harsh power tactics.  
The study’s findings are consistent with the findings of the previous research as 
political appointees and career service employees in Florida’s SPS rank the use of the soft 
power tactics over the harsh power tactics. The study also attempted to identify what is 
the predictors of the different power tactics. Political employees and career service SPS 
employees were divided into groups based on their agency, department, or autonomous 
entities primary organizational functions. The main findings of the research indicated the 
model for referent and legitimately of dependence was statistically significant in 
predicting their usage.  
The predictors of the usage of the power tactics were measured eleven 
differentiated power tactics of the IPI (Raven et al., 1998) and demographic factors of the 
political appointees and career service employees. The most significant findings of the 
study are that the independent variable of age is a significant predictor of soft power 
tactics of expert, referent, informational, legitimacy of dependency, and personal reward 
power and the harsh power tactics of personal coercion, legitimacy of reciprocity, and 
legitimacy of equity. The independent variable of race-African American is a statistically 
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significant predictor of that usage of the soft power tactics of referent power, information 
power, legitimacy of dependence power, and personal reward power and the harsh power 
tactics of impersonal reward power, expert power, legitimacy of equity, and legitimacy of 
reciprocity. The independent variable gender-female is a statistically significant predictor 
of the use of the soft power tactic of information power and the harsh power tactics of 
legitimacy of reciprocity, coercive impersonal, and legitimacy of equity power. The other 
variables are not as significant in predicting the use of the hard or soft power tactics. The 
independent variable education was not statistically significant in predicting any of the 
power tactics. 
The findings of the study suggest future research to investigate the motivations 
behind the statistically significant predictors of the power tactics. Future research should 
also investigate additional predictors of the use of the power tactics. Investigating the 
motivations behind the usage of the different power tactics and additional variables will 
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Appendix A: Political Predisposition Measure 




Federico, C. M., Golec, A., & Dial, J. L. (2005). Political Predisposition Measure 





This measure employs a 7-point response scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very 
conservative). Responses are averaged to form a composite. The higher the score, the 
greater the level of conservatism. 
 
Source: 
Federico, Christopher M., Golec, Agnieszka, & Dial, Jessica L. (2005). The 
Relationship Between the Need for Closure and Support for Military Action Against 
Iraq: Moderating Effects of National Attachment. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, Vol 31(5), 621-632. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271588, © 2005 by Society 
for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reproduced by Permission of Society for 
Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 
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Appendix B: Interpersonal Power Inventory 
 
Interpersonal Power Inventory Items (Subordinate Form) 
Reward Impersonal 
_   A good evaluation from my supervisor could lead to an increase in pay. 
_   My supervisor could help me receive special benefits. 




_   My supervisor could make things unpleasant for me. 
_   My supervisor could make it more difficult for me to get a promotion. 




_   My supervisor probably knew the best way to do the job. 
_   My supervisor probably knew more about the job than I did. 




_   I respected my supervisor and thought highly of him/her and did not wish to 
disagree. 
_   I saw my supervisor as someone I could identify with. 




_    Once it was pointed out, I could see why the change was necessary. 
_    My supervisor gave me good reasons for changing how I did the job. 




_   After all, he/she was my supervisor. 
_   My supervisor had the right to request that I do my work in a particular way. 







_   For past considerations I had received, I felt obliged to comply. 
_   My supervisor had previously done some good things that I had requested. 
_   My supervisor had let me have my way earlier so I felt obliged to comply now. 
Legitimacy/Dependence 
 
_   Unless I did so, his/her job would be more difficult. 
_   I understood that my supervisor really needed my help on this. 
_   I realized that a supervisor needs assistance and cooperation from those working 
with   




_   By doing so, I could make up for some problems I may have caused in the past. 
_   Complying helped make up for things I had not done so well previously. 




_   I liked my supervisor and his/her approval was important to me. 
_   My supervisor made me feel more valued when I did as requested. 




_   It would have been disturbing to know that my supervisor dis- approved of me. 
_   My supervisor may have been cold and distant if did not do as requested. 
_   Just knowing that I was on the bad side of my supervisor would have upset me. 
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Appendix C: Demographic Information Survey Questions 
 
 
Please check the response that most accurately describes you. Provide only one answer 

























_ 2000 or before 
 
What is your age? 
 
_ 18-20 years 
_ 21-25 years 
_ 26-30 years 
_ 31-35 years 
_ 36-40 years 
_ 41-45 years 
_ 46-50 years 
_ 51-55 years 
_ 56-60 years 
_ 61-65 years 
_ 66-70 years 
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_ 71- or over 
 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
 
_ Black or African American 
_ American Indian and Alaska Native 
_ Asian 
_ Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 
_ Hispanic  
_ White non-Hispanic 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
_ High School or GED 
_ Associate Degree 
_ Bachelor Degree 
_ Masters Degree 
_ Ph.D or Terminal Degree 
 
What is your employment classification? 
 
_ Career Service  
_  Exempt Service 
_  Senior Management Service 
_ Elected politician 
 
What State of Florida agency, department, or autonomous entities do you work for?  
 
_ Department of Agriculture and Consumer Service  
_ Commission on Offender Review  
_ Agency for Health Care Administration  
_ Department of Economic Opportunity  
_ Department of Military Affairs  
_ Public Service Commission  
_ Department of Financial Service  
_ Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles  
_ Agency for Persons with Disabilities  
_ Department of Education  
_ Department of State 
_ Department of Legal Affairs  
_ Department of Law Enforcement 
_ Agency for State Technology  
_ Department of Elder Affairs  
_ Department of Transportation   
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_ Department of Revenue  
_ Department of Business and Professional Regulation 
_ Department of Environmental Protection  
_ Division of Emergency Management  
_ Department of Veterans’ Affairs  
_ Department of Children and Families  
_ Department of Health  
_ Executive Office of the Governor  
_ Division of Administrative Hearings  
_ Department of Citrus  
_ Department of Juvenile Justice  
_ Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission  
_ Department of Corrections  
_ Department of Management Services  
_ School for the Deaf and the Blind  
_ Florida Cabinet 
 
What is your pay band and level? 
 
Pay Band    Level 
 
_ 001      _ 013   _ 1 
_ 002      _ 014   _ 2  
_ 003      _ 015   _ 3 
_ 004      _ 016   _ 4 
_ 005      _ 017   _ 5 
_ 006      _ 018   _ 6 
_ 007        _ 019 
_ 008        _ 020 
_ 009      _ 021 
_ 010      _ 022 
_ 011      _ 023 

























Table 1.  
 
Participant Demographics: Age  
 
  Frequency Percent      
2017 27 7.63      
2016 39 11.02      
2015 12 3.39      
2014 19 5.37      
2013 14 3.95      
2012 13 3.67      
2011 8 2.26      
2010 7 1.98      
2009 12 3.39      
2008 18 5.08      
2007 21 5.93      
2006 6 1.69      
2005 14 3.95      
2004 16 4.52      
2003 10 2.82      
2002 3 0.85      
2001 14 3.95      
2000 or Before 97 27.40      
Total 350 98.87      
Missing           4     1.13      
Total       354 100.00      
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Table 2.  
Participant Demographics: Education  
 Education Frequency Percent 
High School or GED 70 19.9 
Associate Degree 46 13.1 
Bachelor Degree 142 40.5 
Masters Degree 91 25.9 
Ph.D or Terminal Degree 2 .6 
Missing 3   




Political Predisposition of Participants  
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
  
Very Liberal 12 3.39 3.41   
1.5 15 4.24 4.26   
Liberal 32 9.04 9.09   
2.5 33 9.32 9.38   
Slightly Liberal 
24 6.78 6.82 
  
3.5 30 8.47 8.52   
Moderate 47 13.28 13.35   
4.5 22 6.21 6.25   
Slightly Conservative 
35 9.89 9.94 
  
5.5 9 2.54 2.56   
Conservative 53 14.97 15.06   
6.5 30 8.47 8.52   
Very Conservative 
10 2.82 2.84 
  
Total 352 99.44 100.00   
Missing  2 0.56   
Total 354 100   
Note. Mean = 4.13 
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Table 4.  
 
Participants Demographics: Functional Areas  
 N Percent 
 
Administrative Agencies 67 18.9  
Criminal Justice-Military Agencies 97 27.4  
Social Services-Education Agencies 121 34.2  
Other Agencies 63 17.8  
Total 348 98.3   
Missing 6 1.7  
Note. N = 348 
 
Table 5.  
 
Participant Demographics: Race/Ethnicity  
Race/Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
   
Black or African American 63 18.1 
American Indian and Alaska Native 8 2.3 
Asian 19 5.5 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 2 .6 
Hispanic 10 2.9 
White non-Hispanic 210 60.3 
More then 1 36 10.3 
Total 348 
 
Missing 6 100.00  





















Gender Frequency Percent 
   
  Male 196 55.4 
Female 154 43.5 
Total 350 98.9 
  Missing 4 1.1 





 Participants Demographics: Employments Classification 
  Frequency Percent   
Career Service 296 83.6   
Political Appointees 56 15.8   
Total 352 99.4   
























Table  8. 
 
Participants Demographics: Agency, Department, or Autonomous Entities ( 
  Frequency Percent 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Service 
23 6.6 
Agency for Health Care Administration 4 1.1 
Department of Economic Opportunity 4 1.1 
Department of Military Affairs 2 .6 
Public Service Commission 4 1.1 
Department of Financial Services 13 3.7 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles 
19 5.5 
Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4 1.1 
Department of Education 21 6.0 
Department of State 5 1.4 
Department of Law Enforcement 15 4.3 
Department of Transportation 38 10.9 
Department of Revenue 8 2.3 
Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation 
7 2.0 
Department of Environmental Protection 13 3.7 
Department of Emergency Management 2 .6 
Department of Veteran's Affairs 3 .9 
Department of Children and Families 33 9.5 
Department of Health 46 13.2 
Department of Juvenile Justice 17 4.9 
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission 12 3.4 
Department of Corrections 51 14.7 
School for the Deaf and the Blind 4 1.1 
Missing 6   
Note. 7 Participants did not answer the agency, department, or autonomous entities  







Table 9.  
 
Factor Loading for SPS Employees Responses on the IPI Form 
Power Base Indexes Factor I Factor II 
Coefficient Alphas for Primary 
Factor 
    
Soft Bases    
    
Expert Power 0.80 0.05 0.91 
Informational Power 0.78 0.04 0.91 
Referent Power 0.67 0.27 0.82 
Legitimacy of 
Dependence 
0.59 0.07 0.71 
Personal Reward 0.43 0.65 0.82 
    
Harsh Bases     
   
Reward Impersonal 0.22 0.79 0.84 
Personal Coercion 0.07 0.72 0.74 
Legitimacy of 
Reciprocity 
0.18 0.61 0.65 
Legitimacy of Position 0.2 0.54 0.79 
Coercive Impersonal 0.25 0.48 0.74 

























Political Appointees Ranking of Social Power Bases  
Bases of Social Power N M   SD 
Information Power 56 
5.18   
1.13 
Legitimacy of Position 56 
5.09   
1.04 
Legitimacy of Dependence 56 
5.07   
0.96 
Referent Power 56 
4.83   
1.02 
Expert Power 56 
4.58   
1.42 
Personal Reward 56 
4.30   
1.20 
Impersonal Coercive 56 
4.27   
1.69 
Legitimacy of Reciprocity 56 
4.04   
1.09 
Personal Coercion 56 
3.90   
1.23 
Impersonal Reward 
56 3.54   
1.46 
Legitimacy of Equity 56 
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Table 11.  
 
Regression Coefficients for Reward Impersonal  
Model 1 
    
t p B 
SE 

































































































Regression Coefficients for Coercive Impersonal Power 
     
Model  
  
t p B 
SE 














































































































Table 13.  
 
Regression Coefficients for Expert Power 
Model 
   
t p B SE B β  
(Constant) 5.197 .485 
 
10.705 .000 
Age -.118 .031 -.214 -3.776 .000 
Education .056 .081 .039 .693 .489 
Political Predisposition .015 .048 .017 .319 .750 
Social Services Education -.046 .340 -.015 -.136 .892 
Administrative .122 .357 .032 .341 .733 
Other -.619 .367 -.160 -1.689 .092 
Race African American -.231 .218 -.060 -1.061 .290 
Race Other Minority .339 .209 .094 1.621 .106 
Gender Female  .005 .165 .002 .032 .974 
Political Appointees .241 .229 .060 14.051 .294 
 
Table 14  
 
Regression Coefficients for Referent Power 
Model 1 
  
t p B SE B β  
(Constant) 5.756 .452 
 
12.729 .000 
Age -.095 .029 -.186 -3.294 .001 
Education .003 .075 .002 .038 .970 
Political Predisposition -.064 .045 -.077 -1.426 .155 
Social Services Education -.323 .317 -.113 -1.019 .309 
Administrative -.486 .333 -.136 -1.460 .145 
Other -.312 .341 -.086 -.914 .362 
Race African American -.456 .203 -.126 -2.246 .025 
Race Other Minority -.678 .195 -.200 -3.483 .001 
Gender Female -.090 .153 -.032 -.585 .559 






Regression Coefficients for Informational Power 
Model 
1 
    
t p B SE B β  
(Constant) 6.017 .456 
 
13.20 .000 
Age -.128 .029 -.244 -4.391 .000 
Education .109 .076 .080 1.432 .153 
Political 
Predisposition 
-.019 .045 -.022 -.407 .684 
Social Services 
Education 
-.222 .319 -.076 -.696 .487 
Administrative -.192 .336 -.052 -.571 .569 
Other -.195 .344 -.053 -.567 .571 
Race - African 
American 
-.635 .205 -.172 -3.103 .002 
Race - Other 
Minority 
.231 .196 .067 1.176 .241 
Gender Female  -.314 .155 -.108 -2.033 .043 
Political 
Appointees 
.310 .215 .081 1.442 .150 
 
Table 16. 
Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy Position 
Power  
Model 1 
    
t p B 
SE 
B β  
(Constant) 4.079 .424 
 
9.629 .000 
Age .022 .027 .047 .805 .421 
Education .095 .070 .078 1.355 .177 
Political Predisposition .094 .042 .123 2.217 .027 
Social Services Education -.055 .296 -.021 -.184 .854 
Administrative -.234 .312 -.072 -.751 .453 
Other -.137 .320 -.041 -.428 .669 
Race African American .148 .190 .045 .780 .436 
Race Other Minority .241 .182 .078 1.324 .186 
Gender Female -.284 .144 -.110 -1.979 .049 






 Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Reciprocity 
Model 1 
    
t p B SE B β  
(Constant) 4.095 .426 
 
9.619 .000 
Age -.059 .027 -.124 -2.148 .032 
Education .016 .071 .013 .225 .822 
Political Predisposition .110 .042 .144 2.593 .010 
Social Services Education -.358 .298 -.137 -1.203 .230 
Administrative -.541 .313 -.165 -1.726 .085 
Other -.076 .321 -.023 -.237 .813 
Race African American -.142 .191 -.043 -.744 .457 
Race Other Minority .129 .183 .041 .702 .483 
Gender Female .041 .144 .016 .285 .775 




 Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Dependence 
Model 1 
    
t 
p 
B SE B β  
(Constant) 6.027 .371 
 
16.223 .000 
Age -.126 .024 -.294 -5.272 .000 
Education -.024 .062 -.022 -.388 .698 
Political Predisposition .038 .037 .055 1.035 .301 
Social Services Education -.339 .260 -.143 -1.303 .193 
Administrative -.367 .274 -.123 -1.342 .181 
Other -.318 .280 -.106 -1.135 .257 
Race African American -.383 .167 -.127 -2.293 .022 
Race Other Minority .234 .160 .083 1.464 .144 
Gender Female -.067 .126 -.029 -.536 .592 






Regression Coefficients for Legitimacy of Equity 
Model 1 
    
t p B 
SE 
B β  
(Constant) 3.873 .479 
 
8.094 .000 
Age -.066 .031 -.123 -2.158 .032 
Education -.067 .080 -.048 -.842 .400 
Political Predisposition .003 .048 .004 .072 .942 
Social Services Education -.870 .335 -.291 -2.597 .010 
Administrative -.975 .352 -.260 -2.768 .006 
Other -.875 .361 -.230 -2.421 .016 
Race African American .302 .215 .079 1.403 .162 
Race Other Minority .631 .206 .177 3.067 .002 
Gender Female .325 .162 .109 2.005 .046 
Political Appointees .402 .226 .102 1.780 .076 
 
Table 20.  
 
Regression Coefficients for Personal Reward 
Model 1 
    
t p B 
SE 
B β  
(Constant) 4.775 .459 
 
10.404 .000 
Age -.100 .029 -.196 -3.407 .001 
Education .092 .076 .070 1.210 .227 
Political Predisposition .074 .046 .089 1.609 .109 
Social Services Education -.280 .321 -.099 -.873 .383 
Administrative -.623 .338 -.175 -1.843 .066 
Other -.133 .347 -.037 -.383 .702 
Race African American -.427 .206 -.119 -2.071 .039 
Race Other Minority -.254 .197 -.075 -1.285 .200 
Gender Female -.102 .156 -.036 -.656 .512 




Table 21.  
 
Regression Coefficients for personal Coercion Power 
Model 1 
    
t p B SE B β  
(Constant) 4.063 .488 
 
8.330 .000 
Age .000 .031 .000 .008 .993 
Education .073 .081 .052 .896 .371 
Political Predisposition .006 .049 .007 .123 .902 
Social Services Education -.438 .341 -.146 -1.284 .200 
Administrative -.344 .359 -.091 -.957 .339 
Other -.128 .368 -.034 -.349 .727 
Race African American -.797 .219 -.209 -3.636 .000 
Race Other Minority -.220 .210 -.062 -1.050 .295 
Gender Female -.083 .165 -.028 -.503 .615 
Political Appointees .076 .230 .019 .330 .742 
 
Table 22.  
Civil Service Employees Ranking of Social Power Bases Usage; Means and Standard 
Deviations for the Likelihood of the Use of Social Power Bases 
Power Base N M         SD 
Information Power 296 5.06 1.48 
Legitimacy of Dependence 296 5.01 1.20 
Legitimacy of Position 296 4.72 1.32 
Expert Power 296 4.48 1.50 
Impersonal Coercive 296 4.35 1.56 
Referent Power 296 4.30 1.45 
Personal Reward 296 4.23 1.42 
Legitimacy of Reciprocity 296 3.95 1.31 
Personal Coercion 296 3.71 1.52 
Impersonal Reward 296 3.62 1.78 






Table 23.  
Means and Standard Deviations for the Likelihood of Harsh and Soft Power Tactics 
  Harsh Power Tactics Soft Power Tactics 
Career Service 
Mean 3.31 4.65 
N 296.00 296.00 
Std. Deviation 0.74 1.09 
Political Appointees 
Mean 3.54 4.79 
N 56.00 56.00 
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Figure 22: P-Plot of regression standardized residual personal coercion power. 
 
 
